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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to explore the links that exist between the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Communities (EC) and the EC budget. In
particular. the thesis examines the impact on the budget of reforming the CAP. It shows
that the nature of support offered under the CAP up to the 1992 MacSharry reforms has
a strong historical precedent in French and German history. It then goes on to examine
in greater detail the support mechanisms of the cereals and oilseeds sectors. The cereals
sector is focused on because of its importance in agricultural output and in total
agricultural support expenditure by the EC. Oil seeds is considered for its policy
linkages with cereals in both production and consumption. The detailed nature of
expenditures on these sectors is examined in detail. with particular emphasis placed on
costs and policy problems arising out of intervention storage.
In forecasting future expenditures under different policy scenarios, cereals
production and consumption are considered separately. Imports. exports and
intervention behaviour are also considered, to permit the examination of all aspects of
the cereals market that affect expenditure. The impact of the 1992 MacSharry reforms is
compared to a strict continuation of the 1988 stabiliser reforms and a price freeze at
1992 levels for the forecast period to 1999. It is shown that the impact of the 1992
reforms is to reduce the extent of the market imbalances by 1999 as compared with the
base scenarios, but unless the level of compensatory payment is cut, then by 1999, the
EC faces a support bill that is higher under the new policy than would have been the
case had the 1988 reforms been retained.
CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION
'I do not k_tIOW if it wi£[get better wfu.n tliings clio.nge, but one thing is certain/ if it is
to get better} things wi£[ haoe to cliange. '
(jeorg Cliristopli Liditenberg, 1742·1799.
(Q1wted in 'EC Commission 1988b)
The European Economic Community (EEC), formed in 1958, agreed at the outset
that a common policy of agricultural support should be an integral pan of the new
economic order. This would be established to replace the policies operated by the
individual countries before that time. The aims of the new Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) were set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome. The principal policy instrument
to be used to achieve these aims, decided subsequently, was that an internal
Community price should be maintained above the level that would exist without
government intervention. This was to be sustained by levies placed on imports, set at
such a level that the high price the EC wished to maintain would not be undercut by
cheaper imports. Moreover, if domestic over-supply were to threaten to drive down that
high price, supplies would be purchased by government intervention stores,
guaranteeing at least a minimum price for farmers. Thus farmers would primarily
receive support from consumers, in that they would be buying food at prices that were
higher than would otherwise be the case. If further action were needed to maintain that
price the cost, net of import levy revenue gains, would be borne by taxpayers via the
EC budget. If, for example, excess supplies were to build up over any length of time in
the EC, they would be sold out of store rather than be kept indefinitely. Generally,
these commodities would have to be exported to third countries, and to ensure their
competitiveness on third country markets restitution payments would have to be made
to exporters. The cost of these too would be borne by taxpayers.
Even in the early years of the CAP, the EEC Commission expressed concern that
such a system could lead in the long term to excessive production resulting in rising
expenditures by the EEC to support the policy. At the time however, the EEC was a net
importer of most agricultural commodities, including temperate foodstuffs. As the EC
imported such large quantities of foodstuffs, the EC budget benefited greatly from the
revenues derived from the import levies. In addition, only relatively small quantities
were exported or stored, and so the financial burden of operating the policies for the
budget (and hence for member state taxpayers) was very small. The high market prices
however tended to encourage production to rise over time. By artificially increasing the
returns to agriculture relative to other economic activities, more resources were retained
in agriculture than would otherwise have been the case. In this way, yields were
increased at a greater rate than would have occurred under freer economic conditions.
Thus by the late 1970's and early 1980's, the EC had become self-sufficient in most
temperate agricultural commodities. By the late 1980's, the EC had become the second
largest food exporter in the world, behind the USA.
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As the EC increasingly became self-sufficient in a growing number of commodities,
it had to budget rising amounts for measures designed to sustain the high internal price.
Increasing quantities had to be exported from the EC to relieve pressure on the internal
market. The budget still benefited from import levies, but increasingly these sums were
being outweighed by export restitution payments. Moreover, more restricted export
opportunities meant that farmers were more frequently resorting to intervention as a
means of disposing of their production at a guaranteed price. This option gave rise to
greater storage costs, in addition to the export refunds required later when the stocks
were finally sold from store (actually termed 'other public storage costs' in the EC
budget).
This led to growing problems within the EC for a number of reasons. It is a feature
of the EC budget that there is no facility for deficit financing. Coupled to this is the limit
placed on own resources - sources of income coming into the EC budget each year.
Thus the EC can, strictly speaking, spend no more in anyone year than it has coming
in as revenue. A further feature of the budget is that some expenditure is classified as
Compulsory, and some as Non-Compulsory. The former arise from commitments
made explicitly in the Treaty of Rome. As the name suggests, these expenditures must
be met as a priority for the budget. The main example of compulsory expenditure is the
cost of supporting the agricultural policy regimes established under the CAP. Another
feature of the budget is that there is a ceiling on the total amount of own resources that
can be raised overall, although by introducing a GNP-based own resource, the reforms
of 1988 raised that ceiling sufficiently for current expenditure levels still to be well
below it
For these reasons, increased agricultural production posed a serious problem for the
EC budget. By the second quarter of the 1980's, expenditures had risen to such a level
that they were taking about 70% of all EC own resources, leaving only very limited
funds for other policies. By 1984, the situation was reached where total expenditures
incurred by the EC exceeded the total value of own resources for that year. In 1984,
and again in 1985, the member states had to make additional payments to the EC just to
allow it to operate and fund all of its commitments. Reforms were therefore needed,
both to the way in which agriculture was supported, and also to the way in which the
budget operated. By restricting the growth in agricultural production, it was believed,
the growth in agricultural expenditure could also be contained, thus releasing more
funds for other EC activities. Moreover, if additional own resources were to be made
available for these other policies, with a larger Community and more policies being
instigated in new areas of activity for the Community, controls would have to be
imposed on agricultural support expenditure in order to ensure the additional revenues
didn't simply get swallowed up by the CAP.
Up to 1988, the CAP's support policies generally hadn't really been reformed -
merely tinkered with at the edges, with the basic feature of largely open-ended support
left unchanged. Policies like coresponsibility, and the backdoor price cuts discussed in
detail in the following chapters, also had no major impact on the fundamentals of the
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policy. Production had continued to grow unabated, as had expenditures. In 1988
therefore, reforms to both the agricultural support policies (stabilisers) and the budget
generally were passed. The new system aimed at restricting budgetary expenditures
was called budgetary discipline. Together, these two tools were supposed to achieve
the joint aims of controlling the growth in agricultural production and budgetary
expenditure, by linking lower support prices to increased production. By keeping the
rate of growth of agricultural spending below the rate of growth of total EC spending
(by maintaining the 'agricultural guideline'), progressively less and less of the total
budget would be taken by agriculture, leaving more for new policies. Initially, the
growth of the agricultural budget slowed, but this was principally because of a drought
in the US (leading to higher world prices and lower export restitutions) rather than the
policy reforms. Within two to three years however, both budget costs and agricultural
production were continuing to rise, seemingly unabated.
In 1992 therefore, further changes to the policies were made, to be operative from
the 1993/4 crop year. For the first time, a reform package was agreed that broke away
from the old support system of high market prices. The new system is to be based on
fanners getting much of their income from direct government payments. This means
that consumers will pay less for the commodities produced by farmers, with the burden
of support shifting still further onto taxpayers, via their contributions to the EC budget.
It should be noted that initially, the direct payments are expected to increase the budget
cost of agricultural support. Savings however are expected to arise in the medium to
long term if, as the EC hopes, production is restrained and unit export refunds are
lowered.
By reducing the amount fanners receive from the market, it is hoped that they will
reduce output. Implicitly it is assumed that the direct payments to be made from the EC
budget to farmers won't encourage production. A key feature of the new system is
cross-compliance, whereby for most farmers, the compensatory payments are
conditional on land being set aside. By taking large areas of land out of the production
of certain key surplus crops, it is hoped that the growth in production, and hence
expenditures, can be slowed. With the onset of the single market, and the establishment
of more and more common policies, such measures are needed if the EC budget is to
have sufficient funds to allow these other policies to grow and develop. For this
reason, the growth of agricultural expenditures is seen as unsustainable. Thus it is
timely to consider the impact the reforms of the CAP will have on the EC budget. That
is the aim of this thesis.
A textbook analysis of the way in which restitutions are funded, import levies are
applied, intervention is operated, and expenditure is incurred, all indicate a policy
whose modus operandi is very straightforward. In reality however, this is not the
case. This thesis focuses in particular on the details of how expenditures arise in
practice. It discusses in detail how the intervention system operates. In terms of both
the Ee's agricultural budget and the EC's cereals market, upon which this thesis
focuses in particular, this is a very important element. From this, it is shown how the
move by the EC from net importer to net exporter has resulted in the financial
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difficulties experienced by the EC over the last decade.
Chapter 2 gives the background to the policy regimes that led to such high levels of
expenditure. It examines them in their historical context, to see why such policies were
adopted by the EEC. It charts the growth in both production and expenditures, as well
as outlining some of the early attempts at reforming the CAP. By its very nature, this
chapter is largely descriptive.
Chapter 3 leads on from Chapter 2 to examine the two main reform packages of the
CAP, the stabilisers of 1988, and the so-called 'MacSharry' reforms of 1992. It
discusses the changes in the main tools of support, as well as the changes in the rules
of operation of the EC budget. Two appendices then analyse two particular aspects of
CAP operations. Appendix 1 carries out an analysis of rising budgetary expenditures in
the face of a budgetary ceiling. It then derives an expression to show how long it will
be before the budget is exhausted. Appendix 2 focuses on the operation of stock
depreciation, and considers the impact of changes in this system to the EC budget. It
also shows what the EC Commission expects the future world price of cereals to be.
Chapter 4 goes on to take two commodity sectors in particular, and examine their
operation in more detail. The two sectors - cereals and oil seeds, have been chosen
because of their significance in the total expenditure on the CAP, and also because of
the important way in which the two sectors are inter-linked, both in production and in
consumption. It details the methods of support used under the two regimes both prior
to the 1992 reforms and also after. It then goes on to take expenditure figures for the
regimes for years in the mid 1980's, and tries to replicate them. This has been done in
order to assess the way in which such expenditure is incurred, and also to see which
variables are important in determining expenditures. This highlights the key variables to
be concentrated upon in subsequent chapters. It also examines the joint questions of
fraud and financial mismanagement, in order to see if they pose any serious threat to the
attempts to impose budgetary discipline on the two sectors.
Chapter 5 moves on from Chapter 4 to analyse the cereals market in a more
rigorous manner. It outlines the key variables in the cereals balance sheet, and
considers their trends over time. It details storage activity, and analyses intervention
stock movements in detail, as well as considering how private stocks relate to the other
factors in the market. It then extends this analysis to see how variations in cereals
production affect the other variables. Under different scenarios and constraints, it
considers the extent to which net trade, net intervention, and consumption vary to
absorb variations in production.
Chapter 6 introduces the theoretical concept of stationarity in time series data, which
underpins much of the analysis in this and subsequent chapters. It then carries out
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detailed modelling of cereals production through the key components of area and yield.
This is repeated for cereals consumption in Chapter 7. Consumption, or 'total
internal use', consists of five distinct categories, each of which is considered in tum.
The bulk of this chapter focuses on the use of cereals in animal feed, as this is the
single main use for cereals in the EC. It also returns to the question of the links between
the cereals and oilseeds sector, and how the nature of the two regimes affects the
amount of cereals going into animal feed.
Chapter 8 then draws on the earlier work, principally from Chapters 6 and 7, to
make forecasts of future budget expenditures in the cereals sector. It takes as
comparisons to MacSharry a strict continuation of the stabiliser mechanisms, and an
alternative where prices are held constant over the forecast period. Under different
policy scenarios, different expenditure scenarios are arrived at. The implications of this
and the earlier chapters are then drawn together in Chapter 9.
1.5
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
!HontJUI'?'aft.weh with wliat goods you haoe
aruf with the first-fruits of a£[ your returns;
tlien your barns wi([ be fi£ka with wlieat,
yOUI'vats overflowi1l!J witli new wine.
(Proverbs 3:9·10, Jerusalem 13ibfe)
2.1: THE PERIOD PRE-EEC
2.1.1; Introduction
"Agricultural policy, in its broadest sense, refers to the actions of government in the
sphere of agriculture. In that sense, agricultural policy has a very long history going
back at least to the ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Romans." I Here, therefore, just
two centuries of European agricultural history will be briefly considered, in order to
show how the policies of certain European countries developed prior to the formation
of the European Economic Community (EEC), contrasting this with the development of
policies in the countries who joined the Community subsequently.2The purpose of
this is to see how the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was, at least in part, shaped
by historical and political factors. Importantly, the financial transfers resulting from
these policies are considered in relation to three groups - consumers, taxpayers, and
producers - in order to identify past patterns of income transfer. This is important if an
understanding is to be gained of why the CAP leads to the transfers it does.
Consideration has been limited to two founder-members of the EEC, France and
Germany, and two who joined subsequently, Denmark and the UK. This approach is
not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to be illustrative of the socio-political factors at
work in the EEC.
In general, certain broad groups of policies can be distinguished. Firstly, there are
those policies which, like the CAP itself before the 1992 reforms, aim to support
farmers by ensuring they receive a 'high' price for their goods from the market. Since
these policies ensure consumers have to pay prices higher than those prevailing for that
particular commodity on the 'world' market, this type of policy is seen as transferring
income from consumers to producers+ In addition, if the government applies tariffs
1 Howarth. R. W. (1985). P6.
2 For a more detailed account. see Tracy, M. (1989), on which much of the early part of this brief
summary is based.
3 Income will naturally be transferred from consumers to producers when the former buy the product
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to imports, say as a means of protecting that high internal price, this acts as a transfer to
taxpayers to the extent that it can be assumed the government has some notion of
'target' revenue. Thus any external addition to revenues like tariffs lessens the amount
of revenues which must be obtained from taxpayers.
On the other hand, the government could implement a policy whereby consumers
only have to pay the world price for commodities. and support is given to farmers by
means of direct payments from the government. Such was the general policy operated
by the UK until EC accession in 1973. Here, the general pattern of transfers is from
taxpayers (as the funders of government operations), to producers. There are many
more transfers which can be effected, but these are the principal ones. As will be seen,
the distinction which can be made between them. namely that one generally transfers
income from consumers to producers, whilst the other transfers income from taxpayers
to producers, is very important when considering the agricultural policies operated in
Western Europe. This is at least partly because of the fact that when transfers are made
from consumers, they will tend to be more regressive, in that poorer consumers will
tend to spend a higher proportion of their total income on food than richer consumers,
thus bearing a disproportionately high share of total transfers. With transfers from
taxpayers however, these will tend to be more closely related to ability to pay, as
income tax regimes will generally have proportionality built in. This may however be
offset somewhat in some countries if food isn't exempted from VAT, this not being a
progressive tax.
2.1.2: The First Three-Ouarters of the 19th Century: A Period of Free-Trade
By the middle of the 19th century, most of the larger countries of Western Europe
had increased the degree of owner-occupation in agriculture. The main difference
between countries concerned the structures of farms. generated by different social
histories and inheritance laws. Moreover. in England. the Industrial Revolution was
having a uniquely powerful impact on agriculture, and the political environment within
which agriculture had to operare.f Specifically it represented a shift in political
influence away from farmers. but to the urban industrialists rather than the urban
consumers generally. The employers wanted cheap food in order to aid them in their
desire to keep wage costs low.
In England, the Corn Laws had been in existence since the Middle Ages, and acted
of the lauer. What is of concern here is the extent to which this transfer is increased by the raising of
the price faced by consumers above Tree trade' levels.
4 For more details on this early period, sec Abel, W. (19XO), and Tracy, M. (1989).
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to regulate trade, initially just exports, but subsequently imports as well. The switch
from net exporter to net importer meant that they were now acting as a protective
device. Under the 1822 Corn Law, a sliding tariff was introduced'i. The urban
working class faced high food prices, especially for breads, and in 1838 the Anti-
Corn Law League was formed to campaign against a policy which hit the poor urban
consumers the hardest. The relaxation in import controls, and good domestic harvests
temporarily eased the political pressure for the abolition of the Corn Laws, but with the
1845 Irish potato famine, the pressures returned. In 1846, Parliament abolished the
Laws with effect from 1849. Politically, this reflected a significant shift in influence
from rural producers to urban consumers or rather, the employers of the urban
consumers. This, combined with a whole series of economy-wide duty and tariff-
reducing measures, made Britain the centre of a growing Free-Trade movement. A
series of good harvests, and fewer imports from America during the American Civil
War, helped British agriculture survive the removal of protection from the abolition of
the Corn Laws. After a few years of lower prices, the apparent success of that move led
to Britain encouraging her Continental neighbours to do the same. The main catalyst for
the success of this mission was the signing in 1860 of the Anglo-French Treaty of
Commerce from which arose, directly or indirectly, a whole series of agreements
freeing up agricultural trade throughout most of Europe. The motivation for France was
partly political, with Emperor Napoleon III wishing to end France's political isolation.
In Germany too, political considerations played their part, as they wanted France's
support for Prussia against Austria and Denmark; though as a net agricultural exporter,
the agricultural sector saw no need for protection, and opposed it for manufactures lest
their input costs be increased.
This 'free trade interlude' was however soon brought to an end by technological
developments in transportation, permitting wheat to be exported to Europe at
competitive prices from the USA and to a lesser extent Russia.
2.1.3: The Late 19th Century - A Time of Increasing Protectionism"
Before the 1870's, price rises followed bad harvests, but the poor harvests of the
late 1870's coincided with four excellent harvests in America. This, coupled to the
much lower transport costs, resulted in large increases in imports from the US,
depressing prices. The decline in prices in Europe continued almost through to the end
5 see Abel, W. (1980), pp227-8.
6 see Appendix 2 for wheat prices in the 1820's.
7 see the data in Appendix 2.
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of the century; initially this was confined to grains, but the development of refrigerated
container ships meant European livestock producers faced falling prices too, through
increased competition from the USA, Canada, and Australia, with falling grain prices
only partially offsetting this.
In France, the 'edifice' of free trade, to use Tracy's term, started rocking in 1870
when France was defeated in the Franco-Prussian war. This put the country heavily in
debt, and increased nationalist sentiments, causing successive governments to gradually
increase import duties and also the burden facing consumers. The early campaigners for
protection were from industry, principally iron and textiles, but the disastrous harvest
of 1879 brought agriculture into the protectionists' fold. Given the technologically
undeveloped state of French agriculture, French farmers were quite unable to compete
with the cheap imports from the US and elsewhere, especially as the majority of
farmers were poor owner-occupiers. In 1892, the 'Meline Tariff imposed or raised
duties on agricultural goods in the region of 10% - 25%. The main exception was with
agricultural raw materials, such as wool and cotton. Moreover, given the relative price
changes following the growth of cheap imports of grain, there was a switch towards
livestock production.
The period 1850-70 was a good one for German agriculture, which was doing well
as a net exporter of grains. Industrialists tried to retain duties on iron, but their failure
through the opposition of farmers caused them to concentrate efforts into getting the
farming community to support the protectionist cause. The increased competition from
America during the 1870's worked in their favour, with US grains displacing German
grains on the British and French markets. In addition, population growth turned
Germany into a net importer of some grains. A tariff was introduced on grains in 1879
at a relatively low level, which was raised steadily throughout the 1880's. By 1890,
bad harvests had raised prices somewhat, and significant election gains by left-wing
parties concerned about the effect of duties on the cost of living saw these duties
reduced. The new century however saw a political climate more favourably inclined
towards agricultural protection, though the government didn't increase duties by as
much as the Farmers' League wanted. In the livestock sector, the favoured method of
protecting domestic production was to have very tight regulations on imported meat and
meat products.
Denmark had traditionally been a net exporter of grains. The events of the 1870's
however had been foreseen by some, and there was a widespread adaptation from the
traditional crops like wheat to livestock, feed grains and root crops. This transformation
was crucially aided by widespread co-operation, providing the necessary processing
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and marketing channels. The lower prices didn't pass Denmark completely by, but by
the turn of the century Denmark had an agriculture which was efficient and well-
organised right down the marketing chain. Exports of livestock products found a ready
market in the UK, having been squeezed out of the German market by the latter's
highly protective 'hygiene regulations'.
For British agriculture, the period after the repeal of the Corn Laws was very much
the 'Golden Age'. The late 1870's however saw a general economic depression,
coupled to poor harvests (especially 1879), the impact of US exports, as well as a
series of foot-and-mouth, sheep liver-rot, and rinderpest epidemics. Many farmers
went out of business, but some relief came for tenant farmers with many landlords
reducing or suspending rents. Thus here, farmers' costs were lowered, rather than their
revenues raised by transfers. The transfer of income was implicitly from landowners to
producers. Harvests recovered slightly during the 1880's, but through the early
1890's, a series of poor harvests coincided with prices at their lowest levels ever as
imports flooded the market (although these problems were less for livestock producers
than arable farmers). From the late 1890's on however, prices slowly rose and
gradually British farming recovered. Unlike most of Continental Europe, the
depression passed with still virtually no protection. This strongly reflected the different
political balance in Britain, with the 'cheap bread' war-cry still as important as it had
been in the 1840's. Furthermore, the food-security argument for increasing food
production (which has frequently been taken as being synonymous with becoming self-
sufficient in food) failed to take hold in Britain, since she was one of the great sea-
faring nations, with an Empire which supplied her with as much cheap food as she
needed. The lack of pressure from agriculture to get protective barriers erected was due
to a number of factors: As noted above, the swing in political power meant many
farmers recognised that they would be unsuccessful had they tried to campaign for
protection, besides which the widespread existence of the landlord-tenant system meant
the burden of depression was partly shared with landlords, who generally had
alternative sources of income in addition to rents from their land.
2.1.4: The Great War And Subsequent Recession
The events of the inter-war period were heavily influenced by both the economic
situation following the First World War and the general economic depression from
1929. The First World War saw farmers temporarily benefit from high prices. In
France, duties were removed during the war, and only slowly re-introduced, partly
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because of the government's concern with the rising cost of living. Through the
1920's, farming faced a cost-price squeeze, and more labour moved from the rural
areas to the towns. The late 1920's saw world grain supplies rise and prices fall.
France's response was to raise tariffs, initially simply to prevent a collapse of the
market'i. A looming election and a world price which continued to fall however meant
that tariffs alone couldn't be used to help protect domestic agriculture. Over the next
few years import quotas were introduced in a number of markets, with a milling ratio
imposed for wheat.9 These policies worked well until higher domestic production
started depressing the home market. Intervention buying was initiated, but domestic
political instability resulted in French agriculture entering 1939 highly regulated but
without settled policies.
German agriculture suffered badly during the First World War. Blockades worked
well for the enemy, accentuating the problems caused by lack of preparation due inter
alia to the expectation that the conflict would soon be over, and thus a lack of stocks,
and too much food being sent to the front. Production fell sharply and rationing was
imposed. The early 1920's saw a sharp rise in grain prices but by 1925, farm prices
were rising slower than the prices of purchased inputs. Tariffs on food imports,
suspended at the beginning of the war, were reimposed in 1925. Although prices rose a
little, agriculture was in no way made prosperous. In 1929 a wheat milling-ratio was
adopted, encouraged by falling prices, and import duties were raised, increasing the
transfers from consumers., to both taxpayers and producers. This encouraged a rising
level of self-sufficiency, helping to insulate Germany from declining world prices in
some markets. In others, especially livestock products, falling prices and the
consequent fall in incomes proved too much for many farmers. The weakened rural
economy helped the Nazi Party gain support in these areas as well as in the urban areas.
The National Socialists were very pro-protection for German agriculture, not just
because their nationalistic thinking made self-sufficiency a very important target, but
also because of the Germanic tradition linking values to the soil10. Agriculture did
recover, but this occurred elsewhere too, so it's hard to isolate the impact of the Nazi's
autarchic policies alone. Imports were cut, and incomes recovered to pre-crisis levels
8 Appendix 2 details the rising protection given by France and Germany to foodstuffs over this
period.
9 Quotas transfer income from consumers to producers by reducing supplies reaching the market,
thereby raising market prices. In as much as the government has administrative costs to cover, they
also represent a transfer from taxpayers to producers. If quotas are auctioned, taxpayers receive a
transfer. The right to produce granted by a quota may also generate rents for the producer.
10 Their slogan Blu: und Boden translates as "Blood and Soil".
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but no further, as price stabilisation was a key policy target. Lower imports cut total
supplies on the domestic market, raising prices, but there were elements of price control
to offset this. Overall, the protectionist philosophy of the National Socialists was in
general shared by other countries; what made Germany stand out was the incorporation
of measures into a coherent package.
Denmark, being neutral, came through the war relatively unscathed, both physically
and economically, since she managed to export to both Britain and Germany. Trade
kept up after the war, and the slump in grain prices around 1929 didn't have too
adverse an impact given the general predominance of livestock production. The health
of Danish agriculture helped sustain the whole economy through the early years of the
depression, but 1931 saw exports hampered by the increased protectionism in other
countries, especially Germany, and the tariffs Britain was starting to apply on imports
from non-Empire countries. The position weakened through 1931 and 1932, worsened
by having farmers who'd borrowed heavily during good years being caught under a
heavy debt burden. Import controls in an export-oriented sector would have been
ineffective, so the government tried to negotiate openings for exports, and with great
reluctance imposed some internal measures. The negotiations with Britain resulted in
limited concessions. Whilst exports to the UK recovered slightly, a degree of Empire
preference remained, and Denmark continued to lose out to New Zealand. Denmark
restricted grain imports further in 1938 because of a further price fall. Wheat and rye
imports were completely banned, and a milling-ratio was imposed. Lower imports led
to higher market prices. Danish farmers had traditionally been supporters of laissez-
faire principles, so these protectionist developments represented a major shift in their
position.
During the First World War, British farmers were guided to grow certain crops, but
without financial inducement or an overall plan for raising output. Although it was
suggested that price guarantees would be needed to increase wheat output, the 1915
harvest was good. Moreover, the American harvest was large, and the German U-boat
attacks on shipping seemed to be dwindling, so reducing fears about import supplies
being interrupted. Little extra effort was therefore made to increase ou tput: but 1916
saw much smaller harvests and more attacks on shipping. In late 1916 and early 1917
therefore. guaranteed prices for wheat, oats and potatoes were introduced, but as
market prices actually rose above the minimum level, these payments weren't actually
made (output rose by nearly a quarter by 1918). Rationing was introduced, price
controls enforced. and County Agricultural Committees were set up, with the power to
compulsorily plough grassland. and take over poorly run farms. By the end of the war
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most food, both domestic and imported, was under government control, and much
debate then followed as to whether or not prices guaranteed by deficiency payments
should continue. It was debated as to whether or not agriculture could survive without
support, but this appeared to be settled with the 1920 Agriculture Act, which extended
the support indefinitely, Within a year however the price of grainplummeted, sending
the cost of the guarantees shooting upwards, and in August 1921 payments ceased.
This return to free trade was then maintained through the twenties, with agriculture
tending to specialise in those products that received 'natural protection' from Britain's
island location, eg milk, eggs and fresh vegetables.
The depression from 1929 had a serious effect on British agriculture since its open-
market stance made it an easy target for dumping. Its problems were further worsened
by the general economic depression. The main government response was to raise
tariffs, but following negotiations in 1932, imports from the Empire were exempted,
thus although transfers were directed from consumers to producers, these were only
limited to purchasers of non-Empire produce. Even so, these measures didn't really
give British farmers any relief. Furthermore the government's policy of cheap food was
still very important, especially given the general state of economic depression the
country was in. The 1931 and 1933 Agricultural Marketing Acts introduced some
measures, but these were commodity-specific, and didn't represent an overall package
of help for agriculture. These Acts enabled the formation of Marketing Boards for milk,
potatoes, bacon-pigs and hops. For wheat, deficiency payments were introduced, again
transferring income from taxpayers to producers; for beef, import restrictions were
imposed, but as this alone wasn't enough, the government made a flat-rate payment to
producers.
2.1.5: The Second World War And Post-War Recovery
With the onset of World War Two, the main target in all countries became
maximum production, subject to such constraints as lack of labour, fertilisers and fuel.
By the end of the war, food was in very short supply throughout Continental Europe,
with only Britain not facing critically short supplies. In Britain, preparations were made
before fighting started, and memories of the the First World War resulted in the
Ministry of Agriculture concluding that farmers needed greater market security. It was
thus agreed in 1940 that prices would be fixed, and markets guaranteed, until the end of
the War. In 1944 it was further agreed that in February of each year the government
and the National Farmers Union would meet, and at this 'Annual Review' decide on the
level of guaranteed farm prices.
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Post-war, the aim of all governments was to restore output to peacetime levels. In
France, mechanisation was promoted to raise output and to release labour for industry.
By 1950, the expansion in output had caused some markets, eg wheat and sugar, to
move into surplus. By the late 1950's, the policy changed to a sector-by-sector
approach, but the problems continued with French agriculture readily adopting new
technologies. Given continued low agricultural incomes, price reductions would have
been politically totally unacceptable, so in 1957 prices were indexed to farm wages,
non-food retail prices and input costs. When de Gaulle's government abolished this the
following year however, the farmers responded with violent demonstrations, after
which indexation was partly restored. Here, unlike the UK, prices were guaranteed
'directly' by means of higher market prices. Limited import levies were also operated.
Denmark had been the only country to remove its wartime provisions after the end
of the hostilities, but export opportunities continued to deteriorate. The only major
export market left after the further raising of protective barriers post-war was Britain
but even here, with self-sufficiency in butter and eggs, rapidly rising pigmeat
production, and increased competition from newcomers onto the export scene like
France, Denmark's farm sector came under great financial pressure. They tried to
diversify exports, but a lack of success here resulted in the reintroduction of
intervention/protective measures such as the milling-ratio.
In many respects, Britain moved in a similar direction to France, with price
guarantees used to raise output resulting in domestic supplies exceeding domestic
demand in certain markets (principally eggs, pigmeat and barley), switching the policy
emphasis to 'selective expansion'. As with France, production of these products
proved hard to contain; and depressed markets resulted in large increases in support
costs to the government/taxpayer under the deficiency payments system, stilI employed
in preference to a system burdening consumers.
In post war Western Germany, there was a dire shortage of food, with the country
cut off from East Germany, the traditional source of much of its food. Domestic
production was providing dreadfully inadequate supplies of food. Although imports
were raised under the Marshall Plan, by the time the Federal Republic was established
in 1949, domestic food supplies were still very low. In 1950 and 1951 therefore,
Import and Storage boards were set up to cover the markets for most of the main
products. They had the power to intervene in the market in order to maintain (high)
prices that were compatible with the aims of agricultural policy, principally that of
guaranteeing returns to producers and expanding output. The 1955 Agricultural Act
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was very pro-agricultural protection. A key reason for this, and for its widespread
support, was the part the rural depression of the 1930's played in the rise to power of
Adolf Hitler. This Act continued to set domestic prices well above import prices, at
sufficiently high levels to cover most farms' costs, regardless of their efficiency.
Consumers bore the burden of this, but appeared to accept it as being politically
expedient, bearing in mind the events of the 1930's.
The overall pattern was one of growing protectionism, and production rising faster
than demand, reducing imports of temperate foodstuffs. The justification for sustaining
this support on a more permanent basis was questioned in most countries but
particularly in Britain, where the debate, at first anyway, was between those who felt
protection was needed to help the poor balance of payments situation and lack of
foreign exchange; and those who felt it was bad economics to produce something
domestically when it could be imported at a lower economic cost. An alternative was
noted in 1962 by Gavin McCrone, who saw that a laissez-faire policy wouldn't succeed
in removing inefficient producers because "they often stay until they have ruined the
other factors of production and until the job of repair and reclamation is too expensive
to be worth undertaking." 11 He favoured credit policy and consolidation of
uneconomic farms to improve agriculture's competitiveness and raise incomes.
The cost of support too was much criticised in England, with a perception that the
largest share of the expenditure went to the largest farmers who arguably needed
support least. In contrast with this, in France there was hardly any debate at all, with it
generally being accepted that support for agriculture was absolutely necessary. Further,
there was barely any recognition of a need for labour to move out of agriculture. In the
backward areas especially, the effect would more likely be adverse, with insufficient
initiative among those remaining to take advantage of this ourflow.l/ A longer-term
analysis in France led to the growing reali sation that given the potential for greater
output, a necessary consequence would be increased exports, with preferential access
to neighbouring European countries as the best way of achieving this.
With regard to the foregoing discussion, it bears re-emphasising that it is not
intended to be definitive in terms of policy-coverage, but just aims to look at a few of
the main policies implemented and their income-transfer implications. Of those referred
to, French and German policies were dominated by transfers from consumers to
11 McCrone. G. (1962), P45.
12 Latil. quoted in Tracy, M. (19X9), P231.
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producers; Denmark's similarly, once protectionist measures were introduced. Just the
UK's main policies were dominated by transfers from taxpayers to producers,
reflecting the political influence of the early industrialists, who wished to keep down
food costs to allow them to keep down the wages they paid to their employees. Here,
farmers had to accept other, oven forms of support.
This isn't to say, however, that these other countries didn't operate policies which
effected transfers from taxpayers to producers, just that the dominant transfers were
from consumers. In 1956, for example, an OEEC studyl3 reported, inter alia, that
Denmark, France and Germany were using government (ie taxpayer) funds for a wide
range of projects, such as land consolidation and research & development. Here
though, these are much more structural policies than 'direct' income-support policies.
2.1.6: The 1950's - Closer Policy Cooperation In Europe
As noted above, France saw for herself a strong interest in developing Europe as an
export market. In 1950 under the auspices of the Council of Europe, a Special
Committee was set up to look at how European countries could jointly organise their
agricultural markets. Two distinct lines emerged; one promoted by France, who for the
above reasons was at the forefront of the talks, put forward a plan (known as the
Charpentier Plan after the French delegate Rene Charpentier) calling for a supranational
'High Authority' to oversee a pan-European policy. The other line was promoted by the
British (the Eccles Plan) which called for the 'Authority' to be just an intergovernmental
forum with no more power than the ability to "suggest how [national policies for
agricultural production and trade] could be reconciled+". The Charpentier Plan was
finally adopted (only Britain and Denmark opposed this) but the French, being
impatient for a common policy, proposed a European Agricultural Community.
Negotiations then took place between 15 European countries to see how such a
supranational body could be formed. Ultimately this 'Green Pool' failed. It did
however show more clearly the positions of the different countries, and the problems
likely to be involved in reconciling these differences.
13 see OEEC, (1956).
14 Tracy, M. (1989), P246.
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2.2: THE FORMA nON AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EEC
2.2.1: Towards a European Economic Community and a Common Agricultural Policy
By 1955 and the Messina Conferencelf (the preparatory conference prior to the
25th March 1957 signing of the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community; more commonly called the 'Treaty of Rome'Jv) the participating
countries, France, West Germany, Italy, and the countries of the Benelux customs-
union (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), decided after much debate and
argument that "[t]he Common Market shall extend to agriculture and trade in
agricultural products"!". The committee set up after Messina to lay down guidelines
for the Treaty, under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak, reported that it was
"inconceivable that any common market should be established in Europe which did not
include agriculture." 18This view reflected the economic significance of agriculture in
Europe during the mid-50's, with total agricultural employment around 17.5m,
(representing over 30% of the working population in some countries), many farms
being less than 5ha; a share of total merchandise production over 10%, and up to 36%
(in Italy); and a contribution to GNP of up to 23% (again, Italy).19
In addition, there would have been the very real practical problems of
distinguishing between agricultural and industrial products should agriculture have been
excluded from the Common Market; and also the distortion to competition arising from
a differential treatment of goods. Moreover, it was very unlikely that the major
agricultural exporters such as France would open their markets to German industrial
exports without a corresponding increase in market access for their agricultural exports.
It can be seen therefore that despite the sort of problems that ended the 'Green Pool'
negotiations, there was a son of inevitability that agriculture would somehow have to
become part of the Common Market.
The way this was achieved was, under Art 38(2) of the Treaty, to make agriculture
subject to the rules of the Common Market, except where Articles 39 to 46 of the Treaty
provide for the contrary, with the agricultural Common Market being accompanied by
the "establishment of a common agricultural policy among the member states",20
15 where the British were present, but only as observers, by their own decision.
16 Note this title strictly also applies to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community - Euratom - signed in Rome on the same day by the same countries.
17 Treaty of Rome Art 38(1).
18 quoted in Neville-Rolfe, E. (1984), PI8S.
19 see European Communities, (1987), PIt.
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echoing Art. 3(d)'s call for "the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of
agriculture". Art 40(2) lays down the forms this may take, according to the products
involved: "[C]ommon rules concerning competition; compulsory co-ordination of the
various national market organisations; or a European market organisation." Whichever
form was chosen, it was to include whatever measures were deemed necessary to
fulfill the objectives of the common policy, as laid down in Art 39(1):
"a) to increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and
by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the
optimum utilisation of the factors of production, particularly labour;
b) to ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural population,
particularly by the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged
in agriculture;
c) to stabilise markets;
d) to guarantee regular supplies; and
e) to ensure reasonable prices in supplies to customers."
Given the potential conflicts between these aims, there inevitably had to be
compromises, based on the priorities set. These started to be debated in July 1958, after
the Treaty of Rome had come into effect (on 1st January 1958) when at Stresa, the
governments and farming organisations met. The starting-point for the talks was the
set-up of the national policies. and likely future requirements. To this was added the
objectives contained within the Treaty, but in practice very little needed to be changed,
so for example the structure of farming was to be adjusted, but still within the context
of the family farm unit. With the benefit of hindsight, it is very interesting to return to
see what the Commission wrote in its First General Report on the Activities of the
Community back in 1958:
"In the past, attempts to increase agricultural incomes have been based on
the too one-sided principle of increasing production. True, this has led to
a marked increase of productivity per worker, especially as there was a
simultaneous decrease in the number of persons occupied in agriculture.
However, the increase in production has led to new difficulties on the
markets. In view of the fact that production of the major products is
increasing more vigorously than consumption, surpluses are appearing
20 Art 38(4).
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on the various markets and their disposal is causing serious difficulties
and worries. "21
As Hans von der Groeben wrote: "Although the participants in the conference were
not unaware that many government schemes for increasing agricultural incomes had
tended to boost production to an excessive degree, neither the resulting threat to market
equilibrium and finance nor consumer interests were high on the agenda at the Stresa
Conference. "22
The final decision taken amended the original Commission proposal by giving the
Council the power to set prices, with the Commission's role reduced (from what they
wanted) to initiating the discussions by making the price proposals. Thus the
supranational input was restricted, with the major decision-making power in the hands
of the Councils of Ministers. Whereas the Ministers were elected, there were no similar
democratic controls over the Commission, and at that time there was no directly elected
European Parliament.
By the early 1960's, three principles for the future CAP had been established, not
expressed explicitly as such at the time, but underpinning all the negotiations. They
were that there should be a Single Market, allowing the free circulation of goods
between countries, implying common prices, competition rules and stable exchange
rates; Community Preference, meaning protection against lower priced imports; and
Financial Solidarity, meaning joint financing of the policy, and the implementation of a
common system of collecting revenues and disbursing funds. The first two derived
directly from the Treaty of Rome, whereas the third derived from Regulation 25 on the
financing ofthe CAP (see below).
It had also been decided that there would be a 12-year transition period leading to
the completion of the EEC Customs Union, to end no later than lst January 1970.
2.2.2: The Creation of the CAP and Its Method of Funding
At the start of 1961, the first concrete moves were made towards establishing the
Common External Tariff for industrial products. With agriculture however, by the end
of 1961 draft regulations had only just been submitted on cereals, poultrymeat & eggs,
pigmeat, wine, and fruit & vegetables. The principal difficulty came in trying to
reconcile the differing stances of Germany and France. Within Germany the industrial
lobby, looking to gain from liberalised trade, felt the proposals were too protectionist.
21 P70, quoted in Harris, S. et al (1983), P37.
22 Groeben, H von der. (1987), P73.
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The German farm lobby however saw the Commission's proposals as representing a
lower level of support than pre-EC. Moreover, the pivotal price - that for cereals
(central as an arable crop and as an input for livestock production) - was higher in
Germany than in France (the main producers) and the lower common price was seen by
the Germans as unrenable-I, The French however were united in their determination to
get the agricultural common market agreed, and would delay the progress towards a
common market in manufactures in order to achieve this.24
By December 1961, no decisions had been taken on the proposals for common
agricultural market organisations, even though the basic method of support, that of
'high' market prices, was in line with what these countries had operated in the past.
Given the French position, a decision had to be forthcoming. Apart from breaks for
Christmas and the New Year, the first "marathon" session of the Agricultural Ministers
lasted from 19th December 1961 to 14th January 1962. From 31st December 1961, for
the first time, the procedure of "stopping the clock" was undertaken so that, on paper at
least, the' negotiations finished in time for the second phase to start as scheduled.
Two main issues caused the talks to be so protracted: The first concerned safeguard
clauses, giving the Community and/or individual member states the right to block
imports should they be causing a 'serious disturbance' on the home market. The second
was concerned with the financing of the CAP during the transitional period. It had
already been decided (on 20th December 1960) that a levy system was to be used for
intra-Community trade, with the levy-revenues accruing to the importer, already the
dominant system among the member states. With imports from third countries, initially
the revenues were to go to the importer, but with an increasing proportion going into
the Community budget, with all revenues going there by the end of the preparatory
period (this being different to the transition period. It had no set time-limit, but would
end with the establishment of the common agricultural market and common prices).
The legislation following this marathon became Regulation 25, which enabled the
establishment of a 'fund' to handle agriculture's expenditures and revenues. This is the
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund - EAGGF - though it is more
commonly known by its French acronym FEOGA25.
The funding of FEOGA was to be based on the Community'S general budgetary
'key' laid down in Article 200 of the Treaty26. This decision, although only covering
23 Eventually, agreement was reached on l Sth December 1964 regarding common cereals prices, to be
operative from IstJuly 1967. See Appendix 2 for more details.
24 see eg Groeben, H von der. (1987), P102.
25 Fonds Europeen d'Orientation et de Garantie Agricole.
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three years27, is nonetheless a very significant achievement in that it represents the
convergence of six countries' methods of financing agricultural policy into a single set
of rules.
FEOGA, as the name implied, was to have two parts: the Guarantee Section which
was to fund export restitution payments and intervention measures (the costs of
buying-in and storing surplus products, and also production aids, processing aids etc.)
- all measures known as Compulsory Expenditure, ie that arising directly out of
obligations under the Treaty and associated legislation; and the Guidance Section,
which was to cover structural measures (eg support for co-operatives, farm
consolidation, infrastructure work etc) ie Non-Compulsory Expenditure, where no
direct obligation for the expenditure arises out of the Treaty. As will be Seen later, the
term 'Compulsory' has over the years been taken quite literally, with important
consequences for the evolution of the EEC's financial situation.
Regulation 25 also specified that, at the single market stage, the revenues raised
from levies on imports from third countries shall pass to the Community, to be used for
'Community' expenditure, along with other monies to be decided upon; with the
expenditure arising out of operations under the CAP being met from Community funds
"for at the single market stage price systems will be unified and agricultural policy will
be on a community basis. "28
Before moving on, it is worth pausing to consider the transfer implications of the
CAP mechanisms as agreed. The cornerstone of the income-support arrangements was
to be price-support, coming from consumers via commodities trading in the EC at a
price above global free-trade levels29. The internal EEC market price however had to
be protected from (a) cheaper imports undermining the higher-priced EEC produce, and
from (b) internal over-supply driving down market prices. The former was to be
achieved by a variable import levy eVIL) on imports, raising their price from world
market levels to the EEC level, thus transferring income from consumers to producers
and taxpayers. The latter was to be achieved by intervention buying and, if necessary,
exports, subsidised to make them competitive on the lower-priced world market. These
also transfer income from consumers to producers in as much as they help maintain the
higher market price. They also transfer income from taxpayers to producers by means
26 see Appendix Table 1 for details.
27 see below for more on the negotiations for the period from 1965 on.
28 see EEC Commission, (1962), P147.
29 for more details on this, especially with respect to the cereals sector, see Chapter 4.
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of the direct government expenditure incurred in their operation.
As was noted above, France and Germany did have a history of policies which
transferred income from taxpayers as well as consumers. In particular France as an
exporter had funded export subsidies. Thus, implementing policies under the CAP that
effected transfers from taxpayers to producers wasn't without historical precedent-",
but more significantly put into its time-setting, the CAP as originally formulated by the
EEC as a net importer for many products meant that, ceteris paribus, the above system
resulted in taxpayers being net gainers in certain markets: The costs of export
restitutions and intervention measures were kept down by the fact that the EEC was, at
the time, a net importer of many products. This obviated the need for the above
protective devices to be used in any permanent or extensive way. On the other hand,
impons meant taxpayers gained by the value of the VIL's collected and, for so long as
in any particular market the EEC remained a net importer. taxpayers would face an
overall net gain in that market 31
It must also be added that the above method of support wasn't to be used
universally. Some sectors were to be supported by direct payments similar to the UK's
deficiency payments, where total production and self-sufficiency levels were generally
low32.
It can therefore be seen that overall, although the principal form of support was to
be via the institutional setting of 'high' market prices, there was also to be an extensive
transfer of income from taxpayers to producers. Only this latter figure is shown in the
EEC Budget as FEOGA expenditure. This transfer was initially restrained by the EEC
being a net importer, but as will be seen below, subsequent over-supply in many
markets has more recently caused the magnitude of taxpayer transfers to producers to
nse.
2.2.3: The Empty-Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise
Before the single market stage, it had to be decided how the CAP and other
Community operations were to be financed from 1965. On 31st March 1965 therefore,
the Commission submitted to the Council a number of proposals concerning, inter alia,
the future financing and associated matters:
30 see section 2.1.6 above.
31 With the EC being a very large player on the world market, there will also be terms of trade effects
to consider. Most notably, as a net exporter of cereals. the EC's exports act to depress the world market
price. Thus as the volume of exports rises, so docs the unit refund cost As a net importer in the early
years of the EC however. the reverse situation would have prevailed.
32 see Chapter 4 for details of the system operated with respect to oilseeds.
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The target date for the establishment of the single market had already been set at 1st
July 1967, and for the period 1st July 1965 to 30th June 1967, it was proposed that the
transitional financing system already in operation should be continued. It was also
proposed that from the single marker stage, agricultural levies should form part of the
Community's independent revenue. With the completion of the Customs Union, it was
seen that there would be less and less coincidence between the country where third-
country imports entered the Community and the country of final consumption. This
notion has since been labelled the "Rotterdam Effect" since many imports enter the
Community at Rotterdam, but then pass on to other member states. The result therefore
is that there is much less justification for the 'country of first import' to retain the levy
revenues, whilst the high EEC prices are paid by the consumers in the 'country of final
consumption'. Consequently, "the proposals concerning the financing of the common
agricultural policy Ihave been linked I with the whole question of achieving a financial
and institutional balance as the integration of the Community progresses. "33 It was
however proposed that these revenues should only go in full ro the Community from
1972, and between 1967 and 1971 the Member States would pay over a (rising)
proportion thereof. A third, connected issue was also proposed, regarding giving the
European Parliament a greater role in the budgetary procedure.P'' The package was
discussed on 28th-30th June. France was alone in not wanting to take the package as a
whole, wishing instead to concentrate on rhe single issue of agricultural finance in the
remainder of the transitional period. At 2am on I st July, the meeting was closed with
no decisions made, so plunging the Community into the 'empty-chair' crisis, following
France's refusal to participate in Council and Permanent Representatives' meetings over
the following few months.
It wasn't until December 1965 that France agreed to resume talks. An extraordinary
session of the Council was held in Luxembourg on 17th-18th January 1966. Here, M
Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister. set out the issues of importance to
France. These were given as the 'style' of the Commission, for which a 'decalogue' of
desired changes was given (see Lambert. pp 221-3), and the issue of majority voting,
where France was adamant that on matters of 'vital national interest' no country should
be in a position where it could be outvoted. The other countries and the Parliament
however were equally adamant that the Treaty-based principle of majority voting should
not be lost. This meeting ended deadlocked. but resumed on January 28th. Prior to
this, the Permanent Representatives met and produced a 'heptalogue' of points
33 see EEC Commission, (1965), P335.
34 see below for more detail on the granting of greater powers to the European Parliament over time.
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concerning the Commission (ibid pp 224-5), which toned down the language of the
'decalogue' without really reducing the proposed role of the Commission. With
majority voting however, the sides remained diametrically opposed. In the end, they
had to settle for a 'gentlemans disagreement' known as the Luxembourg Compromise,
which wasn't so much a compromise as an agreement to disagree:
"I When issues very important to one or more member countries are at
stake, the members of the Council will try, within a reasonable time, to
reach solutions which can be adopted by all the members of the
Council, while respecting their mutual interests, and those of the
Community, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty.
2 The French delegation considers that, when very important issues are
at stake, discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is
reached.
3 The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what
should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.
4 However, they consider that this divergence does not prevent the
Community's work being resumed in accordance with the normal
procedure. "
What this did was to let the six get on again with developing the Community,
without stating what was to be done when that process hit the difficulties foreseen in
Point 3. It also showed up major differences between the member states regarding how
that development should progress.
One of the main areas of Community activity where the Compromise had an impact
straight away was the CAP, where the Council felt decisions should be made on the
basis of unanimity, at that time referring to establishing market regimes for sugar, and
oils & fats, the fixing of certain common prices, and the setting-up of a financial
regulation for agriculture.
The arrangements for financing the rest of the transitional period (extended to 1970
at France's insistence) were then agreed upon. For the remainder of the transitional
period, payments were to be made in accordance with the figures shown in Appendix
Table 1. On the expenditure side, it was decided that all expenditure on market support
arrangements (ie the Guarantee Section of FEOGA) would be borne by the Community
from 1st July 1967, but for structural expenditure (FEOGA's Guidance Section) the
Community would only bear part of the cost, with this expenditure subject to a ceiling
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each year.
1967 also saw the institutions of the three Communities - economic, atomic energy,
and coal & steel - merge to form the European Communities (EC).35
2.2.4: The Financial Arrangements for 1970 Onwards
Having decided how the transitional stage was to be funded, a definitive system of
financing had to be agreed. The Commission didn't make its proposal until 16th July
1969, three months after de Gaulle had resigned as French president, replaced by M
Georges Pompidou.
These proposals split the introduction of the full own-resources system into two:
PHASE 1: From lst January 1971, agricultural levies and common external tariff
revenues (known as the CCT or Common Customs Tariff in Euro-jargon) should
accrue to the Community.
PHASE 2: From 1st January 1974, all Community activities were to be financed
from own-resources. It was from this time that Parliament should be given wider
powers of control.
A meeting of Heads of State and Government was proposed for the end of 1969. In
a subsequent memorandum, the Commission proposed a movement towards the long-
term goal of economic and monetary union (EMU), and set the short-term targets as
deciding the procedures for financing agriculture, creating own-resources, and
increasing Parliament's budgetary powers. The summit took place in The Hague on
1st-2nd December 1969, and resulted in a statement saying that the member state
governments agreed with the above aims, and would work within the Council to
achieve them. Given that the conference was initially proposed by the French, who then
signed such a positive statement of intent, this "Spirit of The Hague" represented a
renewed political will amongst the six (as opposed to just the five, in the face of French
opposition) to further integration.
The Council then got to grips with the proposals on 19th-21 st December. On the
proposed system of financing, it put the start of Phase 2 back a year; and whilst
agricultural levies would accrue in full from 1st January 1971, CCT revenues were to
accrue on a rising scale, accruing in full from 1975. 10% of revenues however would
then be returned to the Member States to cover collection costs. The shortfall in revenue
would be made up by a GNP-based key and the old Treaty keys up to 1975, beyond
which time a '3rd Resource' - 1% of a theoretical harmonised VAT base - was to cover
the excess of expenditure over CCT revenues and agricultural levies, these two
35 the EC being distinct from the EEC in that the latter subsists within the former.
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constituting "traditional" own-resources. If the harmonised VAT base wasn't in place
by then, the keys would continue in operation until it was.
These 'agreements' then had to be rarified by all the member stares' parliaments, in
accordance with Article 201 of the Treaty. This was completed on 21 April, hence the
common name for this legislation; the "Decision of 21 April 197()"(!) This still left the
financing arrangements for 1970 unresolved, so it was agreed to combine the previous
and following methods for that year ie expected levy receipts and the capacity to
contribute, based on GNP. The final agreemem-v was as agreed by the Council, with
an additional clause that until 1975, each member state's aggregate payment couldn't
rise by more than 1% or fall by more than I.SCk. This being so, the introduction of the
FULL own-resources system couldn't start until 1st January 1978 (with changes in
payments for 1975-7 limited to 2% up or down).
The 'Decision' also changed the practical nature of financing Guarantee
expenditure. Previously, a clearing-house system had been in operation, but now a
system of direct financing was put in place. whereby the necessary funds were made
available to disbursing agencies such as the national intervention boards.
At this point, it is worth surnrnarisinu the moves made up to this point concerning
granting greater powers to the Parliament (EP):
On 31st March 1965, a number of proposal s were made concerning the progress of
the Community, one of which aimed at giving the EP a greater role in the budgetary
procedure, in line with the EC's operations being funded from own resources. This
would also mean the EP being elected by direct universal suffrage. It was these
proposals that led to the 'empty-chair' crisis.
On 16th July 1969, a new proposal was made that from Ist January 1974, all the
EC's activities would be funded from OWIl resources. From this time, the EP's powers
would be increased.
21st April 1970 - the Treaty of Luxembourg was signed. This increased the EP's
powers to make changes to the budget. It also made for these powers to be increased
further from 1975. From this time also, it was to be the President of the EP who would
have the power to declare the budget adopted. By 1975 moreover, non-compulsory
expenditure (over which, the EP had greatest power) would have risen to 22.6% of the
total EC budget
36 in Official Journal of the EC, OJ L94, 2~Ul4.1l)7().
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2.2.5: Common Prices ...For a Year; then the Advent of MCA's
1968 saw for the first time truly common prices in the key cereals sector, in national
currency terms and in the common currency, the ua37. The following year however
saw considerable pressures on both the German Mark (DM) and the French Franc
(FF). Low inflation and currency stability through most of the 1960's now gave way to
(relatively) high inflation and greater pressure on the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates. As a consequence, during 1969 the FF was devalued, and the DM
revalued. This made imports from all EC countries into Germany cheaper than German
products, but this was especially so with French exports. What both governments did
however was to continue converting AGRICULTURAL prices from the ua to their
national currencies at the old IMF par values. This prevented French consumers from
suffering price rises in FF-terms; and protected German farmers from a price-cut in
DM-terms. With free intra-Community trade, the consequence of all this would have
been that imports into Germany from the rest of the Community would have been
cheaper than German products (in DM terms), and French exports to the rest of the
Community would have been cheaper than domestic products. France's response to
this was to impose border taxes and subsidies on trade. Imports had a subsidy applied
to lower their price to the French market price, and exports had a tax levied to prevent
them undercutting the other member states' products. The German response to the
falling prices to farmers following the DM's rise after being allowed to float was to
impose an import tax of 11% on all CAP products. The Commission however were
opposed to this, since "if the German government were allowed its MCA-type import
tax [see below], there would be a strong temptation to leave it in force indefinitely."38
With the French already applying border taxes and subsidies, this would have divided
the Community into three separate monetary zones which was unacceptable to the
Commission.
Initially, a plan was drawn up to realign French and German prices over a two-year
period, but by 1971 international economic pressures were breaking-up the Bretton
Woods exchange-rate system. At this, all attempts at returning to a single common price
were abandoned, and Regulation 974/7139 formally institutionalised uncommon
prices, giving the taxes and subsidies the name Monetary Compensatory Amounts
(MCA's). Countries like Germany with prices in national currency terms above the
common price at the market exchange rate had 'positive' MCA's, and countries like
37 see Appendix 1 for more details about the common currencies of the Community.
38 Neville-Rolfe, E. (1984), P255.
39 in OJ LI06, 12.05.1971.
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France in the opposite situation had 'negative' MCA's. These MCA's are the
difference, in national currency terms, between the agricultural prices as they would
have been had they been converted from the common currency at the 'market' exchange
rates, and the prices as they were when converted at the 'green' or 'representative'
rates, (Germany's green rate being 'undervalued' and France's being 'overvalued').
This was done because unless exchange rates are fixed, there will be a natural trade-off
between 'common' and 'stable' prices. If common prices were to prevail, they would
be convened at the market exchange rates, but as these changed fairly frequently, so
would the prices received by farmers in national currency terms. As stable prices for
farmers were considered more important, institutionally-determined exchange rates
were used for agriculture which, being more stable, resulted in more stable prices being
paid to farmers in national currency terms. In terms of claims on the Budget, MCA's
only appeared as elements of intervention expenditure from 1 January 1973, before
which time they were made as direct inter-country transfers.
By this time, Community-funded structural measures were being pushed further
and further into the background. 1968 saw them re-emerge when the Commissioner for
agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, issued his "Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in
the European Economic Community"40, subtitled "Agriculture 1980" but more
commonly known as the Mansholt Plan. Mansholt, concerned about the rising cost of
agricultural support, proposed to expand the CAP beyond price support. It should also
include socio-structural measures involving, inter alia, fewer farmers, and land
consolidation and amalgamation, creating fewer and larger farms. He estimated that
under his plan, Guarantee expenditure in 1980 would be 750m EUA - it turned out to
be 11b EUA (current prices). Even at 1970 prices, 1980 expenditure was 6 times that
envisaged by Mansholt, albeit in an enlarged Communiry.U The Plan itself was never
formally discussed, and when three socio-structural Directives were eventually adopted
on 24 March 1972, they bore little resemblance to the measures Mansholt felt were
necessary. Claims on FEOGA's Guidance Section were in the form of a partial
reimbursement on member states' expenditure; normally 25% but up to 65% for the
poorest regions.
40 Commission Document COM (68) 1000.
41 Neville-Rolfe. E. (1984). P299.
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2.2.6: The First Enlargement and the Commodity Price Boom
Later in 1972, Treaties of Accession were signed with the United Kingdom,
Ireland, and Denmark, to start on 1st January 1973. During the negotiations, the
'acquis communautaire' principle was tested for the first time. This principle was
based on the notion that new member states couldn't demand wholesale changes to the
Treaty when joining, but would have to accept the Treaty and subsequent institutional
arrangements as they stood. This was going to cause difficulties in as much as two of
the new members, the UK and Ireland, were poorer than the average of the six,
heightening the regional disparity within the Community. Moreover, the UK was a net
agricultural importer. Given the dominance of FEOGA Guarantee expenditure in total
EEC expenditure, it was recognised that the UK would become a major net contributor
to the Budget, once the 5-year transitional period was over. Thus it was that when on
25th July 1973 the Commission proposed the establishment of a European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), this was seen as a concession to the UK in order to partly
offset their large net Budget contribution as well as trying to reduce regional disparities.
Up to 1973, the progress towards EMU in 1980 had been moving fairly well, but
1973-4 was to see two events that caused the member states to become rather less
Community minded. Firstly, OPEC - the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries - tripled the price of crude oil. Agriculture was affected initially by the rising
cost of fuel inputs, but subsequently by the general rise in the cost of living too. The
second problem was a natural one; a simultaneous series of bad growing conditions in
the major agricultural areas worldwide causing poor harvests and rising prices for a
number of products. This period is now known as the 'Commodity Price Boom Era'.
The impact of the oil price-hike on the Budget will become clear below, its effect being
indirect. The effect of rising agricultural commodity prices was in general a saving for
the Budget, with rising world prices reducing the levels of export subsidy needed. The
extreme case was sugar, where prices rose so much import subsidies were needed to
ensure supplies to the Community at 'normal' prices.
In February 1974 in the UK, a Labour Government was returned to power at the
General Election. When the implications for the UK of the full own-resources system
became clear, they immediately started renegotiating the terms of membership, in the
context of an imbalance in net contributions (rather than on gross contributions as
previously). The talks continued until late 1974 at the Paris Summit. To avoid
compromising the acquis communautaire, the outcome was stated in general terms,
applicable to any member state. Point 35 of the final communique read: 'The Heads of
..
Government recall the statement made during the accession negotiations by the
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Community to the effect that 'if unacceptable situations were to arise, the very life of
the Community would make it imperative for the institutions to find equitable
solutions. "'42
Also at this Summit the details of the ERDF were finalised. For a trial period of
three years, it was to get a budget of 1300m ua. This was allocated between member
states by means of fixed quotas, the UK being given 28%, the second largest share.
A note to the Council and Commission followed the Summit, calling for a
correcting mechanism to be found within the own-resources framework. Measures
were agreed at the European Council+J meeting of l l th March 1975 in Dublin, and a
Regulation was adopted on 17th May 1976, initially for seven years. This 'Financial
Mechanism' was to operate when an 'unacceptable situation' arose, defined in terms of:
I a measure of national wealth (GNP per capita must be below 85% of the
Community mean),
2 a measure of economic progress (the real GNP growth rate must be below 120%
of the Community mean, and
3 a contribution of over 110% of the theoretical contribution had payment been
based on national GNP as a percentage of Community GNP; all to occur
simultaneously.
Payments were to be restricted to 250m EUA44 or 3% of the expenditure
chargeable to the current financial year. If however a country's average balance of
payments for the preceding three years+> was positive, only VAT and GNP-based
payments are included in the calculations. These payments had to exceed 10% of the
amount the member state would have had to pay if the payment was based on its GNP
as a proportion of EC GNP.
In the end however, this mechanism was only available for four years, and was
actually never used. To see why, the situations of the three poorest member states, the
UK, Ireland and Italy, may be considered for 1976-8. All three countries in all three
years satisfied the first criterion. Ireland and the UK both satisfied the second criterion
also. Both of these criteria were based on the ex post calculation of a three year rolling
42 see EC Commission, (1974), P303.
43 the new title for the "Heads of Stale and Government".
44 European Unit of Account. the new common currency, a basket currency as compared with the ua
which was based on gold.
45 at current market exchange raLCS.
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average. The third criterion was an ex ante estimate, but the Act of Accession restricted
the contributions of the UK and Ireland. In 1979 the UK did apply for a 68m EUA
rebate, but by the time the 1980 draft Budget had been adopted, sterling had risen
sufficiently for the UK to no longer be eligible on the balance of payments criterion.
In May 1975, as a direct result of the UK's accession negotiations, the CAP's
structural measures were extended. The UK had an established policy on hill-farming,
and the EEC version aimed at "the continued conservation of the countryside in
mountains" where "farming performs a fundamental function", as the preamble put it.
This was to cover principally mountain areas, and less favoured areas (LFA's) in
danger of depopulation.
At this time, a common basis for VAT assessment hadn't been agreed, so the
introduction of the 'full' own-resources system was delayed beyond 1975, and GNP-
based contributions continued as before.
2.2.7: "The Years That the Locusts Consumed"
As noted earlier, the oil price hike resulted in rising input costs for farmers, and in
certain sectors, farmers were receiving prices lower than those prevailing on world
markets. The price-decisions of the time reflected this, and indeed in 1974, an
additional price-rise of 5% across-the-board was agreed in October'". Commission
statements at the time showed this was based on the prevailing world market situations
for each commodity, even though some internal markets were already in structural
surplus. These events followed a year after a group of writers published the neo-
Malthusian "The Limits To Growth". Subsequent publications such as "Mankind at the
Turning Point" by the Club of Rome supported this view that the Commodity Price
Boom represented a major switch in world food production to much tighter markets,
food shortages and higher world prices. The four price-reviews of 1974-6 increased
nominal prices by an average of over 9.5% per annum in common currency terms. In
national currency terms, the increases were over 13% per annum. This was possible
because the setting of prices in the common currency, and the determining of 'green'
exchange-rates (effectively the setting of prices in the national currencies) are two
separate operations, and the manipulation of green rates can either negate or accentuate
any changes in common prices. The flip-side of this coin however was rising support
expenditure: FEOGA Guarantee expenditure rose by 46% in 1975 and 23% in 1976,
reflecting increased productivity and the stepped accession of the new members, but
also rising export refunds as internal EEC market prices rose and world prices fell
46 The 'nonnal' price decisions being made in February-March each year.
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back, as global food production picked up after 1973-4. The years 1973-6 under the
agriculture Commissioner Petrus Lardinois, have been described as "the years that the
locusts consumed'S".
Another factor within the EC that acted to take the pressure off the agricultural
policy directly was the accession of the UK. In the cereals sector in particular, the EC
of six was approaching 100% self-sufficiency, whereas the UK was a major net
importer. For the crop year 1972/3, the self sufficiency ratio for all cereals for the EC6
was 97%, whereas it was 90% for the EC9. This benefit was however only a
temporary phenomenon, with the figures rising rapidly as the high support prices fed
through to greater production. Total wheat self sufficiency rose above 100% the
following year, 1973/4, for the EC9, and hasn't fallen below that figure since. With
total cereals, the 100% figure wasn't exceeded until 1979/80, but again has never
returned below that level. This trend hasn't been restricted to cereals either. For
example, total meat self sufficiency reached 100% in 1981, and again hasn't fallen
below that since.48
Lardinois' successor was Finn Gundelach who, unlike Lardinois, had no past
connections with, nor particular loyalties towards, agriculture. Moreover, Community
inflation rates were falling, so he was both more willing and more able to restrain price
increases (his annual average for 1977-80 came to 3% in common currency terms;
6.5% in national currency terms). Over that period however, Guarantee expenditure
still rose by around 80%. The largest single sector in terms of expenditure at this time
was milk and milk products, which was taking 40% of Guarantee expenditure,
representing 35% of total EEC expenditure. In 1977, a co-responsibility levy (CRL)
was introduced on milk production, and was supposed to act as a 'tax' on producers,
so that they might share some of the costs of disposing of the surpluses. In the Budget
nomenclature, the CRL is shown as 'negative expenditure' so total disbursements are
net of this CRL. As has been shown subsequently howeverl'' the price-decisions
incorporated this CRL, making it in effect a tax on consumers rather than producers.
Over the period 1977-9, the costs of milk intervention measures rose by 61% (current
prices), representing around 43-46% of total Guarantee expenditure.
The full own-resources system finally came into operation in 1979, with a VAT rate
of 0.78% applied. It had been expected that the 1% ceiling for VAT would be reached
in 1981, but during late 1980, and especially during 1981, commodity prices rose
47 Neville-Rolfe, E. (1984), P264.
48 All the above data is taken from the various editions of the Agricultural Situation in the
Community.
49 see Hubbard, L. J. (1986).
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sharply, with world wheat prices once again approaching EEC levels, and world sugar
prices rising above them. Moreover, international demand for butter was strong, EEC
milk product stocks were low following a period of aggressive stock-reduction; and
MCA movements in the main were favourable, (most notably the UK MCA, with a
strong rise in sterling causing it to go from a large negative position to positive).
Between 1979 and 1980, CCT revenues rose slightly, and agricultural levy receipts
fell, but the VAT percentage required still fell, to 0.73%. By 1981, it was still only
0.79%.
Another strong feature of the late 1970's in terms of budgetary discussions
concerns the tone of the Commission's writings on the subject of the budget and
budgetary problems. During the late 1970's, a number of Commission documents+'
considered this particular problem. In general however, the emphasis was not on
agricultural expenditure to anything like the degree it became during the 1980's. In
COM(78)531, for example, they say that if "the increase in agriculture spending [sic] is
extrapolated from 1973 it would rise very substantially and leave little room for the
development of other policies by 1981 within the existing own resources.P! Other
than that, agriculture gets no major mention. Even though much of the paper looks at
the question of increasing the availability of own resources, it doesn't look at the
question of increased control of the agricultural markets in order to ensure that the extra
funds don't go into CAP support. In COM(79)85, there are vague mentions of CAP
reform, and about getting the markets back more into balance, but nothing concrete is
proposed or even hinted at. In COM(79)462, the argument, very common at that time,
was of the dominance of guarantee expenditure because of "the relatively low degree of
development of other policies,"S2 regardless of the absolute level of expenditure.
2.2.8: Towards the 1980's and Budgetary Indiscipline
1979 saw a change of government in the UK. The new Conservative administration
under Mrs Thatcher renewed the attacks on the Financial Mechanism and on 30th May
1980, the Council produced the 'Brussels Compromise' package, which provided for
fixed amounts to be refunded to the UK equal to two-thirds of her expected net
contribution, a provision to cover just 1980-1, unless a long-term solution was
reached. This provision was however conceived before the market events referred to
50 See, inter alia. EC Commission, (}978). (l979a), and (}979b).
51 Page 2.
52 Page S.
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above occurred and in the end, the rebates turned out to be equal to 78% of the UK's
1980 net contribution and 99% of the 1981 figure. Given the failure to agree on a long-
term solution to the problem however, this rebate mechanism was extended for two
years, the rebates being equal to 57% of the 1982 contribution and 40% in 1983, thus
giving a four-year average roughly equal to the 67% target figure.
The events of 1981-2 can also heavily influence the outcome of any analysis of
FEOGA's operations over the period of the 1970's and early 1980's. It makes the
period under discussion an important factor to bear in mind, as can be seen in the
following example: In its 1981 paper on FEOGA53, the Commission stated that
between 1975 and 1981, Guarantee expenditure grew at 16% per annum, "slightly
above the Community inflation rate" (page 10). On the other hand54 between 1974 and
1980, the growth-rate of agricultural expenditure was 24.6% per annum.
The price-rises at this time were historically very large indeed. Even so, expenditure
actually fell in nominal terms between 1980 and 1981, because of high world prices,
despite also the accession of Greece and the first full year's operation of the new
sheep meat regime. In 1982 however, expenditure rose sharply, and the VAT
percentage required rose from 0.79% to 0.92%, despite rising levy and tariff revenues.
Notwithstanding this, the 1982-3 price decision was an average increase of 10.4% in
ECU55 terms, and 12.2% in national currency terms. This was the largest single rise
EVER, and other than in Italy and Ireland was an increase in real, as well as nominal
terms. 56
To this can be added the impact of continually rising self sufficiency. As noted
above, self sufficiency was achieved for cereals and meat around 1980. Looking at total
import and export data for cereals, although large quantities of parallel imports and
exports had been traded for the whole period under consideration, 1980 was the first
year that total cereals exports exceeded total cereals imports. Although imports then
rose above exports slightly for 1981 and 1982, since 1983 exports have been
consistently above imports. Thus total expenditure on the cereals sector rose sharply
from 1977 to 1978 to 1979, and then again from 1982 to 1983.57
53 see EC Commission, (1981).
54 see 0rstr0m-M0I1er, J. (1983).
55 European Currency Units - see Appendix I.
56 Paul Dalsagcr, the former Danish Minister for Agriculture took over from Gundelach after the
latter's sudden death. Although the Commission had acknowledged the need for price restraint, and had
proposed 'just' a 9% price rise, the Council fell this was too harsh. The UK Minister failed to block
this pac1cage (see below), and the more pro-agriculture Dalsager accepted the views of the majority
regarding a more lenient price package. See Tracy, M. (1989), p306 for more details on this, and
Fearne, A. (1988) for more details on non-economic pressures involved in price selling decisions.
2.29
By the time of the 1982 price-negotiations also, a solution to the problem of the
UK's large net contribution should have been found, but wasn't. The price-package
had all-but been agreed, giving an average price-rise of 10.4%. The one dissenting
voice was that of Peter Walker, the British minister. He was caught in an awkward
position since he unofficially agreed with the price-package, but wanted to force the
Council to finally settle the UK's contribution problems. A proposal was put to the
Foreign Ministers but it was Francis Pym, the British representative, who rejected
it.58 This was taken rather badly by the other ministers, who saw it as a snub for their
support for the UK over the Falklands War at that time. Back in the Council of
Agricultural Ministers, Peter Walker, rather than linking the price-package to its impact
on the British contribution (an estimated t 112m), claiming this as a 'vital national
interest' and invoking the Luxembourg Compromise until a deal on the British
contribution had been settled, tried to invoke the Luxembourg Compromise 'directly'
by reference to the solution of the British contribution problem. Having already
'unofficially' agreed to the price-package however, his bid to force a unanimity vote
failed, and although the Greek and Danish members voted with him (as a matter of
principle), together they failed to make up a blocking minority, the price-package was
agreed, and the UK failed to get a long-term solution to its contribution problem.
2.2.9: The Council's Response to the Problems, 1982-83
With the developments referred to earlier, not even a strong dollar restricting per-
unit export refunds could prevent the expenditure situation in 19R2 from getting worse,
as own-resources neared the I ~ YAT ceiling. In an attempt to try to contain
expenditure, the Council introduced a set of 'Guarantee Thresholds' for tomato
concentrate, oilseed rape, milk, and cereals. For these products, if production exceeded
the specified 'guarantee threshold', support prices the following year would be cut in
proportion to the excess production, up (0 a maximum of 5%. Some of these sectors
were already in structural surplus by this stage, with the guarantee threshold merely
building this into the system. Moreover. the actual application of the penalties the
following year was not as it at first appeared it should be. Rather than applying the
penalty to the 1982 prices ex postfacto. the Council predicted a 'normal' price-rise for
1983 over 1982, then applied the penalty to this higher price. In some cases, the net
57 For more detail on this, sec Chapter 4.
58 According to the Times editorial of 20th May. Pym had been advised that France would not
abandon the Luxembourg Compromise. which was why he held out for a beucr deal than the £450m
offered.
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effect was still a price-rise, and in those cases where there would have been a net
reduction in support prices, this proved too much for some ministers to accept,
especially the German minister over the cereals price.
In the milk sector, this mechanism had a negligible effect. For a price cut to get the
market more into balance, it was felt that the cut would have to be of the order of 12-
20%59, an option seen as politically unacceptable. Following the European Council
meeting in Stuttgart in June 1983 therefore, proposals were submitted for a
quota/super-levy system for controlling milk production. This was passed by Council
on 31 March 1984.
1983 saw the 1% VAT own-resource ceiling reached. Initial discussions on
alternatives for 1984 and beyond noted the attractiveness of simply increasing the VAT
ceiling. They did however note the regressive nature of VAT, and felt some
progressivity could be achieved by for example introducing (or rather re-introducing) a
GDP-based payment. By the end of the year, no firm decisions had been made. At the
Brussels European Council meeting in March 1984, it was finally agreed that VAT
should be raised to 1.4% from 1st January 1986 (and the accession of Spain and
Portugal), with the option of raising it again two years later to 1.6%.
The March meeting of the Council of Agricultural Ministers, in addition to agreeing
to dairy quotas, for the first time ever agreed to an average ECU price change smaller
than the Commission proposals (-0.5% as opposed to +0.8%), although after MCA
adjustments the change in national currency terms came out to +3.3%. Even so,
appropriations were insufficient, so the Commission proposed that member states
should make loans to the Community, to be repaid over four years starting in 1986 after
the increase in own-resources.
On the question of the UK's rebates, agreement was finally reached in June 1984 at
the Fontainebleau Summit. As with the 1975 agreement, the mechanism was designed
for any member state facing a budgetary imbalance. This was defined in terms of the
gap between the share of VAT own-resource payments and the share of expenditure
allocated. For the UK, a lump-sum payment of Ib ECU was made for 1984, with for
1985 onwards the rebate being 66% of the 'basis for correction'. Although the money
value of the rebate was lower than before, there was now no need to renegotiate rebates
yearly. The rebates were to be controlled via the VAT payments, with the UK's
payment reduced by an appropriate amount and the other member states paying more,
both to cover this and the one-third reduction in the extra contribution made by
Germany; a concession made in recognition that Germany was the largest net
59 see "Brussels Briefing" in Dairy Farmer. June 1983. Page 49.
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contributor.
The early 1980's also saw a change in the tone of the Commission's deliberations
on matters financial and agricultural.P'! In COM(83)270, the Commission refer to the
need for the Council and themselves to jointly take action to control growing
agricultural expenditure. In addition, they imply that there will be a need to ensure that
any increase in own-resources isn't immediately swallowed up by the CAP. In
COM(83)500, the issues of changes to agricultural support policies and budgetary
issues are actually linked and discussed in the same sentence. What this indicates,
compared to the Commission's position as referred to above in Section 2.2.7, is that
the issue of agricultural reform, and the need to generate additional own-resources,
were now being seen as two consequences of the same fundamental problem - that of
structural imbalance in the agricultural sector, given the nature of support under the
CAP.61
2.2.10: Budgetary Discipline ... A Change of Mood?
1984 saw the introduction of a new piece of Euro-jargon - "Budgetary Discipline".
This label describes the terms of the agreement made at the December European Council
meeting, which was aimed at restraining expenditure:
a) a reference framework for total expenditure was to be set by the Council of
Finance Ministers, with other Councils asked to ensure their decisions respected
this;
b) growth of non-compulsory expenditure was to be strictly subject to Article 203
of the Treaty62; and
c) financial guidelines were to be set for agricultural spending: From 1984/5, the
growth in agricultural spending was to be no greater than the growth of own-
resources. "Barring aberrant developments", if this was exceeded, expenditure was
to be "brought back within the limits imposed by this guideline" (Article 5) within
two years.
60 s· li EC C .. ',pcc, inter a ia. ommission (19X3<1), (It)X,h), and (19ox).
61 Another issue of importance to the development to the budget - that of the ECU:$ exchange rate -
was also not explicitly recognised by the Commission until the later 1980's. This topic will be dealt
with in detail in Chapter 3.
62 This was to be set by the Commission, based on the growth of Community GNP (volume terms),
the average variation of national budgets, and the trend of the cost of living.
In 1985, there was another shortfall in the Budget. As with 1984, the member
states were asked to make 'advances' to the Community, but this time, they were non-
repayable.
1986 too saw a budgetary shortfall, despite the increased VAT ceiling. It must be
noted that whilst the 'theoretical' VAT limit was raised to 1.4%, this wasn't the case in
practice. Most member states paid a VAT rate of 1.39996%, but given the UK rebate
was paid by means of an abatement in the UK's VAT contribution, the UK itself only
paid a rate of 0.67663%. Germany, as the largest net contributor, had its contribution
to the UK rebate reduced by a third (again, via its VAT payment), so it therefore only
paid a rate of 1.33697%. This gave an overall uniform rate of only about 1.25%.
Moreover, with the unit value of traditional own-resources being reduced by industrial
tariff reductions under GATf63 and lower agricultural imports reducing VIL revenues,
a greater burden was being placed on the VAT own-resource, reducing still further the
effect of the VAT ceiling being raised. Despite this, the Council refused to adopt a
supplementary Budget to cover the 820m ECU deficit, raising the debts carried over
from previous years to roughly 5b ECU by 1987. The falling dollar contributed to the
above problems by raising unit refund costs and reducing expected CCT revenues by a
total of around 1.3b ECU.
In the cereals sector, rising costs and surpluses resulted in the introduction of a co-
responsibility levy though unlike the milk co-responsibility levy, this was designed to
be more transparent in order to prevent it just being passed onto consumers.
2.2.11: The Situation By 1986-7
Several commentators through the early to mid 1980's were predicting the financial
collapse of the Community64 given total accumulated debts of around 17b ECU.
Article 199 of the Treaty of Rome requires that revenue and expenditure be in balance.
Given that this had last occurred in 1982, it can therefore be seen that technically the
Community had been bankrupt since 1983. It is however a measure of the value the
member states place on the Community and its operations that they have been prepared
to bail it out so regularly since then, not that this could have been allowed to go on
forever, (see below). In 1987, Parliament commented that "it has long been apparent
that the Council of Ministers is incapable of taking the agricultural policy decisions
63 see Hine, R. C. (1985), especially P223. There, he makes the point that not only were there large
percentage tariff cuts (especially in the Tokyo Round), but moreover that these were cuts on already
low tariff~.
64 see, eg, 0rstr0m-M0I1er, 1. (1983), P30, and Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
(1985), P53.
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necessary to ensure compliance with their own views on budgetary discipline. "65
Brian Gardner went further than this, implicating the Commission as well (Gardner, B.
(1987». He quotes a senior Commission official who apparently confessed to him that
"the Commission only proposes and the Agriculture Council will only agree what it
knows COPA will accept" (PI71).66 He continues (PI73), "the most important
conclusion to be drawn from the events of the last six years is that even under the
severest budgetary pressure, neither the Commission nor the Council will do anything
sufficiently radical to cut spending on the CAP. They will be reluctant even to take
measures that will stabilise spending at present levels."
To see what he means by this, the case of dairy quotas as introduced in 1984 may
be considered: Member states could choose one of two formulae when implementing
quotas: Formula A, where each producer was allocated an individual quota, and faced a
super-levy of 75% of the target price on over-quota deliveries to dairies; and Formula
B, where quotas were allocated to purchasers (ie dairies), who faced a 100% super-
levy on over-quota production, which should then be passed on to all producers
contributing to the over-quota production. Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland)
chose Formula B, and given the nature of British milk marketing, ie the existence of a
single purchaser, the Milk Marketing Board for England and Wales (with three regional
boards in Scotland), over all deliveries to the MMB, the over-quota deliveries from
some producers could be offset by under-quota deliveries from other producers. This
reduced the effective levy that the over-quota producers faced, as rather than facing the
super-levy On their gross excess deliveries, they faced it on just their net over-quota
deliveries (net of the shortfall of under-quota deliverers). In Great Britain in 1985-6,
over-quota producers faced a super-levy of 2.25% rather than 100%. As the rules stood
initially, this could only be done in Great Britain, but rather than change the rules to
prevent it happening there, they were changed so that in all member states the quota
was effectively "nationalised". Overall, it was estimated that this decision cost over
500m ECU in extra SUpp0l1expenditure in 1985 alone.67 Production did fall by 5% in
1985, partly through the reduced use of concentrate feed inputs, partly through panic
culling, and partly through culling OCCUlTingbecause of the position of 1984-5 in the
dairy production cycle. Milk deliveries rose by 1.5% in 1986, and butter and skimmed
milk powder stocks rose rapidly. By the end of 1986, production was barely below
1983 levels, and expenditure had risen 33%; not surprising given that the initial 1984
65 see European Parliament, (1987), P13.
66 COPA - Comite des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles - the European Fanners' Union.
67 see "Brussels Briefing" in Dairy Fanner, January 1986, Page 39.
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global quota built in 15% over-supply, representing expenditure of £3b per annum.68
These measures so weakened the effect of quotas that in December 1986, tighter
measures had to be introduced, including cutting the global quota level, raising the
penalties on over-producing farmers, and tightening the rules governing sales into
intervention.
Another problem (discussed in more detail in Appendix 2 of Chapter 3) is that of
the over-valuation of stocks, caused by their valuation at buying-in prices rather than
selling-out prices. Thus for 1986, the stocks as valued at the intervention price totalled
11.2b ECU, but when valued at their resale value came to just 3.7b ECU.69 The
Budget had always allowed for appropriations to be made to cover depreciation (ie the
writing-down of the book-value of stocks), but this facility had only been used
occasionally on an ad hoc basis if sufficient resources had been left available at the end
of any particular year. By 1987, the Commission had admitted that stocks needed to be
depreciated by 8b ECU, or 67% (ibid). By 1987 therefore, a lack of control within the
agricultural sector, coupled to financial mismanagement, had left the EC in a very
precarious financial position.
It can be seen from this chapter that the EC's market position for many commodities
was fundamentally different in 1958 when the EC was established, and the discussions
for the CAP begun in earnest, from the 1980's and 1990's. For many products, the EC
has moved from being a net importer to net exporter. Despite this, the basic method of
support had remained unchanged, not just since 1958 but, for the founder members of
the Community, since the early part of this century. The great significance of this for
the EC budget has been that the growth in agricultural production under the CAP
regimes has generated large increases in expenditure, especially during the 1980's,
when the EC became a net exporter of a number of major products. The next chapter
describes the reforms implemented in 1988, which aimed at controlling both the
development of imbalances on the agricultural product markets, and the financial crisis
arising out of that imbalance. It also gives a lead into the consideration of whether or
not the 1988 reforms of both the agricultural policies (stabilisers) and the operation of
the budget (budgetary discipline) represented a sufficiently significant break with
previous policies to be effective in their aims.
68 see "Brussels Briefing" in Dairy Farmer, October 1985, Page 38.
69 COM (87) 101, P7 - for full details sec Table 3 in Chapter 3.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 - SCALED NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE EC BUDGET (%)
1958-
1964/51
1965/6-
1966n
Ay2
1967/8-
1970/1
Ay2
1971/2-
1972/33
1973/4-
1978/9
range3,4
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D
F
UK
I
NL
B
DK
IRE
L
28.00 31.25 31.50 32.90
28.00 30.92 30.00 32.60
28.00 20.00 20.90 20.20
7.90 9.66 9.30 7.30
7.90 7.87 8.20 6.80
0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20
25.53-32.13
22.99-25.30
16.90-20.04
13.20-15.60
5.26-6.00
4.11-5.28
2.40-2.58
0.60-0.71
0.15-0.17
NQTES:
1) 80-90% on a fixed scale, 20-10% according to each country's share of net EC
imports
2) 90% of receipts from agricultural levies and customs duties on agricultural
produce, the balance according to the schedule of contributions.
3) All receipts from agricultural levies and all CCT (50% in 1971, rising to 100% in
1975), the balance according to the scale of contributions.
4) From 1979, the balance made up by YAT contributions.
SOURCE: Bowler 1985, Page 66.
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APPENDIX 1
THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT70
Article 207 of the Treaty of Rome called for the Budget to be "drawn up in the unit
of account", that is, a form of common currency, rather than having all sums denoted in
terms of all national currencies. The first common unit of account which was used from
1958 through to 1977 was known as the 'unit of account' or ua. This was a 'parity'
unit, with its value set at 0.88867088 grams of fine gold (the same as the US$ from
1934 to 1972), and with fixed exchange rates between it and the member states'
currencies. This fitted in with the global fixed exchange rate system still operating in the
1950's. By 1971, of all EEC currencies, only the German Mark revaluation and the
French Franc devaluation, both in 196<), had diverged from this, but in the period
through the mid 1970's, discrepancies between the official exchange rates declared to
the IMF and the actual market exchange rates became much more widespread, and
started to damage the operation of the Community'S economy.
The decision to change the nature of the common currency followed the
negotiations for the Lome Convention in 1975, as the Community desired greater
stability in aid financing. The new currency was called the European Unit of Account
(EUA) and was fundamentally different from the parity in that it was a 'basket'
currency based on the member states' currencies, weighted according to the member
states' shares of Community GNP, and their shares in the short term monetary
arrangements of the Community. It was initially adopted for use in the European
Development Fund with aid managed under the Lome Convention, but in 1977 was
incorporated into the Financial Regulation for lise in all the Community institutions'
financial operations. A year later however, the Community had passed a resolution
establishing the European Monetary System (EMS). This was to have two elements; a
basket currency which, like the EUA, was to contain all the member states' currencies,
and an exchange rate mechanism (ERM) which set mUTOW bands of fluctuation between
member states' currencies, both bilaterally between each other, and between each one
and the central common currency. From this came a new common currency, the
European Currency Unit (ECU). The EUA had been designed as a fixed package to
remain unchanged until the Community reached twelve members, but the ECU was to
be more flexible, allowing changes in its composition if it was feIt necessary. The ECU
finally took over as the common currencv in 19RI.
In addition, to the foregoing, and specifically in connection with agriculture, the
question of MCA's (see above, Section 2.2.5) has further complicated monetary
70 see also Strasser, D. (1980), PP2S-30.
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issues. Whilst common prices are expressed for the EC in ECU, when expressed in
member states' currencies, conversion takes place not at the market exchange rate but at
a more stable 'representative rate', set each year as part of the annual price fixing. It
was the divergence between this rate and the market rate which set up a gap which
needed to be bridged by an MeA. Since 1984 however, a 'switchover' mechanism has
operated in order to try to overcome the problem of reducing positive MCA's with
restraint in ECU price setting. That is, at a time when, ceteris paribus, the dismantling
of positive MCA's would result in the farmers in the strong currency countries facing
nominal own currency price cuts. This introduces the concept of the green EeU central
rate (green ECU) in addition to the green rate, applied monetary gaps, and real and
natural real monetary gaps.71 With this system, the agricultural ECU is tied to the DM,
as the strongest EMS currency in order to remove future negative MCA's created.
Existing MCA's cannot be removed this way however, nor can new positive MeA's,
which will still require changes in the green rate. Initially, the aim was to dismantle
MCA's by 1992. The 1992 reform package appeared to accept this wouldn't happen.
Apart from the political problems surrounding the changes in farm support prices in
national currency terms that would be req uired, there is also the issue that although
most currencies are in the ERM, they can still fluctuate to a limited extent. This means
that there would still be a trade-off between 'common' prices and stable prices, as
measured in national currency terms.
It has however subsequently been. proposed that from 1993, the artificial green
ECU would be abolished. Fluctuations in the ECU would still create monetary gaps,
but rather than apply MCA's, the EC will instead restrict the total spread of monetary
gaps across all member states to five percentage points. If the spread exceeds this, the
negative gap currency would be devalued, acting to increase the national currency value
of ECU prices.72
With green exchange rates being abolished, and market rates used instead, in those
situations where this would lead to a fall in prices in national currency terms, the ECU
prices are being increased to offset this.?3
71 For an excellent guide through this maze. see EC Court of Auditors. (1989).
72 see, for example, Agra Europe No.1500, ] 7th July 1992. page El5.
73 Strictly speaking, the green rates are being retained. It is just that now, they are equal to the
market rates, so any distinction is superfluous.
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APPENDIX 2:
PROTECTIONISM AND INTERNATIONAL PRICE COMPARISONS
FOR GRA INS FROM 1800
Getting an accurate indication of the extent and effects of protectionism further back
than the most recent of years can often prove difficult. Presented here are data collected
from a number of sources/+ which aim 10 give a general feel for what was happening
with grain policies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Data in Abel75 for the price of wheal in 1825, give the following picture (with all
prices quoted in RM76 per 1(X)kg):
French Ports 18.20 North German Pons 8.55
Copenhagen 7.50 North American Ports 13.85
Dutch Pons 11.45 England 30.50
o/w Amsterdam 10.75
Thus, owing to the Corn Laws in England, the price of wheat there was about four
times that in Germany or Denmark. Abel further77 points out that after 1828, the price
of wheat in England was around 51-52 shillings a quarter, with a customs duty of 35
shillings and 8 pence a quarter.
For 1830, Abel presents the following prices, again in RM per lCX)kg:
Rye: Wheat:
France 23.45 Danzig 13.75
Denmark 12.09 England 28.61
Danzig 7.78
Again, it can be seen that whilst there was a markedly higher price in France than in
Germany or Denmark, it was still below (he price being charged in England. By the
1890's, and what was for English agriculture. a time of depression, wheat was selling
at 22 shillings and 10 pence a quarter, or about a third of the price realised in the mid-
1860·s.
74 For the period until WW2, the references urc Abel, W. (1980) and Tracy. M. (1989).
75 Page 227.
76 Reichmarks. 1RM equalled 5.56 grams of silver.
77 Page 241.
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Data presented in Tracy 78 indicate that in contrast to England, both France and
Germany increased tariff protection during the 1880's and 1890's. In France, the tariff
on wheat was O.60FF per 100kg in I~X1, but (his had risen to 5 FF by 1892 (the time
of the Meline Tariff), and to 7FF by 1X94. This pattern was seen on a number of other
products, with the Meline Tariff in most cases reinforcing existing protection.I" In
Germany, the pattern was generally (he same. In 1879, the tariff on wheat and rye was
1 mark per IOOkg, in 1887 it was lip [05, in 1891 it slipped back to 3.5, but in 1906, it
was back to 5 for rye and up to 5.5 for wheat.
For all foodstuffs too, this pattern was evident. Tracy refers to a study by
Liepmann who looked at 'potential' tariffs~W for foodstuffs. For a number of
European countries, he estimated tariff levels as the percentage of export prices.
Selecting some of his reslllls81:
1913 1927 1931
France 29 19 53
Germany 22 27 83
Finland 49 58 102
This shows how the levels of protection rose during this period. Finland is included
to give something of a comparison, and 10 show that the central countries studied were
by no means the worst (best") at protecting their farmers.
Moving forward to the period of the 1960's (that is, the period around the time of
the formation of the CAP), the following data are presented by the FA082 for wheat
producer prices:
year France W. Germany UK
FF/lOOkg DM/IO()kg t: per 1121b
1960 37.8 40.6 1.346
1961 40.0 41.7 1.338
1962 40.9 42.2 1.367
78 Page 66 for France, page 88 for Germany.
79 See Tracy, M. (1989) for details.
XO The study looked at .~8foodstuffs. The author didn't weight each foodstuff by its importance in the
imports of each country, thus hc referred to the figures estimated as the 'potential' tariffs.
XI Sec Tracy, M. (19X9), pages 22 and 12., lor 11IIkr dcuuls.
82 Agricultural Production Yearbook, various years.
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1963 39.2 42.2 1.342
1964 38.7 42.8 1.304
1965 37.5 42.2 1.237
1966 41.6 43.0 1.267
1967 43.4 38.2 1.294
1968 43.2 37.2 1.371
1969 43.1 37.5 1.450
1970 46.9 35.8 1.562
1971 49.0 36.0 1.630
1972 49.8 36.9 1.753
1973 55.5 37.8 2.974
From this, it is clear that for France and Germany 1967, the year when common
prices were introduced, marks something of a watershed. As the data show, from that
year prices in France make an upwards shift, whilst those in Germany shift to a lower
level. For the UK on the other hand, the ebb and flow of prices received doesn't do
anything dramatic until 1973. This can only be partly attributed to the UK's accession
to the EC however as this was also the time of the commodity price boom.
APPENDIX 3
SUMMARY OF CAP REFORM MEASURES PRIOR TO 1988
• Council Directives 72/159/EEC, 72/160/EEC AND 72/161/EEC are passed which
introduce structural measures on farm modernisation. cessation of farming, and the
acquisition of skills by those engaged in fanning. These were all that came out of the
Mansholt Plan.
• Council Directive 75/268/EEC on mountain and hill farming, and farming in less
favoured areas is passed. This is seen as a development on Mansholt in terms of
structural measures.
• 1977 - a co-responsibility levy is introduced in the dairy sector on 16 September.
• 1982 - Guarantee Thresholds were introduced for tomato concentrate, oilseed rape,
milk and cereals.
• 1984 - Quotas introduced in the dairy sector.
• 1986 - a co-responsibility levy is introduced in the cereals sector.
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CHAPTER 3: CAP REFORM: FROM STABILISERS TO MACSHARRY
''Sta6i{izers" are tfU fatest effort 6y tli.e Community to come to terms
witfi tfU financial pressures 6rougfit a60ut 6y excessive support of tfu
agricU£turaC sector. It is a cheap 6ut fataC{Y indicative remark.. tfiat
sta6iCizers are "'E"numbers, artificial 'European additives designed to
preserve tlie porky 6eyond its naturae afe and a~{y to produce
unwanted ana FiarmfuCside-effects.'
£f)avitf 9larvey, 'Coping with. tft.e agricuCtura{ financial crisis', P
836, in 'JJlgricuCtureand (jovernrrunts in an Interdependent WorU",
tlie proceedings of tlie 20th. intemational conference of agricuCturaC
economists, 'Dartmouth, JJl{tlersnot.
3.1: THE BACKGROUND TO THE STABILISER PACKAGE
3.1.1: Introduction
As was described in Chapter 2.2.10, the term 'budgetary discipline' was first
coined by the EC in 1984, at the December meeting of the European Council. As an
agreement, it was aimed at restraining the growth in agricultural expenditure. As can be
seen from the terms of the agreement however, there was nothing in the text to make
the target of lower growth in expenditure binding on the institutions of the EC. What
the EC had therefore was a polite request to the EC's Councils of Ministers (in
particular the Council of Agricultural Ministers) to take policy decisions (eg the setting
of farm support prices) in accordance with the aims of the budgetary discipline
declaration, rather than a strict requirement so to do.
As was subsequently shown, the Council of Ministers were "incapable", in the
words of the European Parliament, of abiding by the requirements of the declaration,
and by 1987, stronger action was needed.
3.1.2: Towards an Agreement on Stabilisers And Expenditure Control
"The Community is at present faced with a budgetary situation which 'can only be
characterised as being on the brink of bankruptcy. "I 1987 not only saw the
Commission assessing the financial situation with unusual frankness, but also respond
with a series of proposals aimed at correcting the imbalances. The proposals in essence
fell into two inter-related categories: The provision of greater revenues via a new type
of own resource for the Community, along with greater financial restraint (a
1 see EC Commission, (1987a), PI.
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reinforcement of the rules of budgetary discipline); and the restraint of growth in
agricultural guarantee expenditure by the introduction of policies aimed at controlling
the growth in agricultural production (the so-called 'stabilisers' measures, discussed
below). These must themselves be seen as part of a larger whole, including the
completion of the internal market by 31st December 19922, reducing agricultural
guarantee expenditure to just 55% of the total EC budget, and raising structural
spending to 25% of the total; with the restraint in agricultural guarantee expenditure
permitting the development of new policies in areas such as research, communications,
and the environment.
At the European Council meeting of 29th and 30th June 1987, it was agreed that
budgetary discipline "must be binding on all the bodies which will be associated with
its implementation. "
The various sets of proposals- received a mixed reaction. Parliament felt their
across-the-board application would impact more severely on small farrners.f Sir
Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary welcomed the proposals, saying they
wouldn't operate arbitrarily or unpredictably, but would act positively to reduce
production and costs.5
By the end of the year however, there had been neither agreement on these
proposals, nor on the Budget for 1988. Given this situation, the Commission decided
to manage the agricultural policy as if the stabilisers package had been passed, in order
to remain within the financial constraints of the "provisional 12th's", the procedure
whereby if in any year a Budget has yet to be agreed, the monthly spending limit is set
at 1/12th of the previous Budget's appropriations.
When Parliament came to discuss the stabilisers in January 19886, a number of
concerns about the methods of operation were voiced. The essential feature of the
operation of the stabilisers in most sectors was to be the MGQ or maximum guaranteed
quantity. Should production rise above this, price-penalties would be incurred. This
proposal however wasn't seen by all as being sensible, let alone likely to be effective.
One MEP pointed out that with regard to the proposals in the pea/field-bean/lupin sector
for example, if production reached 10mt, support would be cut to zero, and there
2 In February 1987, Jacques Delors spoke to the European Parliament about budgetary discipline,
stating that sectors other than agriculture get the "optimum allocation of resources" as these "are
essential to the success of the Single Act." See Bull EC Supp 1/87 "The Single Act a New Frontier".
3 see, inter alia, EC Commission, (1987a) to (19870.
4 see European Parliament, (l987b).
5 see Agra Europe No.1261, 13.11.1987.
6 see OJ Annexe 2-360, pp275-98.
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would still be an import requirement (ibid P279).
When Parliament questioned the then Commissioner for agriculture, Frans
Andriessen, he first of all commented on the failure of farm incomes to rise with the
increase in Guarantee expenditure, saying that "there is something fundamentally amiss
with the agricultural policy and that therefore something fundamental must now be done
about it, even if it is not popular and not pleasant" (ibid P282). "Finally, it has also
been repeatedly stated in the debate that this is a budgetary policy. That is not true.
Adjustments to the agricultural policy are necessary on account of the market and
market conditions. The Budget too, calls for adjustments to be made, but it is not true
that it was budgetary considerations alone which now prompt us to make the proposals
which we have made. There are three factors involved: the market, the international
situation, and hence the world situation, and the fact that soaring agricultural costs are
gradually making it impossible to pursue other policies in the Community" (ibid).
Not for the first time in the history of the CAP, cereals were a major sticking-point
in the negotiations. The Commission had proposed an MGQ of 155mt, with a penalty
in the form of price-cuts, a line supported only by the UK and the Netherlands.
Germany however, supported by the majority of member states, was proposing an
MGQ of 158-160mt, with the penalty to be in the form of an additional co-
responsibility levy. At one point, the German minister Herr Kiechle was even claiming
that if the Commission's proposed land set-aside scheme were to come into operation,
stabilisers would become unnecessary.
The arguments over the proposals were fast-reducing confidence in the likelihood
of a decision being reached. By halfway through the summit, Britain was no closer to
Germany and France, and still opposing any moves aimed at watering-down the
proposals. To try and break the deadlock, Chancellor Kohl held bilateral
"confessionals" with each leader. It transpired that Mrs Thatcher had become a minority
of one, and in the end had to compromise in order for a deal to be concluded. The relief
with which this was greeted in the rest of Europe didn't just reflect agreement finally
being reached on the stabilisers package, but also the perceived change in the political
climate: It was felt that Mrs Thatcher had finally accepted that neither she (nor anyone
else) could single-handedly bludgeon the Community into submitting to their position.
It was felt moreover that it would now be much harder for any member state to
justifiably or successfully invoke the Luxembourg Compromise, and thus hold up the
development of the Community.
3.3
3.1.3: Details of the A~eement Concernine BudeetaIy Discipline
Article 199 of the Treaty of Rome requires that "the revenue and expenditure shown
in the budget shall be in balance". Expenditure may be classified as Compulsory or
Non-Compulsory, where the former refers to commitments arising directly out of
obligations under the Treaty and associated legislation, the main example being
agricultural guarantee expenditure (ie expenditure incurred by FEOOA's Guarantee
Section); and the latter referring to all other expenditure. The tightening of the rules on
budgetary discipline were aimed at once again restoring this situation.
The first major change to note was that which gave the EC a new own-resource. As
determined in a Council Decision of 24th June 19887, the first two 'traditional' own
resources were to be amended in that the levy payments and tariff revenues collected by
the member states were to be handed over net of the 10% collection cost
reimbursement. This is a major change, the significance of which will be seen below.
Secondly, the VAT own resource had a ceiling placed on it of 1.4%. Moreover, the
VAT assessment base was now to be restricted to 55% of a member state's GNP. One
criticism of VAT as a tax is that it is inherently regressive in nature. This measure was
therefore aimed at aiding those poorer member states for whom consumption represents
a very large percentage of total GNP. The most important development however
concerns the provision of a new own resource, based on member states GNP, the basis
of which, like VAT, is estimated on a theoretical common base. Once the monies from
the other three own resources have been called upon to cover expenditure, this 4th
resource can be called upon, subject to a ceiling being placed on TOTAL own
resources. Article 3 of the aforementioned Council Decision puts this total ceiling on
payment appropriations at 1.15% of EC GNP for 1988, rising to 1.20% by 1992
(equivalent to around 1.9% - 2.0% of the harmonised VAT base), or 1.3% for
commitment appropriations. This too is a significant development in terms of total
resources available to the EC for the funding of actual policies. Before, both the 10%
reimbursement to the member states to cover the collection costs of the two traditional
own resources, and the reimbursements made to the UK for its disproportionately large
net contribution, and the abatement of the German contribution to the funding of this
latter reimbursement, were taken out of own resources in such a way as to deprive the
EC of those funds for its other activities by reducing the effective own resources base.
What the new system allows is for those payments still to be made, and the EC not lose
out on the total own resources available for the funding of its activities, given the
'topping-up' nature of the new resource. The new resource moreover, being based on
7 88/3761EEC, Euratom. in OJLl8S. op cit, P24.
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GNP, ie a measure reflecting ability to pay, also reduces the relative burden falling on
the poorer members of the Community.
The Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the
Budgetary Proceduref established a financial perspective which outlined what in
effect was a medium term financial plan for the EC.9 This specified commitment
appropriations for the years 1988-1992 (in 1988 prices) for all forms of expenditure,
including 'EAGGF Guarantee', expenditure on which was expected to rise from 27.5b
ECU in 1988, to 29b ECU in 1992 (see Table 1).
TABLE I - THEFJNANCIAL PERSPECfIVE 1988-1992
All figures in 1988 prices.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
year total FEOGA Cc) as % of (b)
expenditure Guarantee
1988 45303 27500 60.70
1989 46885 27700 59.08
1990 48900 28400 58.08
1991 50950 29000 56.92
1992 52800 29000 54.92
SOURCE: the Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and
Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure, in OJL185, 15.7.88, P36.
The intended growth of this expenditure was to be limited to 74% of the growth rate
of the EEC's GNP (the 'Financial Guideline'). This had behind it the intention of
reducing FEOGA Guarantee expenditure as a percentage of total EC expenditure over
this period, thus releasing own resources for other sectors within the EC's operations.
This became doubly important given the increased own resources now available to the
EC. Tighter control was necessary to ensure that the increase didn't simply go into
funding an ever-expanding CAP. The target set out in COM(87)101 was that by 1992,
Guarantee expenditure should have fallen to just 55% of the total EC budget's outlay
(in 1988 for example, it turned out at 64%). See also Appendix Table 5 to see the
financial perspective updated to 1992 in current prices.
Another reform, to be considered in more detail below in Appendix 2, is that which
8 see OILI85, 15.7.88, P33.
9 Stahl, G. (1989).
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deals with the depreciation in value of agricultural stocks held in public storage.U' The
EC has long had a facility to allow for the financial depreciation of agricultural stocks
held, necessary because of the discrepancy between the 'value' at which they are
bought in (as determined by the intervention price, buying-in price, etc) and the
(usually lower) price that the stocks realise on resale. This lower price is due to two
factors: Firstly, stocks will deteriorate in quality whilst held in store to some degree.
More importantly however, most stocks will eventually be exported onto third country
markets, and will require a payment to cover the gap between the (usually higher) EC
market price, and the world price. Although this is in effect EXACTLY the same as the
'normal' export refund, the EC treat it differently in the budget, terming it 'other public
storage costs'. Despite this facility for depreciating the value of stocks during their time
held in store (which for some commodities has been up to five years), it has only rarely
been taken up. The new rules require that all newly created stocks must be fully
depreciated by the end of the calendar year in which they are purchased. That is, by the
end of that year, the value at which the stocks are entered into the accounts of the EC
must reflect the price at which they could realise on sale onto the world market. This is
a most significant development in terms of improving the financial discipline under
which the CAP operates.
To illustrate this point, consider a hypothetical year pre-1988, when the EC is, by
August say, starting to run out of own resources for that financial year. A large harvest
of wheat has been brought in, and a considerable surplus must be disposed of. The
cereals management committee can either agree to export it, or let it be put into
intervention stores. If it is exported, FEOGA must reimburse the exporter the value of
the total export refund within a few months. If the surplus is put into store however,
the short term call on FEOGA's funds is limited to the monthly payments to the
member states which only partially cover the technical and financial costs of holding
surplus stocks!", with the main expense, that of 'other public storage costs', not being
faced until the product is actually removed from store, which could be up to 5 or so
years away. This system has also had significant distributional consequences. The
initial expenditures are incurred by the member states, who then make monthly claims
for reimbursement on the technical and financing costs incurred. These reimbursements
have however been made by FEOGA at a rate less than the full cost of these operations
10 Council Decision 88/377/EEC concerning budgetary discipline.
11 technical costs cover the physical costs of moving the product into and out of store, as well as the
actual costs of keeping it there. Financial costs represent an interest payment on the member Slates'
'investments' in the stocks, ie it represents the opportunity cost of having capital tied up in the fonn of
stocks.
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as incurred by the member states. Thus in this way there has been a 'hidden' transfer of
resources from the member states to FEOGA. In addition, the payment of the remainder
of the cost of holding intervention stocks, that of 'other public storage costs' hadn't, up
to the 1988 reforms, been met by FEOGA until the stocks were sold out of
intervention, with the burden being fully borne by the member states in the meantime.
Thus fanners (producers) received their payment relatively prompnyl s, whereas
member states (thus taxpayers) received a less than full payment for the costs incurred
by operating the intervention system for the EC, and also faced delays in the amounts
they were reimbursed. Moreover, this would have hit the northern member states more
heavily as the main intervention products have traditionally been the 'northern' products
of cereals, dairy products and beef.
Thus the system as it operated before 1988 allowed for the real cost of operating the
CAP to be hidden and deferred by this' form of 'creative accountiug'l '. as well as
partly being passed onto the member states over and above the contributions via the
own-resources system. Whilst this was fine for perhaps one or even two years, given
the extent to which intervention stocks rose during the 1980's, eventually the
consequences of this action would be felt. In the long-term, this was a more expensive
action, given the 'refund' still had to be paid for, but there were also the technical and
financial costs to be covered in the meantime as well. This point concerning the non-
depreciation of stocks, and the adverse consequences that will result for the budget of
the EC is discussed in greater detail and illustrated by means of a simple model in
Appendix 1. As was noted above, the rules now require the value of stocks to be
written down each year to fully reflect the declining price they will realise on sale from
intervention. This point is discussed, with numerical examples, in much greater detail
in Appendix 2.
Two further points need to be made concerning the issue of the "burden of the
past". Firstly, this reform only referred to how newly constituted stocks were to be
dealt with financially, namely that the depreciation was to be dealt with within the
constraints of the financial guideline. Regarding stocks already held by 1988 however,
funding for the depreciation of these was to occur outside the guideline. This is seen by
Shackleton as a concealment of the true cost of getting the agricultural markets back on
a sound financial footing. He notes 14 that this will contribute to the real cost of
12 although over time, the gap between sale into intervention and payments to farmers from the
intervention agencies has been increased slightly, as a way of saving money.
13 Swinbank, A. (1988).
14 Shackleton, M. (1990), P28.
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FEOGA's operations only falling to around 63% of the total budget in 1992, rather than
the targeted 55%.
A second point is that over the years, this failure to depreciate the value of
agricultural stocks has contributed greatly to the so-called 'burden of the past'. The
other contributor to this has been open-ended structural policies, commitments for
which have extended over a great number of years. This too has been reformedl l,
with in most cases projects now only having funds made available for a maximum of
five years, thus correcting the other major form of creative accounting within the CAP.
The extent of this burden can be seen in Tables 2 and 3.
TABLE 2 - THE EXTENT OF FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT
IN THE MID-1980'S
% OF VAT RATE CONTRIBUTION (unless otherwise stated)
Actual VAT rate
non-budgeted expenditure:
-deficit (at 1987)1
-non depreciation of
agricultural stocks
-"cost of the past"
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
1.00 1.14 1.23 1.40 1.39
0.10 0.23
0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.03
0.09 0.06 0.09
V A T rate required for
proper financing 1.22 1.28 1.40 1.60 1.65
Accumulated liabilities
(in b ECU) 3.0 6.0 8.6 12.2 17.0
NOTE: 1) Guarantee deficit plus traditional own resources shortfall, 1986-87.
SOURCE: EC Commission 0987a), Page 4
IS by Council Reg (ECSC, EEC EURATOM) No 2049/88, in OJLl85, 15.7.88, P3.
3.8
TABLE 3 - AGRICULTURAL STOCK OVERVALUATION
end of year (billion ECU)
Value at 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intervention Price 4.0 7.0 8.8 10.6 11.2 12.3
Market Price 2.2 3.6 4.3 4.9 3.7 4.2
Depreciation Required 45% 49% 51% 54% 67% 66%
SOURCE: As for Table 2, (Page 7).
3.1.4: Details of the Agreement Concerning Agricultural Policy Reforms
As for the 'stabilisers'Jv, that is the measures aimed at controlling agricultural
production, the sectors where quotas were already in operation, namely sugar and milk,
had the operation of those quotas confirmed and generally strengthened. For the other
sectors, the main weapon is the setting of a maximum guaranteed quantity, or MGQ,
with some form of price penalty if this is exceeded:
SECTOR
cereals
STABILISER
MGQ + additional 1.5% CRL, repaid in full if
production less than MGQ, and repaid in part if the
overrun is less than 1.5%. For a greater overrun, up to
a further 1.5% could be charged. For any overrun, the
intervention price is cut by 3% the following year. This
cut is cumulative.
oilseeds and protein plants MGQ, with production aid and support-price cuts the
wine
following year for MGQ overrun. This cut is not
cumulative.
MGQ (+ any shortfall from previous years), with cut
in production aid payable at end of year if net MGQ
exceeded in that year.
MGQ, with price cuts which can be offset by
grubbing-up vines.
MGQ, with cut in production aid if MGQ exceeded.
MGQ, BUT applicable on quantities withdrawn from
olive oil
cotton
fresh fruit and vegetables
16 see OJ Ll lt), 22.4.1988 for the legislative details and eg EC Commission (1988a) for a broader
description.
3.9
processed fruit and
vegetables
market rather than quantity produced. Overruns result
in cuts in 'basic' and 'buying-in' prices the following
year.
ElmER: MGQ, with cuts in the production aid the
following year if the MGQ is exceeded;
QR: aid limited to a pre-determined quantity (equivalent
to a production quota system).
With regard to price cuts, it is unclear from the legislation whether the cut should be
an absolute one off the current year's price, or as happened in the early 1980's, a cut in
the intended price rise for next year. With cereals, for example, if the MGQ is
exceeded, "the intervention prices for the following marketing year shall be reduced by
3%." 17 Given this wording, either interpretation could be applied. In practice
however, the former of the two possible methods of implementation has been the one
used. Thus for example, with the 1989/90 price decisions for cereals other than durum
wheat, the intervention price was cut by 3% (in ECU terms), ie there was an 'intended'
zero change in support prices, plus the 3% cut under the stabiliser system. The same
thing occurred with the 1990/91 price-setting.
As referred to earlier, these 1988 budgetary discipline/agricultural stabiliser
measures differ from the 1984 package in that they are now legally binding on the
institutions of the EC. This is ensured through the Council Decision concerning
budgetary discipline.If Article 5 demanded that the Commission's proposals and the
Council's decisions must be consistent with the Guideline. If the Commission feels the
Council's decisions will result in the Guideline being breached, it will refer the
decisions back to a special meeting of the Council. Moreover, unlike the 1984 package,
which had a 2-year leeway should the expenditure ceiling be exceeded, the "agricultural
Guideline must" now "be respected each year." Article 6 acts to ensure this, by
establishing an "early warning system". Each year, for each chapter in the budget, the
Commission sets out monthly spending profiles based on the monthly expenditure
incurred over the previous three years. If spending rises above profile, or threatens to
do so, the Commission shall examine the operation of the stabiliser and, if they deem it
necessary, will submit proposals to the Council, who must act "within a period of two
months in order to remedy the situation".
17 Reg (EEC) No 1097188, in OJL1lO of 29.4.1988, P7; Art2(3).
18 88/377/EEC in OJL18S 15.7.88, P29.
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3.1.5: The Summer of 1988 and its Consequences
A few months after the February Brussels meeting, Jacques Delors addressed the
G7 meeting in Toronto. There, he declared the CAP to be reformed, agricultural
spending had been "cut", and he added that no further concessions should be made -
farmers had had as much as they could take. Looking back on the events of the period
since the 1988 reforms, it can be seen that through 1988 and 1989, large budget
savings were indeed realised (even if saying that spending had been cut was a little
excessive). There is however much conjecture over the possible cause or causes of this.
The 'event' which puts doubt on the Commission's interpretation of things came from
the United States of America, in the form of a drought in the Mid-West. The effect of
this was felt primarily on the world cereals market. World cereals prices rose sharply,
reducing dramatically the levels of EC export restitution payments necessary. Through
1988, these payments fell from about $120/t to $60-70/t. In addition, the firming of
demand for EC grains helped in the reduction of stock levels, so leading to reduced
expenditures there by both reducing existing stocks and lessening the demand for
storage for the 1988 harvest. As predicted by Ackrilll'' however, the benefits from this
only lasted for two years. More recent data on the world grains situation20 indicated
that whilst production rose year by year from 1988/9, during 1990/1 the rebuilding of
stocks eased right off, and the rise in consumption slowed.
This having been said however, there were a number of sectors causing immediate
concern, in addition to the cereals sector. An article in Agra Europe21 indicated that the
main overspending sectors were beef, sheepmeat, dairy, fruit and vegetable, and wine.
With beef for example, the problems hung over from 1990, when there was a BSE
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad-cow disease) scare in the UK and Ireland.
In Ireland also, there was the problem of the collapse of Goodman International, the
company that controlled 40% of the Irish beef industry. In addition to this, the EC
industry faced very tough competition on the internal market from cheap imports of
beef from the former East Gennany. With the cereals sector, appropriations for 1990
were 4390m ECU, but were 5242m ECU for 1991.22 The main areas of expenditure
for which greater appropriations were allowed for were export refunds (up from 2846m
ECU in 1990 to 3236m ECU in 1991), and the coresponsibility levy23, (where
19 see Ackrill, R. (1988).
20 Agra Europe No. 1426, 8.2.91, page M/B.
21 Agra Europe No.1426, 8.2.91,page PIt.
22 though as these are only appropriations. the actual ouuurn figures may well differ - up or down.
23 counted in the budget as negative expenditure. therefore appearing as a negative number in the
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'revenues' are 'down' from -1l77m ECU to -899m ECU).24
In total, the Commission as at February 1991 was forecasting a budget overrun of
1875m ECU in 1991, despite the Guideline set for 1991 at 31516b ECU (in 1991
prices).
The debate on the future course of the CAP then had to focus on the price proposals
for 1991/92. In the cereals sector, the coresponsibility levy was set to rise from 3% to
6%, BUT farmers were to be exempt from the levy if they set aside 15% of their land.
The intervention price for hard wheat was scheduled to be cut by 7% (if the Council
agreed with the Commission proposals). Perhaps more significantly however in terms
of keeping the overall expenditure within the Guideline was that on the same day that
the Commission announced the price proposals, they also announced that the 1990
harvest came in at 159.7mt, or slightly less than the MGQ. Thus the budget lost
Additional CRL revenues (or 'negative expenditures'). In the beef sector, the proposal
was that the emergency intervention safety net be abolished, and the level to which the
market price must fall before normal intervention will occur was, it was proposed, to be
cut by 8%. In practice, this meant that if these proposals were accepted, and the beef
market returned to 'normal', then there should have been virtually no intervention
purchases the next year. With the dairy sector, a 2% cut in quota was proposed, but
there was to be no price cut. Other sectors facing the possibility of price cuts, included
oilseeds, rice and peas (all 3%), sugar (5%), and tobacco (10%). These proposals, if
accepted by the Council, would still have resulted in spending on agricultural price
support rising by 30% that year, from 25.1b ECU to 32.5b ECU, and there would still
have been the need for a supplementary budget. These measures however still fell well
short of those proposed in a paper written by the Agricultural Directorate and discussed
in January 1991.25 There, it was proposed that cereals prices should be cut to levels
around 30 ECU/t above the current world -price level26 (to give a 90 ECU/t
intervention price and 100 ECU/t target price), with direct payments made to fully
compensate small farmers, and partially compensate larger farmers so long as they set
expenditure section of the budget rather than in the revenue section.
24 figures from the 1991 budget of the EC. in OJL30. 4.2.91. pp456-462.
25 The "MacSharry Plan". See. for example. Agra Europe No. 1423, 18.1.91. page E/lff.
26 This is never defined. It isn't clear if it is the third country selling price of EC exports. or cif
border price of EC imports. At the end of June 1992. data from HGCA and Agra Europe suggest that
both are higher than the 90/100 ECU per tonne figures imply. It could be therefore that the EC are
taking as the world price the lower long-term trend value for the third country selling price of EC
exports (considered in the context of intervention stock depreciation in Appendix 2). Some illustrative
calculations there suggest the appropriate order of magnitude for this price.
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aside land. The CRL, MGQ and srabiliser mechanisms would then be abolished. For
oilseeds, the proposal had been for price cuts of a similar size to cereals, with aid paid
again on condition of land being set aside. For milk, the global quota was to be cut by
4.5%, with an intervention price cut of 10%. For beef, the intervention price was to
have been cut by 15%, with the beef premium raised, but available on fewer head.
3.1.6: The Decisions of 1991
General negotiations for a major reform of the CAP, with the MacSharry proposals
as the starting point, were scheduled for later in 1991. In the meantime however, the
1991 price decisions had to act to try to restrain expenditure within the Guideline. Prior
to the negotiations, it became clear that action was going to have to be taken to ensure
that the guideline wasn't breached, with rising expenditures in a number of sectors.
During the negotiations, all member states bar the UK and the Netherlands argued that
because of German unification, there was a need for the Guideline to be increased. The
Commission and the two member states opposed this however on the grounds that
extra appropriations had already been made available for this - the principal reason for
the continuing rise in expenditures under the CAP was worsening imbalances internally
in a number of sectors, coupled with deteriorating world market conditions. Eventually
an agreement was reached, but it required a softer position by the Commission to get
the other member states, especially France to agree-".
Certain features of the 1991/2 price agreement, and the concessions that the
Commission had to make, are set out below:
With cereals, the Commission wanted a 6% basic CRL, but the agreement just
raised the CRL to 5%. If however farmers agreed to set aside 15% of their land for one
year, they would be exempt from this levy. Producers already in the 5-year scheme
would get the extra 2% levy refunded. In the oilseeds sector, the Commission wanted a
3% price cut, but the final agreement cut prices by 1.5%.
Turning briefly to some other sectors, in the dairy sector, the 2% quota cut
proposed by the Commission was passed, but there was now the facility for member
states to add to their national reserves, and reallocate this quota to, for example,
producers in less favoured areas. In the beef sector, the plan to abandon the 'safety net'
intervention purchases wasn't passed. The only change is that the trigger price has been
lowered - to 78% on an EC-weighted basis, and 72% in any individual member state.
Regarding 'ordinary' intervention, the buying-in price was also lowered, by 4% (the
27 The Commission had partly to twist the other member states' arms by threatening to take the final
decision on the price proposals away from the agriculture ministers. passing n to the finance ministers.
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Commission wanted an 8% cut).
Whilst the compromises forced on the Commission were expected to cost an extra
800m ECU28, they were able to ensure that those arguing for an increase in the
Guideline weren't successful in that wish. Also, as far as the cereals sector was
concerned, there was now an element of cross-compliance, with the lowering or
removal of the CRL conditional on land being set aside. Moreover, as the package was
expected to push spending up to the Guideline ceiling, the Commission's hand hadn't
been weakened for the negotiations later on in 1991 when a more extensive reform of
the CAP would be discussed.
3.1.7: Summary up to 1991
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion and from Tables 2 and 3, by 1987 the
extent of financial mismanagement had grown to such a magnitude that the future
development of the whole EC was being threatened. In February 1988 therefore, the
European Council agreed reforms to both the way in which agriculture was supported
under the CAP, and more broadly, reforms to the financing of the EC, in particular
creating a new own resource based on the relative GNP's of the member states. In the
immediate wake of this, as can be seen from Appendix Table 1, spending on farm
support continued to fall as a percentage of total EC expendi lure in 1988, and in 1989
actually fell in absolute terms. The Commission took this to be a vindication of the
1988 reforms, but with hindsight, it appears that the dominant feature influencing this
favourable, though short-lived, fall in expenditure, was the drought in the US. Indeed,
in the latter part of 1990, it appeared that expenditure was once again starting to rise.
Certain features of the budgetary reforms actually, paradoxically, made this more
likely, the main one being the way in which stocks were now to be valued. For the
reasons discussed above, there were rising stocks of a number of major commodities
through 1990 but unlike previously, the financial consequences of this couldn't be put
off, as happened in the early 1980's. Now, the financial effects are felt by FEOGA
immediately, and thus any rise in stocks are accompanied by a more immediate rise in
FEOGA expenditure than occurred in the past.
Moreover, there was one fundamental aspect of the stabiliser reforms, missed by
many, that made them less effective in restraining production than was at first
predicted. That is the point that support to agriculture was still 'open-ended', that is,
regardless of how much farmers produced, there was still, to a large extent, support for
all of that produce given that it can be sold at a price domestically that is greater than
28 Financial Times, 29 May 1991. Page 30.
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prices on the world market. The only major exception to this was where rules for
intervention were tightened up, so that sale into intervention was restricted to certain
months of the year or, as with some commodities, the quality requirements for
purchase increased. All that happened under the stabiliser mechanism was that the
support to farmers would occur in future years at a reduced price level; a policy that,
over the years, appears not to have been successful in containing production, given the
strong rising trends in yields for so many of the commodities supported under the
CAP. The only exception to this point was in such sectors as oilseeds, where the
stabiliser rules permitted such large price cuts that farmers' marginal returns were
significantly affected (athough the long term impact of this was undermined by making
the price cuts non-cumulative).
3.1.8: A Look to the Future
The reform proposals put forward by the Commission in December 1990 received a
hostile reception. Foremost among the causes of this was the way in which the
payments to cereals producers compensating them for lower support prices,
discriminated against the larger, more efficient producers. In late June 1991 therefore,
revised reforms appeared which aimed at correcting this, as well as appearing to have
one eye on the GAIT negotiations which, at that time, were making no headway.
Agreement was finally reached on 22th May 1992. For the first time, a reform
package was agreed that moved away from the original support system, based on high
market prices. The new system supports farmers by means of direct payments. The
new policy covers the arable, tobacco, milk, beef, and sheepmeat sectors from the
1993/4 crop year. In addition to the changes to the support regimes, the set aside
arrangements have been extended, as have environmental measures, early retirement
and forestry.
The new arrangements for cereals and oilseeds are considered in more detail in
Chapter 4. One key point with the new system is that initially, the direct income
payments were to be degressive over time. As they currently stand however, there is no
degression in the scheme as it appears up to 1997. The delaying of the question of
reducing the payments after that date permitted agreement to be reached, but on past
experience this may make agreement in the future harder to make. Moreover, it may
well undermine any chances the new system has of returning the agricultural markets
(and the EC budget) back towards balance. This will be considered in greater detail in
the later chapters of the thesis.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1- TRENDS IN EC EXPENDITURE FROM 1973
NB 1973-77 in mio ua, 1978-80 in mio EUA and 1981 on in mio ECU
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Year Total Expenditure FEOGA Guarantee (c) as % of (b)
1973 4004.6 3174.2 79.26
1974 4516.4 3277.9 72.58
1975 6411.2 482l.5 75.20
1976 7287.6 5365.0 73.62
1977 8704.9 6166.8 70.84
1978 11973.1 9264.6 77.38
1979 14367.1 10417.5 72.51
1980 16290.4 11283.2 69.26
1981 17792.8 10960.2 61.60
1982 20422.7 12369.5 60.57
1983 24313.0 15788.2 64.94
1984 27523.6 18328.3 66.59
1985 28098.7 19725.9 70.20
1986 34192.8 22120.0 64.69
1987 35324.2 22951.8 64.97
1988 41278.9 26389.6 63.93
1989 41131.0 24460.4 59.47
1990 43324.8 24979.5 57.66
1991* 56085.4 32419 57.80
1992* 62827.6 36022 57.33
SOURCES
1973-1990: EC Court of Auditors Annual Reports (in OJC Series) - various years
1991-1992: Budget of the EC for 1992, OJL26, 3.2.92.
* - These figures are payment appropriations.
Note Mio is Eurojargon for 'million'. Thus for example, 4004.6 Mio ua is 4.0046
billion ua.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2 - A~TLlAL FEQGA
GLlARA~TEE EXPE~DITLlRE 127J - 1220
AS A PERCENTAGE ~lF INTENDED EXPENDITURE
(units of account as for Appendix Table 1)
Year Percentage Year Percentage
1973 134.39 1982 90.49
1974 97.89 1983 112.35
1975 108.94 1984 111.10
1976 94.11 1985 98.86
1977 106.78 1986 105.27
1978 124.39 1987 99.95
1979 108.72 1988 92.63
1980 98.31 1989 84.26
1981 86.41 1990 91.16
SOURCE: Budget of the European Communities (OJL series), various years.
(a)
Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
APPENDIX TABLE 3 - TRENDS IN EC QWN RESOURCES FROM
.l21J
NB 1973-77 in mio ua, 1978-80 in mio EUA and 1981 on in mio ECU
(b) (c) (d)
Total 'Traditional' financial
o.r. contributions
4583.9 2496.6 2087.3
4971.5 3067.7 1903.8
5893.1 3741.1 2152.0
7710.3 5228.2 2482.1
8200.2 5705.7 2494.5
customs agricultural sugar GNP VAT
duties levies levies
12003.9 4390.9 1872.7 410.6 5329.7
14372.4 5189.1 1678.6 464.9 2302.1 4737.7
15427.6 5905.8 1535.4 466.9 7519.5
18024.0 6392.4 1264.9 482.6 9884.1
21164.2 6815.3 1522.0 705.8 12121.1
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1983 23013.6 6988.7 1347.1 948.0 13729.8
1984 24880.0 7960.8 1260.0 1176.4 14482.8
1985 26080.8 8310.1 1121.7 1057.4 15591.6
1986 33270.7 8172.9 1175.5 1111.5 22810.8
1987 35349.1 8936.5 1626.1 1471.7 23314.8
balancing collection
item costs
1988 40883.3 10344.7 1504.6 1390.7 4445.8 24522.6 -1325.0
1989 44329.3 11458.8 1282.7 1381.6 1641.8 29976.7 -1412.3
1990 41413.1 11427.9 1173.4 910.7 284.5 28967.8 -1351.2
1991 52907.8 13277.6 1262.3 1288.2 8408.0 30255.9 -1584.2
1992 62441.7 12888.8 1353.1 1236.0 14280.8 34232.4 -1549.4
SOURCES
1973-1990: EC Court of Auditors Annual Reports (in OlC Series) - various years
1991-1992: Budget of the EC for 1992. NB These are expected revenues required
to cover the appropriations set out in Appendix Table 1.
NOTE
During the accession of Greece and Portugal, their VAT based contribution is being
replaced by an additional GNP based contribution.
APPENDIX TABLE 4 - THE COST OF UK REBATES IN YAT %
TERMS
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
0.117 0.125 0.1200'<)82 0.0980.]490.1270.187
NB. 1986 is an estimate
1987 excludes 0.018 additional payment for 1988
1988 includes 0.0] 8 for 1986
SOURCE: Commission 21 sr General Report, page 64.
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APeE~DIX TABLE S - THE FI~A~CIAL PERSPECTIVE 1288-1222
(APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMITMENT - CURRENT PRICES)
(million ECU)
(a) (b) (c) Cd)
year total FEOGA Cc)as % of (b)
expenditure Guarantee
1988 45303 27500 60.70
1989 48464 28613 59.04
1990 53485 30700 57.40
1991 61477 33000 53.68
1992 66592 35039 52.62
SOURCE: Commission 25th General Report, page 293.
APPENDIX 1
FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT AND BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE
'11ie people's curse is on tlie man wfio hoards the wfuat,
..l'l 6Cessine on fiim wfio seas it.
{Proverbs 11 :26, [erusalem 'Bib{e}
As was discussed above, the EC's failure to deal in a 'correct' financial manner
with incorporated stocks led to a large financial burden known as the 'burden of the
past'. The Commission estimated this over-valuation of stocks to be around 8b ECU by
1987.29 As was also discussed, this gave the cereals management committee a
loophole they could potentially exploit should financial pressures grow too great in any
particular year. To consider how this could come about, consider the following
theoretical models of management committee behaviour.
The starting point is the assumption that there is an optimal cost-minimising balance
of sales of surplus products between export and intervention depending, inter alia, on
current and future world price levels, and the effect EC exports have on those levels,
and also on the discount rate. Budgetary constraints, occurring either on the income
side with the exhaustion of own-resources, or on the expenditure side with a limit
placed on possible expenditure, will distort this allocation in the short run, and will
29 EC Commission, (1987a), page 7.
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create a financially unsustainable policy in the long-run.
Assume initially there is no financial restriction on the operations of the committee.
Assume also (initially at least) that there are no carryover stocks into the first time
period under consideration, there are constant unit storage costs, there is a constant unit
export subsidy rate, there are just two outlets for surplus production - export now or
storage now and export later. Both the future export price and discount rate are known,
budgetary resources can't be carried over from year to year, there is a constant level of
surplus each year, and the aim of the management committee is to minimise surpl us
disposal costs (subject to any budget constraints that may be present).
Regarding the assumption of constant per unit storage costs, whilst economies of
size in storage may be available to the national intervention authorities, payments made
by FEOGA to reimburse those authorities for storage costs are made on a flat-rate
f
basis. Thus looking at this cost from FEOGA's viewpoint, it can be seen that per unit
storage costs are indeed constant.
Consider model 1 (developed from Diagram 1):
MODELl: DIAGRAM 1 - THE COST IMPLICATIONS OF EITHER
STORING OR EXPORTING
BUDGET
COSTS DIAGRAM la: ALL EXPORTED
C
current export costs
o ~------------------------~---------- A
SURPLUS
PRODUCfION
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BUDGET
COSTS
DIAGRAM Ib: ALL STORED
D
B
SURPLUS
PRODUCTION
InDiagram la, all the surplus quantity OA is exported. Assuming a constant rate of
export refund, OC is a straight line, with a slope equal to the unit refund level. Diagram
1b shows the outcome of OA being stored now, and exported later. Given the
assumptions regarding constant unit storage costs and export refunds, OB and OD are
also straight lines. Assuming OA is constant each year, and constant unit export
refunds, BD, the cost of exporting the surplus in a future year, equals AC, the cost of
exporting all the surplus in the current year, discounted at the appropriate rate.
Reversing Diagram Ib and amalgamating Diagrams la and 1b yields Diagram 2,
overpage. The quantity exported in the current time period reads from 0 to A, and the
quantity stored currently and exported later reads from A to O. So, for example at A,
the whole quantity is exported in the current time period, and at 0, the whole quantity is
stored currently, and exported later. Given these assumptions, the committee will either
export all of OA in the current time period, or store it all currently and export it later,
depending on which is the lower cost option (ie is AC or OD the lower budget cost ?)
The key variables determining this are the per unit levels of exportrefund and storage
cost, and the discount rate. As Diagram 2 is drawn, the committee will choose to export
all now. If in this simplified scenario however the discount rate and the unit storage
cost changed sufficiently relative to the unit export refund level, this situation could be
reversed. Except for the unlikely situation where OD=AC, where the committee would
be indifferent between outlets, the committee will therefore face a corner solution, either
exporting all now, or storing all now and exporting all later. Note that in Diagram 2, the
unit export cost is NOT given simply by the slope of the line BC, because the total
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export cost for a given level of exports is given by the vertical distance between AB and
BC at that particular export level, not by the height of BC above the x-axis.
DIAGRAM 2: TOTAL STORAGE AND EXPORT COSTS
BUDGET
COSTS
D
B
future export costs C
current storage costs
O~----------------------~~------------A SURPLUS
PRODUCfION
Note that the model presented assumes that if there is no net exportable surplus,
there are no budget costs. This can be justified by assuming that with the 'surplus
production' so defined, there is no short term public storage of any production, and any
modest expons that are made with refunds are exactly offset with imports with the same
unit VIL applied. Thus the impact on the budget is neutral.
From this position, the model can now be made more realistic by relaxing the
assumption regarding unit export refund rates. It can now be assumed that as exports
rise, so the world price falls and the unit export refund rises. That is, it is now being
assumed that the EC is a 'large exporter', and the volume of exports is sufficiently great
so as to alter the level of prices on the world market. Graphically, both BC and CD
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become curvilinear. The impact of this is to make the cost-minimising solution one
where only part of the surplus OA is exported in the current time period, with some
being held in store until a later time period. This can be seen on Diagram 3. Here, OE is
exported, with EA being sold into intervention and exported subsequently. FG is the
cost of exporting OE, EF is the cost of storing EA, and GH is the discounted cost of
exporting EA in the future. This diagram therefore shows the cost minimising balance
of disposing of the surplus quantity OA between intervention and export, with no
external constraint on this activity.
DIAGRAM 3: TOTAL STORAGE AND EXPORT COSTS
FOR A LARGE EXPORTER
BUDGET
COST
CD
A SURPLUS
PRODUCTION
With the Common Agricultural Policy however, there will necessarily be a
constraint on the EC's spending activities. This will occur because, as mentioned
before, expenditure shouldn't exceed revenues in anyone year. Consider therefore
Diagram 4 overpage, with a budget ceiling of OL imposed. Without this constraint, the
cost minimising point would have been at H, with OE exported and EA stored. For this
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particular year however, the capped budget of OL is insufficient to fund that level of
exports, so El exports must be diverted from export to intervention. Given the
assumption of constant levels of surplus production needing to be disposed of each
year, in the following year there is a disposable surplus of OA, plus lA carried over
from the previous year (IA=AJ). Thus in this second time period, there is a total
surplus of OJ requiring disposal. Assuming there is no change in the unit storage costs,
AB and JK will be parallel.
DIAGRAM 4: BUDGET CONSTRAINT IMPOSED ON A LARGE EXPORTER
BUDGET
COST
K
L
B
I E A J
SURPLUS
PRODUCfION
As Diagram 4 is drawn, with OK>OL, this policy would be financially unsustainable
by the second year, even if all the surplus production of OJ were put into store. Thus,
even if the policy is such that the budget ceiling isn't breached until a number of years
have passed, it can be seen from Diagram 4 that ultimately, this policy is unsustainable.
This 'crisis point' will occur when the total of annual production plus carryover of
intervention stocks generates costs beyond own resources. In the experience of the EC,
this happened despite the increase in own resources in 1986 resulting from the
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European Council meetings of 1984.
Moreover, the model illustrates a point which is crucial to the success of any policy
reforms enacted by the EC. Given that the EC rule that the budget must be in balance,
and the additional constraint effective since 1988 that total expenditure on agricultural
market support can only increase in line with the Guideline, then the problems arising
out of the way the CAP operated during the early and mid 1980's will only be
prevented by ensuring both that there is no more financial mismanagement of the sort
that generated the 'burden of the past', and that the growth in agricultural production is
successfully curtailed. The former reform, by itself, will not be sufficient to alleviate
the ills of the CAP.
An alternative representation of this particular problem can be seen in Diagram 5
overpage. EBl, EB2 and EB3 are rectangular hyperbolic 'equi-budget' lines. The total
surplus is Otl. Given this quantity, and an available budget of EBI or above, the
committee has a free hand in deciding whether to dispose of the total surplus quantity to
intervention or export, or whether some should go for export and the rest be put into
intervention.
If the budget was set lower, at EB2 say, then an effective constraint would be put
On the committee's operations. The quantity RB could be exported at the full export
refund level 'r', but there would be the quantity BA (=s) for which there would be no
funds left to do anything with - not even storage costs could be covered. Alternatively,
all of Otl could be exported at a refund level PwD, but this would leave these exports
uncompetitive on third country markets. What is needed therefore is a way of allocating
all of Otl between export and intervention, whilst not breaching the budget ceiling
EB2. Let 'a' be the per unit storage cost. The line RS is a 'blend-price' line of
combinations of sales to export and intervention. If all of the surplus is stored in any
year, the unit cost to the budget in that year is 'a'. If it is entirely exported, the unit cost
is 'r', For combinations of export and storage, the unit cost is given as the height of RS
above Pw. A budget constraint of EB2 would permit maximum exports of EA, with the
remainder RE going to intervention. This yields a unit cost of PwD. The limit case is
represented by a budget constraint of EB3. Here, the budget could just cover the
Storage costs of all of Otl being put into intervention in that particular year, but would,
ceteris paribus, result in too great a demand on the following year's budget for the
policy to be sustained.
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MODEL 2: DIAGRAM 5 - STORAGE AND EXPORT UNDER
A BUDGET CONSTRAINT
p
r
ESec
b
~----------------------------+----------------Pw
OL....-------------L.------Q
tl
Let Ot1 = t. The proportion of underfunding of the total surplus is sIt. It first
needs to be re-stated that it is currently being assumed that s, t, r, d, and a are all
constant over time.
Current expenditure is equal to the quantity stored (ie carried over) times the per-
unit storage cost (ie c*a), plus the quantity exported times the unit export refund (ie r[t-
e)). With EB2 the budget constraint may be defined as r(t-s), ie the full refund rate
times the reduced quantity which can be exported at this rate, ie:
ca + r(t-c) = t(r-d) = r(t-s)
ea + r(t-c) = r(t-s)
ca+rt-cr=rt-sr
c(r-a) = sr
sr
c=-
r-a
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Thus, an expression is derived for the quantity carried over from year 0 to year 1
(the subscripts refer to years relative to year 0, the base year). What is needed however
is a general expression for the carryover in ANY year. Considering the carryover from
the second year, given the above assumptions, in year 1, s} (the current season's
surplus) and Co (the quantity carried over from the previous year) need to be both
carried over to the next year, if EB2} is only sufficient to finance tt-SI at rl' Therefore:
r(s+co)c =--
1 r-a
r[s+(~)]
r-a
=----
r-a
2
sr sr
=-+--
r-a (r_a)2
From this, a general expression for C
n
can be established:
2 n
sr sr sr
Cn=-+--- +.....+-
r-a ( 2 n
r-a) (r-a)
Cn=s(2:..)+s(2:..)2+.....+ s(2:..)nr-a r-a r-a
Thus it can be seen that the build-up of carryover stocks follows a geometric
progression, the general formula for which is:
where g=(~)
r-a
Turning now to diagram 6, it can be seen that eventually EB2 will reach (pw + a) at
point Y. What this shows is the "limit point" where output has reached the point where
the constrained budget is only sufficient to cover the minimum possible expenditure on
total production plus carryover Q ie if all output Q is put into store.
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rDIAGRAM 6: THE EXTREME POSITION - THE 'CRISIS POINT'
t
____ E~B2
OL-----------------~-------.----------
SURPLUS
PRODUCfION
Q
This can be written:
Qa = r(t-s)
rQ = (t-s)-
a
Given that in this situation the carryover is the full quantity of production plus
carryover from previous years, it can be written:
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ns(1-g ) = (t-s)':'
l-g a
n rI-g = (t-s)-(1-g)
as
n rg = 1- (t-s) - (1-g)
as
n log g = log [1 - (t-s)":" (I-g)]
as
log [I - (t-s) ..:.. (I-g)]
as
n = ----:------logg
Thus an expression has been derived which shows how many years it will take
before the budget is exhausted, ceteris paribus.
APPENDIX2
THE OPERATION OF STOCK DEPRECIATION
In order to prevent the internal price for agricultural commodities from falling below
a certain specified level on the internal EEC market, the Commission has at its disposal
the possibility of buying goods into intervention stores so as to restrict supply on the
market and sustain market prices. There are certain financial consequences arising from
this, including payments to cover the cost of the physical operations involved, and the
financial costs incurred by the member states in having capital tied up in the stocks. In
addition to these, there is the problem that stocks usually realise a lower price on sale
out of intervention than was paid when they were bought in. This, in the case of
products like cereals (and indeed butter, if stored correctly), is NOT due to a physical
deterioration in quality, but to the fact that when they are sold out of store, they are
usually sold onto the lower-priced world market (since to sell them back onto the
internal EEC market would undermine the reason for buying them in off that market in
the first place. Those products that are sold back onto the internal market are sold at the
prevailing internal market price unless going for non-food uses).
At some point, this difference must be paid for. Up until the 1988 Brussels
Summit, the full difference between the two prices would not be paid by FEOGA until
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the products were sold out of store, with the member states having to wait until then to
get reimbursed fully for the expenditure they incurred in buying in these products.
Following this Summit however, this situation changed, with the requirement now
being that the stocks are written down in value from the level at which they are bought
in, to the level at which they are expected to be sold out at, by the end of the financial
year during which they are bought in.
Regarding the expected future selling-price, this is taken as the estimate of the
future world price for that particular commodity, which is calculated as an extrapolation
of the average of the last few years' world prices (usually 5-10 years), since to try to be
any more "accurate" with the estimation would still leave problems due to the vagaries
of the world market and its susceptibility to external shocks such as the US drought.
Thus, having established the selling-out price for the particular commodity, and
knowing the buying-in price, the degree to which the commodity's value must be
depreciated is now known. In general, most depreciations use the facility allowed for in
the legislation whereby most, but not all, of the depreciating is done at buying-in, with
the balance being completed at the end of the financial year. For cereals, 75% of the
depreciating is done at buying-in, and the remaining 25% at the end of the year. This
does however vary between products, with for example milk products being
depreciated 70%/30%.
With intervention expenditure, the expenditure initially falls on the member states'
intervention authorities, who then get reimbursed month by month by means of the
monthly claims submitted to FEOGA. When a particular consignment of a product
enters store therefore, they will claim back the cost of the initial depreciation (75% for
cereals) in that month's claim. The way this is calculated is by means of the
depreciation coefficient ('k'), which appears in the Official Journal. The value for k for
cereals is 0.5530, ie by reducing the value of the cereals to 55% of the buying-in price,
the value has been reduced TO 25% of the difference between the buying-in and the
selling-out prices (given that products sell for at least something on leaving store).
and
Pk = 0.55Pbi
Pbi - Pk = 0.75 (Pbi - Pso)
I
2
substituting equation 1into equation 2 yields:
Pbi - 0.55Pbi = 0.75Pbi - 0.75Pso
or
Thus:
O.3Pbi = 0.75Pso
Pso = 0.4Pbi 3
30 OJL281, 30.09.89; Reg(EEC) No 2964/89.
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So, it can be seen from equation 3 that in depreciating newly constituted stocks, the
Commission is working on the basis that the world cereals price (ie that which the
stocks will realise when sold out onto the world market) is 40% of the buying in price.
As regards the actual financial transfers involved, there is a payment made relating
to the initial depreciation, and a subsequent one made relating to the final part of the
total depreciation at the end of the financial year. It ought to be noted that although the
regulation requires that the depreciation be done in full by the end of the year, if the
budget situation is too tight to allow the second part of the depreciation to be carried
out, then this requirement will not be fulfilled.
Consider this principle in action for October 1989:
The buying-in price for common wheat was 163.62 ECU/t.31 This figure gives an
implied selling-out price (ie world price) of 65.45 ECU/t. The!WC quoted the price on
20th October to be $155/t, or 140 ECU/t converted at Eurostat $/ECU exchange rates.
Repeating for December 1990, the common wheat buying-in price was 161.44
ECU/t32, implying a world price of 64.58 ECU/t. The IWC was quoting, for 14th
December, prices of $83/t fob for French wheat, and $81 fob for UK wheat. Taking the
French price, and converting it to ECU at the Eurostat-quoted exchange rate gives a
price of 60.72 ECU/l.
What is therefore happening is that the EC has taken the decision to consider the
long term trends in world prices, and depreciate down to that level (demonstrated to be
a level of 40% of the buying in price), rather than try to follow all the fluctuations in
current prices. What was therefore happening during 1988 and 1989 was that with the
high world prices following the US drought, the EC was over-depreciating its stocks.
For those years where that occurred, it was then the case that the member states
refunded FEOGA the amount of the over-reimbursement. Currently however, it can be
seen that the long term world price the EC is working to is approximately the actual
level. Whilst any divergence is going to result in administrative costs correcting the
imbalance, it will still probably be less than that required to have 'k' continually being
changed in order to get Pso to track the variable world price exactly all the time.
31 Home Grown Cereals Authority Bulletin 24/14.
32 HGCA Bulletin 2Sn.6.
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APPENDIX3
BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE AND THE US $
For many sectors within the EC budget, including the cereals sector, the ECU:$
exchange rate will play an important role in determining the overall level of support
expenditure, regardless of internal policy decisions. Considering the cereals sector in
detail, there are two main lines in the cereals chapter of the budget that will be heavily
influenced by exchange rate movements. They are the lines representing refund
expenditure on exports from the open market; and the line representing other public
storage costs, effectively refunds on exports from intervention. These lines will be
affected because they relate the internal cereals support price to the world price, the
latter normally being quoted in terrns of US$ per tonne. In terms of the per unit level of
refund payment made, or reimbursement given on export from intervention however,
the payment, made in ECU in the first instance, must cover the difference between the
internal and world prices when both are quoted in ECU terms. Thus ceteris paribus, a
change in the $:ECU exchange rate will affect the world price when Quoted in EeD.
This will in turn affect the level of unit refund required on exports. In general terms,
when the $ strengthens, so the ECU world price rises, and a lower unit refund is
required. The converse holds as well.
Despite this very important link between the EC budget and the value of the US$, it
wasn't until the 1988 policy reforms of 1988 that explicit account was taken of the role
of the ECU:$ exchange rate on budgetary expenditure.
During 1985 and 1986, two factors led to a heightened awareness of the problem.
Firstly there was the US Farm Bill that proposed cutting domestic support levels. This,
it was estimated33, would result in lower world prices of around 25% and greater EC
support expenditure of 400m ECU in 1986 alone. Soon after34, it was realised that the
financial limir, agreed at Fontainebleau in 1984, was going to be breached. Part of the
blame for this was levelled at the exchange rate movements that had occurred - the $
had fallen by 35% in the previous year, and by 22% since the budget had been agreed
at the end of 1985.35 The EC Commission had estimated that a fall in the value of the
$ by 10% would raise support expenditure by 800m ECU. Independent estimates put
33 Agra Europe No.1167, 17-1-86.
34 Agra Europe No. 1174, 7-3-86.
35 It must be noted that when estimating the appropriations each year in the budget, a particular
ECU:$ exchange rate is asswned. It was from this level that the $ had fallen by 22% in this particular
case.
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the figure at over 1 billion ECU. It had become all too apparent to the policy-makers
that the ECU:$ exchange rate played a very important, and potentially very disturbing
role in the finances of the EC, but until 1988, no policy was forthcoming that attempted
to offset this disturbance.
It was decided in 198836 that a monetary reserve should be established. It was to
consist of l000m ECU of provisional appropriations, "to cover development [sic]
caused by significant and unforeseen movements in the dollarlECU market rate
compared to the rate used in the budget". 37 Certain features of this arrangement need
to be highlighted. Firstly, the appropriations are only provisional because the reserve is
'held' by the member states, only to be drawn upon should the need arise. This need is
defined in terms of the actual expenditures incurred as compared with the forecast
expenditures. A 'significant' movement in the market rate is one which raises or lowers
actual expenditures by more than 400m ECU, when compared with the rate used in
drawing up the budget38. Moreover, these appropriations operate outside the
agricultural guideline. Thus if exchange rate movements affect expenditures by up to
400m ECU, but not more, then the burden is borne by the budget within the guideline.
If however costs rise by more than 400m ECU, the extra costs are borne by the
member states, with no extra pressure being placed on the guideline. Also, the reserve
operates in a symmetrical fashion. Thus savings over 400m ECU can be added to the
reserve, up to a maximum of lOOOmECU. Note that this reserve is to be called up
under the fourth, GNP-based own-resource, so the member states' contributions reflect
their wealth as measured by the harmonised GNP base. Moreover, "any
savings ...which have been transferred to the monetary reserve ...and which remain in
the monetary reserve shall be cancelled and ...be counted as a revenue item in
succeeding budgets",39 ie any sum remaining at the end of (he year is cancelled, and
counted as a budgetary surplus. Thus, sums over the IOOOmECU are not carried
forward to future years.
In 1988, "it was not necessary ... to have recourse to the reserve,,40. In 1989
however, considerable savings for the EC budget could be attributed to favourable
36 see the Council Decision of 24th June 1988 concerning budgetary discipline (88/377/EEC) in
OJL1S5, 15.7.1988, Page 29, and Article 10 in particular.
370p cit P29.
38 For the 1991 budget, the rate was $1=0.83ECU. For 1990 and 1989, the rate used was
Sl=O.81ECU.
390p cit P31, Article 12, second paragraph.
40 see EC Commission. (1989), P4.
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changes in the ECU:$ exchange rate.41 Total savings were put at 1219m ECU, 819m
ECU of which were transferred to the reserve. The other 400m ECU went to become
"unutilised appropriations". That is to say, the first 400m ECU of the total savings was
received by FEOGA. The converse would also have been true - that just the first 400m
ECU of any additional expenditure would be borne by FEOGA. "In 1990, recourse to
the monetary reserve was not necessary. ,,42
Although figures are not yet available for 1991, savings are once again possible. At
the beginning of the year, support costs were rising rapidly, partly due to a dollar
weakened by the Gulf War. After the end of hostilities however, the dollar rose sharply
- between mid-February and mid-April, it rose 12.2% against the ECU.43 Given the
assumptions made by Agra Europe, this will yield a saving of around 1.5b ECU. This
will be accentuated given also that the dollar had been falling since the start of the War,
and was therefore relatively weak when the 1991 budget was drawn up.
41 see BC Commission. (199Oa). P17.
42 see BC Commission. (1991). P2.
43 Agra Europe No.143S. 12.4.91. page P/4.
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CHAPIER 4; DETAILS OF THE CEREALS AND OILSEEDS SECIORS
'If necessity is tfie mother of invention, crisis seems tne mother of
redirection. in farm poficy.· Luther 9 'Ttueeten, '5'lgricu{turaf Poficy: 5'l
1lJview', I'J{_Food .9lnt! .9l.gricufturaf Poficy . .9l.merican 'Enterprise
Institute. 'Wasnington (P40).
4.1; INTRODUCI10N
As has been pointed out during the first two chapters, the sectors upon which this
thesis focuses most closely are cereals and oilseeds. These have been chosen because
of their central importance when looking at total CAP support expenditure (see below),
and also because the two sectors are very close in terms of policy linkages. The
purpose of this chapter is to look at the two sectors in detail, considering first the
methods of support employed. This offers a chance to compare and contrast the two
very different methods of support that were employed from the policies' instigation
until the reforms agreed in 1991 and 1992. This work will then be moved on to look at
how expenditures actually arise under the different regimes. To this end, consideration
will be given to work carried out that attempted to reproduce the expenditure figures for
cereals for 1986 and 1987, and 1986 for oil seeds. This was carried out in order to gain
particular insights into those expenditures, and also to act as an introduction to the later
work of actually modelling and forecasting expenditures in those sectors. In addition,
the questions of financial fraud and mismanagement will be examined, in order to see
whether or not these problems could seriously undermine the EC's attempts at
enforcing budgetary discipline.
4.2: METHODS OF SUPPORT IN THE TWO SECTORS
The main focus of this section is the policy format that applied to each sector from
their instigations, as it has been these policies that have shaped the patterns of
expenditure over the lifetime of the CAP. The oilseeds regime however was reformed
in 1991, with adjustments made in 1992 when the cereals regime was reformed, though
only with effect from the 1993/4 crop year. Thus as the new regimes principally
influence the forecasting sections of the thesis, discussion of their nature will occur
after the old systems have been examined in detail. With the cereals regime, the 'old'
system will still therefore be described in the present tense.
4.1
4.2.1; The Cereals Sector
The original support policy for cereals was determined in the 1960's at a time when
the EC was a major net importer of cereals. Indeed, the EC only became a net exporter
of cereals in the crop year 1980/811. The method of support employed offers an
illustration of the 'classic' method of price support in the EC. In this sector, support is
given to fanners by means of an internal price within the EC that is maintained at a level
generally above that prevailing on the world market. In Western Europe, most
agricultural markets can be typified as exhibiting relatively static, inelastic demand,
coupled to inelastic but increasing supply. Technological advance is an ongoing
process, and as will be seen in later chapters, this is usually modelled in a very simple
way by the use of a time trend. Thus new production methods are continually being
introduced which act to increase supply. The significance of the method of support
employed in the cereals sector is that by setting a price greater than the opportunity cost
of resources used in agriculture-, excess resources are encouraged to remain in
agriculture. This doesn't induce technological change per se, it simply encourages a
more rapid development of new, output-increasing technologies by artificially raising
demand. The short run supply curve is therefore pushed to the right, against a relatively
static commercial demand curve. For cereals specifically, the main demand is for animal
feed. Here, demand is actually falling slightly, accentuating the downward pressure on
prices.
The implication is that with a relatively stable and high institutionally-determined
support price insulated from the world market, and a 'free-market' internal price being
driven down over time, then at the high support price the net self sufficiency ratio will
rise over time. This has happened in the cereals sector, as with all sectors receiving
support under the CAP.
Moreover, because this price represents a disequilibrium position, in that EC supply
and demand are not equal, and because the EC's internal market is a place where lower-
cost third country suppliers can earn super-normal profits, then certain protective
devices must be permanently maintained in order to protect this high price for EC
cereals producers.
First, in order to prevent domestic over-supply from driving down the internal price
on the Community market, a system of intervention is operated. At the annual price-
fixing, the Council of Agricultural Ministers determine the 'Intervention Price', from
1 Data from the cereals balance sheets in the Agricultural Situation in the Community, Eurostat,
various years.
2 as measured at frcc trade prices.
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which is derived the 'Buying-In Price'. This is intended to put a floor in the market, so
that if producers can't realise at least this price by selling their crop on the open-market
(net of transport costs to the intervention store), then they can sell their crop to the
Community, via the intervention agencies in the member states, and thus receive at least
this minimum level of return.i
Second, protection must be given against cheap imports entering the Community
and selling on the internal market at a lower price than the comparable EC product. In
order to achieve this, the Council of Ministers first set the Target Price. This is set as
the market price at Duisburg in the Ruhr. This is deemed to be the place of greatest
cereals deficit within the EC, therefore having the highest market price. From this is
deducted the costs of transporting cereals from Rotterdam (the main point of import into
the Community) to Duisburg. This then yields the Threshold Price, that is, the
minimum import price for cereals corning into the Community. This having been
estimated, the Variable Import Levy (VIL) can be calculated. The Community considers
all the offer prices (cif) from exporters to the Community, takes the lowest, and sets the
Vll, as the difference between that and the Threshold Price.
At first glance, it might be assumed that when exporting to third countries, the EC
carries out the reverse operation in estimating the level of the export refund, ie the
payment required to producers to enable them to sell their produce on third country
markets at a price low enough to be competitive, yet still get a reasonable return. In
practice however, the unit refund is normally lower than the unit VIL. There are several
reasons for this:
When calculating the level of the refund, the aim is to take the price of the cereals
being exported down from the internal market price to the price at which the cereals sell
for on third country markets. This needs certain features to be highlighted. First, the
internal market price received by producers in the cereals sector tends to be around the
level of the intervention price, which is up to 35% lower than the target price. Thus the
EC internal 'reference' pricef is lower when calculating the export refund. Moreover,
whilst the third country selling price of EC exports is lower than that for the types of
cereals imported by the EC5, the difference between these two prices is typically less
3 In recent years, the degree of support offered to producers by the intervention system has been
undennined by various policy manipulations. These will be diSCUSSedin detail below.
4 With the cereals sector, the term 'reference' price has no specific meaning. unlike target. threshold.
intervention and buying in prices. It is used here to cover all these terms and their use when reference is
made to them in calculating the VIL. export refund. and payment to producers when selling to
intervention.
S Principally accounted for by quality differences - the high quality cereals imports, eg hard milling
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than that between the internal threshold and market prices.
Putting some numbers on this to illustratev, on Monday 17th August 1992, the
import levy for wheat was 147.99 ECU/t, whereas the maximum export refund for
exports by tender the previous Thursday was 76.95 ECU/t. The standing refund for
specified destinations was 60 ECU/t.1 Thus it can be seen that the unit VIL is indeed
rather larger than the unit export refund.
Turning to international grain prices, at Thursday 13th August 1992 French wheat
from the open market was selling at $120.40/t ($117 for wheat from intervention), with
US Soft Red Winter also selling at $120.40/t, Canadian Western Red Spring was
selling at $147.90/t, and Australian Prime Hard was selling at $181/1. Even Argentinian
wheat, which often historically has traded at a lower price than EC wheats, was trading
at a higher price - $12911.8
Internally, the August Threshold Price for common wheat was 223.18 ECU/t, and
the Buying-in Price was 153.68 ECU/t. With an exchange rate of 0.693$ to the
ECU9, this gives a third country selling price of French wheat of 83.44 ECU/t. With
an export refund of 76.95 ECU/t, this gives an implied internal price of 160.39 ECU/t,
above the buying-in price but only about 72% of the threshold price.
Turning now to see how these policies have resulted in particular budgetary
transfers, it should first be re-emphasised that when talking about cereals, or even
about 'wheat', the product is highly differentiated in consumption, and as was noted
above, whilst the EC exports large quantities of its own lower quality non-milling
wheats, it at the same time imports smaller, yet not insignificant, quantities of - for
example - hard milling wheats. Thus in terms of Diagram 2 (below), the transfers
wheats, trade internationally at higher prices than EC standard non-milling wheats, barley, etc.
6 From the Home Grown Cereals Authority's Weekly Bulletin Volume 27, No 7, 17th August
1992.
7 There are two ways of exporting from the open market - by Lender or by standing refund. The latter
has the refund given, and normally is used by traders exporting small quantities on a regular basis to
the Alpine or Scandinavian countries. The former is how the bulk of open market exports are funded.
There is a process of competitive tendering (traders bid for the unit level of refund they require on a
stated quantity), and the Commission decide which bids to accept. The refund offered is a maximum,
and often individual tenders require a lower refund than the maximum, depending on the trader, market
conditions etc.
8 These prices are quoted as, respectively, fob Rouen, fob intervention, fob US Gulf, in store St
Lawrence, fob Eastern States, and fob Bahia Blanca.
9 Financial Times 25th August 1992. The market rate was used as the 'Green' rate was not available.
This calculation is given for illustrative purposes.
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illustrated can be represented by the import of hard wheats in Diagram a, and the export
of soft wheats in Diagram b:
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In Diagram 2a,the area abed represents the total import levy revenue earned for the
budget, with the unit levy ac on import quantity q lq2. The hashed area represents
transport costs from Rotterdam to Duisburg. In Diagram 2b, the unit export refund ac is
paid on quantity q3q4, giving a total export refund cost to the budget of abed.
This far, only the transfers arising out of the trade protection part of the cereals
regime have been considered. As discussed earlier however, this is only one part of the
regime's protective devices. The other major element concerns intervention storage
operations (the expenditure category 'intervention other than storage' will be discussed
later).
Within this element of expenditure, certain key lines can be identified. First there is
the expenditure officially called 'other public storage costs' (OPSC). This is the budget
line covering the difference between the book value of the stocks when sold from
intervention, and the price realised in that sale. As described in Chapter 3, stocks are
depreciated in value when bought in, and again at the end of each financial year, but
still may not be fully depreciated in value at the time of sale. Moreover, the bulk of
cereals stocks (around 80% or so) go for export to third countries. The main difference
is in terms of how traders bid for the right to export. With export refunds, traders bid
for the level of export refund they would require, whereas with exports from
intervention, they bid in terms of the price they expect to be able to sell at on third
country markets. Given the intended purpose of intervention, this price should be no
lower than the price that exports from the open market can be purchased at. As
described in Chapter 3, there is also the expenditure covering the depreciation of stocks
held. These two expenditure lines together represent the difference between the buying-
in price and the selling out price. Since selling out most frequently occurs to third
country markets, it is this that is seen as analogous to the export refund. Note also that
if world prices are relatively 'high', OPSC can actually be negative, with the member
states having to reimburse the EC for over-devaluation of the stocks when held in
intervention.
In addition to these payments however, there are the 'storage' costs themselves.
These can be broken down between 'technical' and 'financial' costs, both of which are
paid to the member states as standard amounts. Taking the technical costs first, these
represent "the amounts of the standard rate reimbursements paid by the EAGGF to the
member states to cover the cost of the physical operations involved in storage. [They
are] therefore directly related to the quantities in stock and to their movements." 10
10 Court of Auditors Report for the financial year J985, in OlC321, 15.12.86, Page 45, para 4.18.
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Specifically they include "taking into store, packaging, transport, processing, storage,
and withdrawal from store." 11 Financial costs on the other hand represent the
opportunity cost of the interest foregone by the member states having funds tied up in
intervention stock purchases. Put another way, it is the "charge on borrowing the
money for storage, ie the borrowing cost of the actual purchase of the stock." 12
"Variations in this expenditure are therefore directly related to changes in the book value
of the stocks. ,,13
The member states make monthly claims to FEOGA against these expenditure
categories, with the 12th claim at the end of each financial year settling any outstanding
sums that might exist. With technical costs, no details are published as to how much
they are. With financial costs however, the rates of interest at which these payments are
made are published in the Official Journal. In the Court of Auditors report already
quoted however, it is estimated that across both types of expenditure, the Community
under-reimburses the member states. For 1985, the estimate was a total of 160.2 Mio
ECU14 - a burden that has been effectively transferred from the Community budget to
member state budgets.
These transfers can be considered with reference to Diagram 3 overleaf. The gap
marked (OPSC + depreciation) illustrates the difference between the buying-in price
and the selling out price. As alluded to above, this is to all intents and purposes the
equivalent of export refunds on sales which go for export to third countries. The upper
reference price in the refund calculation is the internal market price of the EC. Here, it is
the Buying-in Price. Data from Eurosrat 15 suggest that, excluding exceptional market
conditions, the market price and the intervention price are not very far apart. In most
cases, the market price lies from about 90%-110% of the intervention price. Thus in the
two situations where exports take place from the open market or from intervention, the
upper of the two reference prices is approximately the same. Moreover, work reported
in greater detail in a later chapter suggests that whilst in the early 1980's cereals sales
from intervention sold at a markedly higher price on third country markets than sales
from the open market, since around 1983/4 sales from the two outlets to third countries
11 Reg (EEC) 3247/81, OJL327 14.11.81, Page 1.
12 see House of Commons. (1987).
13 Court of Audi tors, op cit, Para 4.19.
14 ibid Page 45.
15 In the 'Agricultural Situation in the Community' each year, a table is published showing "Market
prices for cereals as a percentage of the intervention price".
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have been at approximately the same price. Thus the lower reference price is also
approximately the same in the two situations (although from the trader's point of view,
with exports from intervention the costs of transport to the port must also be accounted
for).
Monthly T+F t
OPSC+
depreciation
Buying-in Price
Selling-out Price
DIAGRAM 3: FINANCIAL TRANSFERS WITH RESPECT TO
INTERVENTION STORAGE UNDER THE CAP
When comparing the unit cost of disposing of a tonne of cereals 'directly' onto third
country markets or via intervention therefore, this part of the operation costs
approximately the same in each case. What Diagram 3 illustrates also is that with
disposal via intervention, the technical and financial costs (labelled as T+F) add to the
total unit disposal costs. With each monthly claim from the member states, the unit cost
rises. Personal attempts to put a figure on unit values of T+F have met with a wall of
silence in the European Commission, but it can be seen that if stocks are held for any
length of time, then unit costs can rise significantly. Although exact lengths of stay are
hard to pin down, it is not uncommon for cereals to be held in store for 2-3 years, if not
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longer. Thus in terms of Diagram 3, the additional monthly payments required on top
of the (OPSC + depreciation) can add quite significantly to the unit cost of disposing of
surpluses via intervention. This can be seen in that the vertical height of the box (total
expenditure when cereals are sold into intervention) gets added to by the distance
marked 'Monthly T+F' for each month a consignment of cereals is held in store.
A final point to note on this aspect relates back to the question of stock depreciation.
With most of the writing down of the book value of stocks occurring as soon as the
products are bought into store, this means that the unit payments by FEOGA on
financial costs have fallen since the 1988 reforms because of the lower book value of
the stocks on which those payments have to be made. The points to note here therefore
are that savings have been realised by FEOGA because of the policy of depreciating
stocks values, but this has meant that the burden of expenditure falling on FEOGA has
become more immediate, as was discussed in Chapter 3.
In addition to these two principal forms of support, there is a category known as
intervention, other than storage. The main element within this for the cereals sector is
the production aid available for durum wheat. When the price in the area of greatest
surplus falls below a minimum guaranteed level, aid is paid on the basis of area grown
and harvested. In practical terms, this payment is a regional support payment, as the
producers who are eligible are, in the main, amongst the poorest in the Community.
The other major element of expenditure in this section of the budget is a production aid
paid to producers of crops that go to make starch. The products involved are potatoes,
wheat and maize. With potatoes, it is felt that starch potatoes have just the one possible
outlet, and the producers are in a region that provides very limited alternative
production opportunities. This payment is therefore justified as a sort of regional
payment. The payments for the cereal crops are therefore needed to allow their
producers to compete fairly with the producers of starch potatoes.
The fourth element of 'expenditure' in Chapter 10 of the budget, the cereals
chapter, is that dealing with coresponsibility levies (CRL's)16. Whilst this is
principally a revenue for the budget. it appears in the expenditure section of the budget.
The EC justify this by classifying CRL monies as 'negative expenditure'. The effect of
this is to reduce the final total expenditure figure on the cereals sector by a considerable
sum. In 1990, for example. the 'positive' expenditures in the first three sections of the
cereals chapter come to around 4389.35111ECU. The 'negative' expenditure under this
16 The basic CRL charged. the reimbursement of this for small producers, the additional CRL payable
under the stabiliscr mechanism. and the repayment of this, if required, in accordance with the 1988
agreement
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fourth section totals nearly 590m ECU, or about 13.5% of the positive expenditures.
Thus the final 'expenditure' figure on cereals comes out at approximately 3799.35m
ECU, a lot of money still, but rather Jess than 4389.35m ECU.17
4.2.2: The Oilseeds Sector
This sector was reformed in 1991. The 'old' regime will be discussed first, before
the pressures for change are discussed, and the new regime examined, in particular in
the policy linkages established between it and the cereals regime.
In terms of the budget, the oil seeds sector is actually only half a sector. In full, it is
the oils and fats sector, which includes olive oil. Moreover, this sector as a whole is
actually the highest spending sector supported by the CAP (appropriations for 1991
total6.041b ECU, and 5.551b ECU for 1992). For this thesis however, the focus will
be just on the oilseeds sector for the reasons outlined above.
The oilseeds sector covers a wide range of products, principally rape, sunflower
and soya, but also linseed, castor, flax and hemp. Expenditures on this sector
comprised production refunds, intervention storage measures, and export refunds. The
most dominant single category of expenditure has been production refunds for rape
sunflower and soya. Since 1973, it has fallen to 90% of total oilseeds support
expenditure once (in 1976), but in recent years has represented around 96-99% of the
total.
Before these payments are discussed in detail however, certain key features of the
oilseeds regime need to be discussed. Firstly, and perhaps most significantly, is the fact
that imports enter the Community at low or zero rates of tariff. This has been bound in
the GATT since the 1960's when the EC agreed to this in exchange for being allowed
to operate the VIL system on cereals. Moreover, with a processing industry very
heavily dependent on imported seeds, there was much internal pressure to allow seeds
in at global trading prices in order to continue providing the processing industry with a
cheap input. This laid the foundation for a regime that was in the main very different
from the cereals regime.
Unlike the cereals regime, where support to farmers comes from the high
maintained prices, with the oilseeds regime, support has come 'directly' from payments
that were essentially the same as the deficiency payments as operated by the UK before
entry into the EC.
17Chapter 10 of the budget also includes expenditure on the rice sector. This is very small in the EC
and has no major policy linkages with the cereals sector. It is therefore ignored in this thesis
(expenditure on the rice sector in 1990 totalled 85 million ECU).
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As with the cereals regime, a target price was decided upon that producers should
ideally receive. It was set at a level "which is fair to producers, account being taken of
the need to keep Community production at the required level." When the world price
(and therefore the internal EC market price) was below this level, as it usually was, the
difference was bridged by a variable crushing subsidy, paid to Community oilseed
crushers. If the world price rose above the target price, rather than reverse this
payment, it was simply suspended. The payment of the subsidy allowed support to be
given to EC oilseed producers whilst ensuring that Community oilseed crushers could
buy EC-produced seed, and then sell their products, at a price competitive on the EC
and world markets. Under normal circumstances, this system ensured that a market
could be found for all EC-produced seeds, but should this ever not have been the case,
then an intervention price was fixed, at a level just fractionally below the target price, so
as to put a floor in the market price for producers. As with cereals, buying-in took place
at the "buying-in price", set at 94% of the intervention price. Sales into intervention
could only take place in the country of harvesting, seeds had to be in batches of at least
lOOt, had to be of the LEAR (low erucic acid rape) varieties, and supplies offered
would only be bought in between November and May of each respective marketing
year. Sales from intervention normally took place only by tender. Thus intervention
was a rather more restricted outlet for produce than was (and still is) the case with
cereals.
In practice, producers tended to receive a price slightly lower than the target price.
The difference was partly accounted for by the administrative costs of the crushers in
handling the subsidy, and partly reflected the bias in the system towards the buyers of
oilseeds. These crushing subsidies were not payable on imports, but only on seeds
"harvested and processed within the Community". As no import levies were imposed, a
security was lodged against imports. This was returned either once the imported batch
had been checked through the crushing mill, and it been ensured that no crushing
subsidy had been paid; or when the seed had been "rendered ineligible".
The basic operation of this system can be seen in Diagram 4 overleaf. In terms of
the detailed system of operation, although the mechanism for supporting soya was
slightly different, the basic principles were exactly the same.
As noted above, intervention was available for oilseeds, though rarely taken up at
all, and certainly not on anything approaching the scale of cereals. When it was
however, the categories of expenditure were exactly the same as with cereals. At the
end of June 1992, cereals stocks totalled nearly 23 million tonnes. Oilseeds stocks were
zero. The 14000 tonnes of rape held at the end of May had all been removed.
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DIAGRAM 4: FINANCIAL TRANSFERS - PRODUCTION AIDS
UNDER THE OLD OILSEEDS REGIME
Deficiency
Payment
Target Price
Return to producers
Intervention Price
World/EC
Market Price
It should be noted that with rape, two types are distinguished - normal and double
zero. It is the latter which the Commission has been trying to encourage farmers in the
EC to grow. Indeed, from 1991 support was intended only to be available for these
varieties. The double zero refers to the nature of the chemical make-up of the seeds, and
what this implies for potential end-uses. Firstly, there is a low or zero erucic acid
content, which allows the oil to be used for human consumption, either directly or in
processed food products. Secondly, there is a low or zero glucosinolate content, which
makes the meal better for incorporation into animal feed. One problem with '00'
varieties is that they have lower yields than traditional varieties, and thus the
Commission has applied premia to the support prices of '00' varieties over the
traditional varieties.
A final point that is worth noting concerns the operation of the stabiliser applied to
the oilseeds sector. As described in Chapter 3, when production exceeded the MGQ in
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any particular year, the support prices were cut the following year, as with the cereals
sector. Unlike cereals however, those price cuts had no limit to them, but the price
reductions were calculated using a coefficient. With rape for example this is 0.5, so as
an example, if production exceeded the MGQ by 30%, then producers would face a
15% cut in support prices the following year. Coupled to this is the fact that these price
cuts were non cumulative, so if a price is cut in year t+ 1, in t+2 that price cut is restored
before considering t+2's price decisions in the face of the size of the harvest. The
consequence of this was to generate very large price fluctuations from year to year.
This in turn generated an oilseed cobweb. If in year t, production exceeded the MGQ,
t+I's prices were cut proportionately. In t+l, it may well have been found that this
lower price resulted in output falling below the MGQ, thus the price in t was restored in
t+2. This encouraged higher production, above the MGQ and so it (generally) went
on. Indeed this established something approaching a 'true' cobweb in as much as the
oilseeds cycle had a periodicity of two time periods. So the EC found itself in the
position of having a policy called a stabiliser that actually actively destabilised the
market, because of the two points that the price cuts were non cumulative and
unlimited. Whilst it can be seen that the 'cobweb' doesn't apply absolutely perfectly, in
&eneral a fall in the intervention price (net of stabiliser adjustment) one year, leads to a
fall in area the following year. With price cuts being non-cumulative, a rise in price that
following year leads to an increase in area the year after that, etc:
year rape NET sf! soya ALL oilseeds
area price* area price" area price* L area price*
1987/88 1860 407.6 2291 534.7 567 489.4 4718 477.2
1988/89 1843 373.2 2165 419.2 534 431.6 4542 408.0
1989/90 1660 393.6 2133 498.7 632 381.6 4425 424.6
1990/91 1986 406.9 2646 533.8 664 488.6 5296 476.4
1991/92 2099 400.8 2376 525.8 481 481.3 4956 469.3
1992/93 1847 na na
NOTE: The price given is the intervention price for rape and sunflower, the minimum
price for soya, and the average of these prices for total oil seeds.
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4.3: POLlCY LINKAGES BETWEEN THE TWO SECTORS.
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, one reason for focusing on these two
sectors in particular is that the products involved have particularly strong linkages, both
directly and via a third group of products, known commonly as Annex D Products, as
the list of these products appears in Annex D to the EC regulation governing the cereals
sector18. They include manioc (cassavaj l'', corn gluten feed, and beet pulp. Like
oilseeds, they have Iow or zero import duties bound in the GATT. Together, oil seeds
and their products - oil and meal - plus Annex D products, make up a group known
collectively, but somewhat inaccurately, as cereals substitutes. They can indeed be
substituted for cereals in animal feed but of all possible combinations, only a mixture of
manioc and soya bean meal comes very close to substituting for the energy/protein
balance of cereals. Other than this, individual cereals substitutes aren't really substitutes
for cereals or for each other. Despite this, the name has stuck, and the problem they
pose is still the same. That is, since they trade within the Community at a price below
cereals, they are replacing cereals in animal feed. For the ECI2, the quantity of cereals
going to animal feed, as expressed as a percentage of total internal cereals use, has
remained very stable. In 1973, it was 65%, by 1980 had gently fallen to 62%, and by
1989, had fallen even more slowly, to become 60% of total EC12 cereals consumption.
In absolute terms however, the figures suggest a rather different story. Between 1973
and 1989, the quantity of cereals going into animal feed fell from 93mt to 79mt. At the
same time, imports of these cereals substitutes has risen significantly. Taking a few
substitutes to illustrate this point - the imports of cassava into the EC in 1977 were
3.8m tonnes. By 1982, this figure had risen to 8.1m tonnes. With maize gluten feed,
imports rose from 1.5m tonnes in 1977 (Q 3.7m tonnes in 1986. The imports of soya
beans into the EC in 1973/4 were 7.7m tonnes. In 1986 they were 12.9m tonnes.
Similarly, soyabean meal imports rose from 3.4m tonnes to 1O.9m tonnes in that same
period.20 Data for the make-up of compound feeds show that between 1975 and 1986,
the cereals content fell from 61% to 51%. with oilmeals rising from 13% to 18% and
substitutes rising from 5% to 10%.21
This leads on to why the EC has been trying to encourage the production of double
18 Reg (EEC) 2727/75, OJL281, 1.11.75, Page I.
19 During the late 1970's, imports of cassava rose sharply. In 1982 therefore, VER's were agreed with
the main suppliers, most notably Thailand. The EC 'traded' lower exports to the Community for aid to
help develop and diversify those areas where cassava was the dominant crop.
20 All the above data is taken from Tracy (1988).
21 Agra Europe. (1989), Page 5.
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zero varieties of rape since the mid 1980's. Although the EC is only around 50% self
sufficient in oils, it is just 20% self-sufficient in meal. Most of the imports of meals are
in the shape of soya from the US, Brazil and Argentina. By switching production to a
variety of rape which produced a better form of meal, it was hoped the EC could reduce
its import reliance in the feed and protein sector. (NB - although the EC had been trying
to increase production of soya as well as rape, it was generally much less successful).
These efforts were however curtailed rather with the introduction of stabilisers and the
MGQ.
Another feature, highlighted in a paper by Ian Sturgess22 is that the BC's
production of oilseeds is biased towards high oil-bearing varieties. This creates a
problem for the EC in as much as the world price of oil is rather more unstable than the
world price for meal. Thus the EC has been encouraging production of those crops for
which prices are rather more stable. From the viewpoint of the ECs budget, this makes
the aid levels more stable, and rather more predictable.
In addition to all these factors, by the mid 1980's, the crisis in the cereals sector
was starting to take shape, with high and rising levels of expenditure and self
sufficiency. The principal response from the EC was to cut support for cereals, firstly
under the guaranteed threshold policy, and more latterly under stabilisers. On the
production side this has led to farmers switching from cereals to oilseeds, subject to
constraints such as crop rotation+'. So far, this hasn't been offset at all by falling
cereals prices halting the decline in cereals' incorporation into animal feed, although
more will be said on this in subsequent chapters.
4.4: AN EXAMINATION OF PAST EXPENDITURES
Whilst the basic principles underlying the way in which expenditures have been
effected under the CAP are very straightforward, in practice the complexities of market
management mean that a detailed understanding of exactly how these expenditures arise
can be quite difficult to come by. As a prelude to the main forecasting work later on
therefore, expenditure outturn figures for past years (1986 for cereals, 1986 and 1987
for oil seeds) have been taken and then replicated. This exercise was needed in order to
discover the main areas of cereals expenditure, and the problems that would likely be
faced in the subsequent simulation work. Below is a table summarising actual and
'estimated' expenditures. Following that is a brief explanation of the work carried out,
which highlights those areas where expenditure is significant, and where difficulties
22 Sturgess. I. M. (1987). P24.
23 For disease control reasons. rape for example can't return to a field for at least 6 or so years.
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were encountered, with comments on implications for the simulation work. Note that
with cereals, CRL revenues were not replicated.
4.4.1: The Cereals Sector
As can be seen from the table below, each line of the cereals chapter in the budget
was considered individually. A number of lines haven't been estimated as they
represent relatively very small sums of money. Each element will be considered
separately below, and problems discussed. This will then lead into the problems of
fraud and mismanagement.
1286 EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES
(MILLION ECU)
Category A: Actual B: Estimate Bas % of A
100 REFUNDS ON CEREALS
1000 refunds on common
wheat grain & flour 691.9 926.16 133.9
1001 refunds on barley
grain and malt 587.4 644.17 109.7
1002/1003 refunds on
other cereals 372.7 167.8 45.0
l00TOTAL 1,652.0 1,738.9 105.26
101 INTERVENTION STORAGE OF CEREALS
1010 carryover payments not estimated
1011 technical costs 342.6 362.8 105.9
1012 financing costs 216.6 169.4 78.2
1013 other public storage costs 783.1 779.1 99.5
1019 other intervention storage not estimated
101TOTAL 1,347.4 1,264.5 93.8
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102 INTERVENTION, OTHER THAN STORAGE, OF CEREALS
1020 production aid for
durum wheat 210.8 300.5 142.6
1021 production refunds
for potato starch 53.0 52.2 98.5
1022 other production refunds 124.7 132.4 106.2
1029 other intervention not estimated
l02TOTAL 388.5 485.1 124.9
CHAPTERI0TOTAL 3387.9 3488.5 102.97
NB --- = negligible sum
1000: REFUNDS ON COMMON WHEAT GRAIN AND FLOUR
This expenditure has three separate elements - grain refunds set by tender, grain
refunds set by standing refund, and standing refunds on flour.
Calendar year exports from the open market (Xom) were required for this
calculation, as exports from intervention are dealt with separately in the budget (see
1013). Thus, exports from intervention (Xi) were deducted from total exports (LX) to
derive this figure:
rX-Xi=Xom
LX=9.2m tonnes (from SITC/NIMEXE trade tables)
Xi=3.3m tonnes (from Agra Europe)
Xom=5.9m tonnes24.
Exports from the open market can receive one of two types of refund - a standing
refund, or one granted on acceptance of a tender bid. The former is generally lower,
and is mostly used on exports to geographically close countries such as Sweden and
Switzerland. Data on the quantities permitted for export on export licences granted by
tender (Xomt) are available25, and so a figure for exports by standing refund (Xorns)
24 This figure docs carry with it the proviso uuu once the trader is granted an export licence, he can
hold it for up to 4 months before having to use it, and he can trade a quantity between 93% and 105%
of the quantity stated on the licence. Thus this figure can only be an approximation of the ACTUAL
quantity traded.
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was derived:
Xom-Xomt=Xoms
Xomt=1.8m tonnes
Xoms=l.l m tonnes
For exports by tender, details are available for each individual tender, and so for
each, the quantity and maximum refund quoted were multiplied and the sum found.26
For exports by standing refund, no such data are available so an approximation of
94.95 ECU/tonne was taken.27
For wheat flour, a different approach was taken. a split was made in the data so that
separate estimates were made for January to June and July to December. From the same
sources as for wheat grain, total exports were 2.3 million tonnes. Another data
source28 showed total licences issued as 1.6 million tonnes (that figure subject to the
caveats noted earlier) with 30% exported in the first six months of the year, and 70% in
the second half of the year. The latter proportions were applied to the former quantity.
The average refunds for each half were obtained as before29 and thus:
Period
January-June
July -December
quantity
O.7mt
1.6mt
refund ECU/t q*r
109.2 76.44
IS0.2 240.32
L=316.76
For grain, tender exports were valued at 220.1 mECU, and for standing refund
exports, 94.95*4.1 mt totals 389.3 mECU.
Thus total expenditure on item 1000 comes to 220.1+389.3+316.76=926.16
mEeU, about 134% of the actual figure, but subject to the caveats noted earlier, such
as the assumption that the maximum refund is paid on all exports.
25 From the H-OCA.
26 From H-OCA's 'Cereals Statistics'. Note that this calculation assumes the maximum refund is paid
on all exports - this is unrealistic; but no accurate nltcrnative is available other than by going back to
details of each export from Customs or the EC.
27 In H-OCA op cit, the highest and lowest standing refunds available each month are shown. This
figure is simply the average of all the 'highest' figures available through the year.
28 H-GCA op cit.
29 ibid.
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1001: REFUNDS ON BARLEY GRAIN AND MALT
For barley grain, exactly the same approach was taken as with wheat. This gave:
Xoms=O.8mt
Xomt=3.1mt
An estimate of standing refunds was obtained in the same way, coming to 107.25
ECU/t. This, multiplied by O.8mt comes to 85.8 mECU. For exports by tender, the
total value of tenders comes to 380.9 mECU. The sum of these is 466.7 mEeu.
For malt, the same approach was taken as with wheat flour. A total export quantity
of 1.2mt was split 28%n2%. Thus:
Period quantity refund ECU/t q*r
January-June 0.3111£ 156.1 46.83
July- December O.8mt 163.3 130.64
L= 177.47
Thus total expenditure on item 1001 comes to 644.17 mECU, 109.7% of the actual
figure, but subject to the caveat that the product 'malt' is differentiated, including malt
made from wheat, roasted, unroasted, etc. The data however make no allowance for
potential differences to be accounted for with regard to different refunds available.
100211003: REFUNDS ON OTHER CEREALS
This category covers other cereal grains, and also flours, groats and meal
therefrom, plus worked grains (eg rolled, flaked, kibbled, pearled, germs and pellets).
Considering first the unworked grains, estimates were made as before of exports from
the open market. This gave:
durum 59997t
6129t
4009t
rye -2445t
-56840toats
other
maize
It can clearly be seen that for rye and maize, meaningless results were obtained.
Approximate account was therefore taken of the fact that some licences issued at the end
of 1986 wouldn't be taken advantage of until early 1987. The licences issued for these
two grains in the last 6 weeks of 1986 were assumed not to be taken up until 1987,
leaving 46830t of rye and 14660t of maize exported from the open market in 1986.
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For standing refunds, figures for rye (16 ECU/t), oats (95 ECU/t) and maize (20
ECU/t) were obtained as before, but 110 data were available for durum. For this
therefore, an implicit refund level had to be derived. According to Eurostat data, in the
Southern member states, the market price for durum came to 96.7% of the intervention
price over the year as a whole, or 307.0 ECU/t (including monthly increments). As a
world price, the IWC's monthly quotations of Canada No 1 CW Amber Durum were
taken, converted to ECU, and the average taken. This came to 128.4 ECU/t, giving an
implicit unit refund of 178.6 ECU/t. Thus:
cereal quantity refund q*r
durum 59997 178.6 10.72 mECU
rye 46380 16 0.74 mECU
oats 6129 95 0.58 mECU
maize 14660 20 0.29 mECU
L=12.33 mECU
Turning to that other than unworked grains NIMEXE tables detail the breakdown of
each type of working between cereal types. Export refunds apply as a proportion of the
corresponding unworked cereal's refund, and these are detailed in, for example, the H-
aCA's 'EEC Marketing Arrangements for Grains and Processed Products' (Annex
10). These coefficients are typically 1 or above. Also, maize is differentiated between
make-up and end-use, with different coefficients applying to each.
Flour
oats (95* 1.8)*6 = 1,026
maize (20* 1.4)* 13844 = 887,632
20*713 = 14,260
L = 0.9 mECU
GrQats and Meal
durum 178.6*772979 = 138,054,049.4
rye 16*867 = 13,872
maize 20*44497 = 889,940
(20* 1.8)*72348 = 2,604,528
4.20
(20* 1.4)*557 == 15,596
L == 141.6 mECU
Flaked
barley (107* 1.5)*29922 = 4,802,481
(95*2)* 19099 == 3,628,810
L = 8.4 mECU
The sum of these expenditures is 150.9 mECU. There is in addition 24018t of
small quantities of the above types not accounted for. Even if a high refund was
chosen, say the 95 ECU/t of oats, and a coefficient of 2, this expenditure would still
only come to 4.56 mECU, giving a total expenditure for items 1002 and 1003 of 167.8
mECU. This figure is just 45% of the actual figure. There is clearly a problem here, but
some light was shed when the problem was repeated for 1987. This was the first year
in which the expenditure items were split between durum and all the other cereal types
in the budget. Here, the estimate of expenditure on durum came to 71.8% of the actual
figure, but for the other cereal types, the figure was just 29.5% of the total. That having
been said, this overall represents only a relatively small element in total expenditure,
and this therefore doesn't represent a major problem for the later estimation work.
1011: TECHNlCAL COSTS OF PUBLIC STORAGE
The component parts of this expenditure item are varied and, as admitted by the
Court of Auditors-", inherently difficult to forecast. Even ex post, it is hard to see
clearly where the money has gone. A rough estimate has been made however on the
basis of an assessment of 'average' stocks held over the year, and the use of the value
of the monthly increments paid on the intervention price as a representative figure for
the monthly per-unit costs of holding stocks.
The Court of Auditors annual report for the year 198731 shows that at 30.11.1985,
total cereals stocks came to 19.3mt, of which nearly Imt was durum wheat. At
30.11.1986, the [Owl had fallen to 14.7mt, of which just over Imt was durum (note
that for the purposes of intervention, the 'year' goes from 1st December to 30th
November, but data limitations necessitate this being taken as a proxy for the calendar-
year). The source also shows total quantities moving into and out of intervention during
the year, so an assumption had to be made as to the pattern of these movements; it was
30 See EC Court of Auditors. (1988), P26.
31 C0] 316, 12.12.1988, P65.
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assumed that the quantity moving into store did so entirely during the first 5 months of
the harvest year (ie from harvest, taken as July, through to November inclusive), and
did so evenly through this period; and that movements out of store took place (evenly)
through the remaining 7 months of the year (December to June). The ensuing
calculations were as follows:
For the seven month period December to June, the average monthly sale figure was
calculated as one seventh the total sales figure (l1.9mt). This figure of 1.7mt was then
used to estimate the stock figures for each month December to June, by assuming that
1.7mt was sold from intervention each month, given the starting stock level at the end
of November as 19.3mt. Next, the figure for monthly sales into intervention was
estimated as one fifth of total sales (7.4mt). This figure of 1.48mt was then added
successively to the June stock estimate from the above manipulation to give stock
figures for July to November. The average was then taken of the 12 monthly stock
figures so estimated, which came to O.9mt for durum and 11.3mt for all other cereal
types. The figure for durum was calculated separately as it has a different monthly
increment from the other cereals, 2.83 ECU/t as opposed to 2.45 ECU/t (figures apply
for the harvest year 1986n). These figures were first multiplied by 12 to give an
estimate of the annual per-unit cost of storage, and then multiplied by the relevant
quantities to give an estimate of the overall expenditure for item 1011:
(2.83 * 12) * 880700 = 30.6m ECU for durum
(2.45 * 12) * 11313000 = 332.2m ECU for the rest
This gives a grand total expenditure figure of 362.8m ECU, 105.9% of the actual
figure.
1012: FINANCIAL COSTS OF PUBLIC STORAGE
For this, the quantities referred to were taken from the above source, and the price
of buying-in was taken as the average of the 12 monthly intervention prices including
monthly increments for each cereal type. This gives us:
DURUM RYE BARLEY REST
Pint l2-month average 316.4525 187.305 188.261 189.998
Quantity bought in ('ooot) 880.7 966.75 2,925.25 7,421
P*Q (mECU) 278.7 181.1 550.7 1,410.0
where the quantity bought in is the monthly average figure as calculated using the
same method as for the previous item of expenditure. This gives a total expenditure
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incurred by the Member States of 2420.5 mECU. This is then reimbursed by the
Community at the rate of 7% (that was the figure used during 1986), giving an
expenditure burden falling on the Community of 169.4 mECU. This equals 78.2% of
the actual figure.
1013; OTHER PUBLIC STORAGE COSTS
These are, in effect, the same as item 100 in the budget, only for exports from
intervention rather than from the open-market. Quantities of exports from intervention
are shown in Agra Europe. An implicit subsidy payment was calculated on the basis of
this author's estimates for third country trading prices of EC cereals sold from
intervention and average annual intervention prices, net of monthly increments. The
estimate was made on the basis of two half-yearly estimates. The cereal types were split
into wheat and the others because of data restrictions, with barley data taken as
representative of them all.
quantity * refund
Jan-Jun wheat = 2,323,218t refund = 78.1316 ECU/t 181,516,739.5 ECU
rest = 1,804,999t refund = 101.9316 ECU/t 183,986,436.1 ECU
Jul-Dec wheat = 1,009,186t refund = 104.398 EeU/t 105,357,000.0 ECU
rest = 2,885,303t refund » 106.84 EeU/t 308,265,772.5 ECU
giving a total expenditure of 779.1 mECU, 99.5% of the actual figure.
1020; PRODUCTION AID FOR DURUM WHEAT
This is paid per hectare sown and harvested of durum wheat. According to the
Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, the area sown to durum in 1986 was 2.1mha in the
EC9' 0.5mha in Greece, O.lmha in Spain, and 24,000ha in Portugal, a total of
2.7mha. Given that payments are made with reference to area sown AND harvested, it
seems reasonable to assume the rate of aid applicable is the 1986/87 rate of 113.79
ECU/ha (with 16.26 ECU/ha in Spain), rather than the 1985/86 rate of 101.31
ECU/ha. This gives an estimated expenditure of 300.5 mECU, 42.6% too high. There
are however certain factors causing inherent problems in this calculation: Only areas
where durum represents a traditional and important part of agricultural production are
eligible, and so some of the total area may be excluded and the durum must satisfy
certain other conditions, principally it must be suitable for pasta production and fit for
human consumption(!) Also, the aid will only be granted when, in the area of greatest
surplus, the intervention price is lower than the guaranteed minimum price.
NB: for dururn, the marketing year has always been 1st July of one year to 31st
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June of the following year (Ie harvest time to immediately before the next harvest). All
other cereals have only had this marketing year since 1986{7, before it was 1st August
to 31st July. the change being needed to accommodate the earlier harvest period in the
Southern States.
lOll: PRODUCfION RERJNDS FOR POTATO STARCH
Not for the first time, there was a data problem here. For quantity of potatoes going
for starch, the H-GCA's Weekly Digest of 24-10-1988 (Volume 15 No 17) showed the
quantity for 1986{7 = 1.Omt32
As regards refunds, there are two types: Article 2 of Regulation 2742{75 (OJ L281
page 57) states that "Member States shall grant a production refund of [x EeU]/metric
tonne of potato starch", x being 31.25 for 1986/87. Article 2 of Regulation 1008/86
(OJ L94) states that "for the marketing years 1986/87, 1987/88, and 1988/89, Member
States shall pay to producers of potato starch a premium of 18.70 EeU/t of potato
starch produced". Adding these two refunds together gives a total refund available of
49.95 EeU/t. Then: 49.95*l.Omt = 52.2 mEeU, 1.5% less than the stated figure.
Given that to qualify for a refund, 'starch in the dry matter' must be at least 97% pure,
it might be expected that this estimate is above the actual figure, but this might be offset
by the effects of taking figures for the crop year 1986/87 rather than the calendar year
1986.
NB - this payment is being phased out, along with the following category (1022),
as protection (for wheat and maize at least) is available through the mechanisms of the
CAP, (this being coupled to an increase in refunds TO THE PROCESSOR when
products not protected by the CAP - like potatoes - are used).
1022: OTHER PRODUCfION REFUNDS
The same Weekly Digest article as above gives, for 1986/87, 4.6mt of maize going
to the manufacture of starch. and 1.6mt of wheat. Regulation 1569/83 (OJ L 163) gives,
for 1986/87, refunds of 19.41 EeUlt for maize and 27.79 ECUlt for wheat. Then:
4.6m*19.41 = 89.3 mEeU, and 1.6m*27.79 = 43.1 mEeU, giving a total
expenditure of 132.4 mEeU, 6% higher than the actual figure, though the same caveats
apply as for 1021.
32 This was however the first time they'd shown this data, the source of which was stated (in a phone
conversation) as a MAFF leuer marked confidential. and is also the only figure found anywhere and for
any year showing the quantity of potatoes going for starch production.
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From this, it can be seen that the overall estimate is very close to the actual figure.
Within that, item 102 is put out by the errors inherent in the estimate of the production
aid for durum wheat. Item 10 1 comes very close to the actual figure, owing to a close
estimate of the dominant expenditure, that of other public storage costs. It must be
remembered however that, as acknowledged by the Court of Auditors, the technical and
financial cost elements are very hard to estimate. With Item 100, overall the estimate is
fairly close, but certain elements are rather inaccurate. Concerning the relevance for
later work however, the first stage, that of estimating total expenditure for future years,
should be reasonably straightforward, on the basis of the fact that in this initial
exercise, the total Chapter 10 estimate is quite close to the actual figure. Where this
work suggests problems might arise however is in trying to allocate that expenditure
between different lines in the budget_}1
4.4.2: The Oilseeds Sector
In this section, the focus IS on the slims paid out as production aids34 for
rape/colza35 seeds, sunflower seeds and soya beans in 1986 and 1987. Dominant
within total expenditure are the aids for colza/rape and sunflower seeds, with
expenditure on these representing anything from 80 to 98% of total oilseeds support
over the period 1981-90. In contrast to cereals, as has been noted before, storage plays
a much smaller part in the management of the oilseeds market, and the expenditure
incurred is negligible. Moreover, export refunds also constitute only a minor part of
33 The above work was scm to MAFF in the hope that a civil servant could find the time to consider
the calculations, and make comments accordingly. Remarkably, Allan Buchan in Cereals and Set-aside
Division A was able to do this. Some of his points are that for 1986, the lowest figure for cereals
exports hc could rind was 9.4 million tonnes; the refund received by traders will "be anything from 0.5
to 2 ECU below the maximum level granted." With standing refunds, he notes that the higher levels
relate to small quantiucs to specific destinations "involving some of the Alpine states", with the lower
figures relating to most exports. He also comments (hat generally, for exports from intervention,
licence validity is 1 month plus 2 months, not I+4. With exports of 'other' grains, he notes that
NIMEXE data suggests rather more was exported than the figure used in the above calculation.
None of the calculations has been re-worked in the light of these comments, but the points are to
be bome in mind with future work. The author thanks Mr Buchan for the time he obviously took in
making these points.
34 Aid is paid to farmers on the quanti lies of seed they produce and send for crushing, Since the
production aid is given in the fonn of a crushing subsidy for rape, these terms are used interchangeably.
35 In Eurojargon,rape undcolza are, for our purposes, the same product, that is the seed. These uses of
the terms need to be distinguished from their traditional uses in England, where 'rape' was used to
describe the seed and 'colza' the oil produced from the rape seed.
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total expenditure. Since 1981, it has risen above 1% of total oil seeds expenditure on
one occasion only - 1987 - and then it only reached 2.4%.
Thus to restate, the emphasis of the current work is in re-creating the past
expenditure for production aids payable on the three seeds referred to earlier, the
expenditure for which represents nearly all support expenditure for oilseeds.
The procedure was the same for all three seeds. First, details of quantities of seeds
going for processing, imports of seeds, and changes in stockholdings of seeds were
obtained from Eurostat's quarterly publication "Crop Production". The first edition of
each year has detailed balance sheets for each seed type separately (and end-uses as
well). Initially ignoring stock movements, the quantity of imports was subtracted from
the quantity of seeds going for processing, in order to get a figure for EC-produced
seeds going for processing. This is necessary as it is only these seeds which are eligible
for aid payments. This procedure makes the assumption that all seeds imported go for
processing. Although this assumption is forced into the process as details simply aren't
available here as to the end use of imported seeds, given the relatively very small
quantities of seeds going for alternative end-uses, the potential adverse effects on the
final calculation of this assumption not being completely accurate are only minor.
The quantities thus obtained from Eurostat relate to crop years (1-7 to 30-6 for
rape), whereas the budget works on a calendar-year basis. Thus the crop data had to be
converted to a calendar year basis. Initially, the ad hoc assumption was made that 75%
of the total crush went for crushing between July and December, and the remaining
25% between January and June of each harvest year. After further consideration
however, and with reference to data published in the H-GCA's "Annual Statistics" on
quarterly quantities of seeds going for crushing in the UK, the calculations were re-run
assuming a 50/50 split, ie a steady supply of seeds all year round. It is these latter
results that are reported below. Although oilseeds storage is technically quite difficult, it
seems reasonable to assume that a number of producers will still have adequate
facilities. Thus those who haven't will supply their seeds for crushing straight after
harvest, and those with storage facilities will supply their seeds later. Also, it seems
more reasonable to assume that the mills themselves would prefer a steady supply of
seeds for crushing throughout the year, rather than have some very busy periods and
other very slack periods.
This procedure of splitting the total supplies also proved necessary for another
reason. For 1987, (though not for 1986), the levels of aid were very different between
the two periods January-June and July-December. In this year, the average level of aid
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available during July-December was one third lower than for January-June. Two
estimates were made therefore. One simply took the annual figures of seeds processed,
and one looked at separate estimates for each of the two 6-month periods.
The figures for crushing subsidies are published in the Official Journal throughout
the year. The published data show a number of different figures. At the top are three
separate numbers (for the ECIO, Spain and Portugal) of gross refunds in ECU, for
seeds going for crushing in the current month and for future months, up to 6-months
hence. The figures rise slightly through time. Then, the aids are shown in national
currencies for each member state, net of MDA's.36
For simplicity, the gross ECU aids were used in the calculations. As no detail exists
. here as to the flow of seeds for crushing throughout the year, all that was done was to
take the arithmetic average of the aids. Again, there is little information available to
allow an improvement on the rather ad hoc method used concerning these last points,
and the fact that their potential inaccuracy may affect the final outcome to a limited
degree needs to be borne in mind.
This having been said however, a look at estimates for 1986 and 1987 shows that
for rape and sunflower seed production aids, this method doesn't give too inaccurate a
result. For the estimates of total aid given for soya bean production however, the
problems are obvious. The main one is that the method of estimating domestic
production eligible for aid, and then allocating this between years, clearly gives absurd
results. Unfortunately, there seem to be no data available here to help correct this
situation. One further point ought also to be added regarding the estimates for rape. As
mentioned elsewhere, there is a higher aid payment available for '00' varieties of rape.
The EC however seems not to publish data breaking down production by quantities of
ordinary and '00' rape produced. This estimate therefore uses the total production
figure published, and the aid available for normal varieties of rape. The fact that this
gives an estimate higher than the actual figure is therefore disappointing, as a more
detailed approach, taking into account the premium for '00' varieties, will push this
estimate up rather than down. One possible explanation of why the expenditure is being
over-estimated is that it is wrong to assume an even spread of production going for
crushing through the year. This may be resulting in more assumed to be going for
crushing in periods ofrelatively high aids than was actually the case in practice (though
of course, the converse to this would be easier to explain awayl)
36 Manerary Differential Amounts - the term used in the oilseeds sector for what are elsewhere called
MeA's.
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TIlE PROCEDURE USED IN ESTIMATING THE EXPENDITURE:
"12 month" calculation:
where:
Ej = estimate of the total cost of the rapeseed crushing subsidy in year j
CrUY = the estimated quantity of domestically-produced rapeseed going for
crushing in the EC lOin year j
Srlol = the 12-month average of the crushing subsidy available for rape produced
and crushed in the EC 10 in year j
. .
CrSpJ = as for Crlol but data for Spain
Srspj = as for Sr10i but data for Spain
NB: j always refers to calendar years.
The 6-month calculation is essentially the same as for the 12-month calculation
except that for both the ECIO and Spain there are two parts to the calculation, the first
taking the estimated quantity of seed going for crushing in each country in the period
January-June and the average subsidy available in that same period; and the second
taking the same data as it applies to the period July-December of year j:
processing minus imports ('OOOt)
year rape EClO rape Spain s/fl EClO s/fl Spain
1985/86 3624 12 1685 885
1986/87 3448 8 2050 842
1987/88 5207 11 2659 836
year soya EC10 soya Spain soya Port'l
1985/86 -316 5 2
1986/87 103 -119 -43
1987/88 594 -305 -22
taking these as 50% to Jan-Jun, 50% to Jul-Dec:
1986: rape ECI0 rape Spain s/fl ECIO slfl Spain soya ECI0
Jan-Jun 1812 6 843 443
JuI-Dec 1724 4 1025 421 52
annual 3536 10 1868 864
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1987: rape ECIO rape Spain s/fl ECIO slfl Spain
Jan-Jun 1724 4 1025 421 52
Jul-Dec 2604 6 1330 418 297
.
annual 4328 10 2355 839 349
oil crushing subsidies (ECU/t)
1986: rape ECIO rape Spain s/fl EClO slfl Spain
Jan-Jun 290.57 6.1 386.73 17.2
Jul-Dec 323.14 6.1 384.82 17.2
annual 306.85 6.1 385.86 17.2
1986: soyaECIO soya Spain soya Port'l
Jan-Jun 367
Jul-Dec 400.15 250.89 403.29
annual 383.57 250.89 403.29
1987: rape ECIO rape Spain s/fl EC10 slfl Spain
Jan-Jun 360.45 6.1 416.71 17.2
JuI-Dec 242.98 0 354.23 31.9
annual 303.74 3.16 387.1 24.2
1987: soya ECI0 soya Spain soya Port'l
Jan-Jun 261.36 16.9 261.36
Jul-Dec 226.66 4.225 226.66
annual 243.26 10.3 243.26
estimated and actual expenditures EC12 (mECU)
rape s/fl soya
1986:
acrual 1042.65 759.1 200.25
"12 month" 1085.08 735.65
"6 month" 1083.67 735.31
1987:
actual 1238.99 949.72 405.31
"12 month" 1314.62 931.92
"6month" 1254.16 918.83
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4.5: FRAUD AND FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT
As noted previously, the practical day-to-day operation of the markets is very
complex indeed, and so it is quite reasonable to expect farmers, and others involved in
the operation of the markets, eg first-processors, to make mistakes in the operations
required to receive financial support, for example in filling in forms declaring area
under a particular crop, quantity produced etc. This complexity however, coupled to the
potentially large sums of money involved, is also likely to induce certain parties
involved to attempt to obtain money they're not due. Regarding intervention, the rules
often result in bureaucratization, making it difficult to control, and increasing the
likelihood of financial mismanagement.
Before moving on, the problem in hand should be defined. Following the approach
of the House of Lords-", fraud exists when transactions or events have dishonestly
been intended to mislead, as concluded by admission of such or by a court's decision.
Irregularities cover "mistakes, errors, and incorrect behaviour in carrying out financial
transactions in the course of Community operations" (HaL ibid, para 8). If investigated
further, they may be shown to be fraudulent if intent to deceive can be demonstrated.
For many purposes however no distinction need be made as the effect on the Budget is
the same. As the House of Lords points out, the distinction between intentional and
innocent misappropriation of funds "affects only the remedies available" (ibid para 9)
One of the great problems with fraud, as with any illegal activity, is being able to
get an idea of the extent of the problem. First, where fraud is concerned, given that it's
illegal, the perpetrators will naturally try their utmost to avoid detection, but unless
fraud is detected it can't be quantified with any sort of accuracy. Second, as regards
problems concerned with mismanagement, with the problems of intervention detailed
later, again the problem cannot be quantified accurately.
The Commission's approach is one of just reporting the sums involved with the
cases brought, with usually just a passing reference to the likelihood of there being
other cases that aren't reported. For example, in a report from 198238, they note that
"over the eleven years for which cases have been recorded, there have been some 1400
instances of irregularities, involving 80 million ECU ...Although this seems a huge
amount at first sight, it represents only about 0.1% of all EAGGF expenditure and, in
view of the millions of honest transactions financed during this period, it cannot be
considered excessive" (P5). It goes on to note that "over a third of the sums wrongly
paid have been recovered" (ibid). In a more recent report-", it puts this line even more
37 see House Of Lords. (1989). P8.
38 see EC Commission (1982).
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strongly, for while it acknowledges a few cases involving large sums of money do
exist "it should be firmly pointed out that the figures given for the financial losses
resulting from frauds are not based on any really reliable study. Frauds do occur; but
there is no verifiable source to justify claims that they amount to 10% or even more [of
EAGGF expenditure)" (ibid P3). It is however rather extreme to discount all but
reported cases of fraud.40
4.5.1: Intervention and Associated Problems
Intervention storage, as mentioned above, is one of the key elements in the
operation of the CAP. In order to see the main problems which exist with this system, a
detailed examination of the way in which the system is operated and administered is
needed. The sheer complexity of the system will be highlighted in this section.
Over all commodities, about 60% of all guarantee expenditures have been on
intervention measures. There are analytically two distinct types of intervention:
First Category Intervention refers to withdrawal from the market, ie
intervention storage, production and processing aids, guidance premiums and private
storage (ie paying farmers to hold products on-farm rather than seiling them to public
intervention stores).
Second Category Intervention covers the losses incurred when products are
sold from intervention, and also the reimbursements covering technical costs and
financing costs.
Within First Category Intervention, for some products a distinction may be made
between Intervention A ie purchases by intervention stores+l, and Intervention B
which refers to private storage.
Considering these in more detail, taking 2nd category intervention first as it is this
which relates most to the cereals and oilseeds sectors:
2nd Category Intervention
Introduction
Whilst certain management functions rest with the Commission, the day-to-day
operations occur at the local level, and control therefore rests with the member states
through their appointed bodies (eg the Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce,
IBAP, in the UK). It is these bodies therefore that deal directly with the players
39 see EC Commission (1987g).
40 see House Of Lords. (1989), P89 of the minutes of evidence for more on the 10% figure.
41 "normal intervention" - see Harris, S. Cl al. (1983), P72.
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involved- those selling into intervention, those buying from intervention, and those
running the stores. As regards buying-in, there may be in addition some (national)
central control to try and ensure the best use is made of the existing storage capacity.
There is often a time-delay between quantities arriving at stores and their being
officially accepted. due either to physical capacity limitations, or to allow quality checks
to take place. These may be carried out at a State laboratory, an independent lab, an
intervention agency lab, or just in the storekeepers lab. With cereals, for example, tests
must be made for maximum moisture content, maximum % content of imperfect grains
(eg broken, shrivelled, pest-damaged, and sprouted grains and grains of other cereals),
minimum specific weight, etc, all of which have a bearing on the actual price paid to the
bearer on official reception of the product into store. National agencies may also set
minimum quantities that can be offered, (eg lOOt in the UK). It must be noted from this
that intervention isn't in practice the bottomless pit it might be thought to be, since
products must reach at least a minimum quality, as set by a number of criteria, and even
if this is met, suppliers may not get the full intervention price if an intermediate quality
level is attained (though premiums may be available if better quality produce is
supplied). Also, the period when sale can be made to intervention is restricted.
As regards payment for sale into intervention. this is made in the first instance by
the intervention agency; not immediately, but after a prescribed time-delay (around 90-
120 days), which reduces the effective price paid to the seller; and the reimbursements
to member states to cover the costs incurred (see below). Whilst the commodities are in
store, the technical and financial costs are paid in the first instance by the member
states, and when the commodities are sold out of intervention, usually at a loss, ie at a
lower price than they were bought in at, then that cost too is initially borne by the
member states.
Reimbursements from the Community to the Member States
Annex 1 to Council Regulation 3247/81 (reproduced below) shows the "Standard
account with revenue and expenditure items for determining the amount to be financed
by [FEOGA] in respect of intervention measures entailing the buying-in, storage and
disposal of agricultural products", ie just what is being reimbursed (net) to the member
states.
DEBIT (EXPENDITURE)
1 Costs, material operations
1 standard amounts for costs incurred
a) by entry into stock
CREDIT (REVENUE)
1 Revenue from transport
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b) in storage
c) by withdrawal from stock
d) by processing or market preparation
e) by drying and special cooling and
homogenization processes
f) by transport
2 Transport costs not covered by a standard amount
3 Other costs deriving from operations
provided for in Community regulations
2 Financing Costs(Article 5 of Reg 1883/78)
3 Price difference and other items
1 Value of quantities in stock at the
beginning of the year
2 Value of quantities bought in
at the end of the year
3 Other
I Revenue from sales
2 Value of quantities in stock
3 Value of quantity losses
exceeding the tolerance
4 Amounts collected or recovered
from sellers, purchasers, and
storers
5 Other
4 Credit Balance Debit Balance
This leads onto one issue that has repeatedly been commented on and criticised, and
that concerns the method of reimbursement from the Community to the member states.
As with other FEOGA Guarantee expenditure, these reimbursements are made on the
basis of monthly declarations. With these declarations however, it's not a question of
stating how much expenditure has taken place during the particular month in question,
but rather the amount of expenditure that's occurred from the beginning of the financial
and calendar year to the end of the month in question. The difference is then taken
between the declaration at the end of month t and that at the end of month t-l to get a
figure of expenditure to be reimbursed just for month t. (Put another way, these
declarations show a cumulative total, and the figures for individual months'
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expenditures are the differences between successive cumulative totals). This system
results in certain problems:
In effect, each declaration is just a provisional estimate, elements of which can be
changed in subsequent months without the need to show these changes - they are
"simply absorbed by the system"42. This feature was desired initially because of the
ease with which preceding calculations could be corrected "and only a single figure by
column and by product is required for noting second category expenditure in the
monthly declaration (ibid P29). Moreover, as the Court of Auditors note (ibid P26) this
second category expenditure is, by its very nature, very hard to predict, as its quantity
and unit-cost components depend on:
"a) climatic and technological conditions;
b) supply and demand conditions on the world market;
c) the level of the internal intervention prices which are fixed in the course of the
financial year ie after the budget for that year has been adopted." (ibid).
Given this therefore, it can clearly be seen that with the problems inherent in
predicting the above variables, any forecast of expenditure based on these variables is
going to be subject to frequent revisions. Looking at what constitutes second category
expenditure, the 'material operations' are at least partly determined by movements into
and out of store, which is in turn partly determined by current Management Comminee
policy, itself partly determined by the state of the Budget, but also partly determined by
the international situation (should, for example, the EC target exports to a particular
third-country to counter US exports") Moreover, Commission Regulation (EEC) No
2775/8843 restricts the reimbursement of financial costs provided for in Article 4(2) of
Reg (EEC) No 729/70 to Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, given "the current
situation in the Community" (Reg (EEC) No 2775/88 - 3rd recital of the preamble) ie
because the financial situation in the Community has got so tight, this category of
expenditure has been transferred in full to the national exchequers of eight member
states, and in part to the remaining four (given a reimbursement rate of interest of 6.8%
in 1988, compared to national 19X9 short term interest rates of 15.2%, 11.5%, 8.1%,
and 13.0% respectively, and long term interest rates of 16.6%, 11.8%, 9.5%, and
14.1% respectively).
42 see EC Court of Auditors. (1988), P29.
43 OJL249, 8.9.1988, P8.
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The Loss on Sales
The third element in the equation, 'Price Difference and Other Items' (as well as
part of 'Costs, Material Operations') relates to the value of stocks, and the value of
movements of products into and out of store for each reference period ie from the
beginning of the year to the end of the particular month in question).
First, the book-value of the stock at the beginning of the year, and the purchase-
value of all stocks bought in between the beginning of the year and the end of the
month in question are added together. This figure is then divided by the total quantity
involved (ie the size of the opening stocks, plus quantities bought in) to give the
global average purchase-price. Next, by dividing the revenue received for total
sales out of store during the reference period by the quantity released, we derive the
global average sales price. The difference between these two global figures gives
the average loss on sales. This is then multiplied by the total quantity released to
give the total cumulative loss on sales for the reference period. The difference
between this figure in successive months gives expenditure during the last month
included.
Problems With This Calculation
a) Assessing the Quantity in Stock
Looking first at the quantity in stock, an aide-rnemoire from the Commission to the
member states asks for a physical stocktaking of all stocks on the last day of the year.
In practice, the degree of detail given to the stocktaking depends not only on the
member state involved, but also the product. In 1988, the Court of Auditors carried out
a study of intervention in six member states - West Germany, France, Ireland, Italy,
Holland, and the UK, and with reference to three products, cereals, milk products and
beefmeat, which gives a combination representing 95% of total expenditure on public
storage44. The Court found that in many cases, it was very hard to tally the stock
figures declared to FEOGA with the figures on central records. In a number of cases,
the only way they could obtain up-to-date stock data was to contact the stores directly.
With products kept in cold store, a great problem was found in gaining access to
individual lots to audit, caused primarily by lack of space. Other problems they note
include lots being mixed together and their separate identities being lost; and lots unable
to be located within a reasonable time. With specific reference to cereals, only Germany
stored cereals in such a way as to get a reasonable estimate of the quantity stored from
the dimensions of the pile of cereals, kept in a regular shape. Elsewhere, cereals are
44 see EC Court of Auditors. (1988), op cit.
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stored in irregular piles. In Italy, movements of cereals into and out of store are
sometimes reponed in such round figures that they "can only represent global and
approximative estimations"(ibid P9).
In conclusion, consider the following, taken from the Court of Auditors Annual
Report for the year 198745.
"In practice, the Court found that for these and other reasons to do with the member
states' administrative arrangements, the monthly declarations submitted by member
states bear only a tenuous relationship to the actual level of the underlying expenditure.
Its analyses showed, for example, that the average rate of error for quantities declared
as having entered public storage was of the order of 25% and that the average error rate
of quantities declared as having left public storage, which determine the losses on sales
from intervention to be made good by the Community, was as high as 45%" (para
4.15).
"In the absence, taken overall, of adequate independent physical stocktaking and
quality control arrangements in the member states, in the Court's opinion no reliance
can be placed on published figures for the quantities and values of products held in
intervention storage at the end of the financial year nor on the related expenditure in the
year" (para 4.17) - despite the central importance of these variables in the cost
calculations.
Although it must be noted that the errors referred to above can conceivably work in
either direction, it is of great concern that the data used for the calculation of billions of
ECU's-worth of expenditure can be so inaccurate.
b) Putting A Yalue on the Stock
Whilst stocks are now depreciated fully within one financial year (see Chapter 3), in
the years before 1988 this didn't occur, therefore this would potentially have introduced
significant biases into the calculations.
The provisional nature of these declarations can and does engender a casual attitude
towards the accuracy of the filling-in of the monthly declarations. Even if the data on
which the forms were based were accurate. this casual attitude by the people involved
may well go unnoticed, since a derailed audit only occurs after the twelfth and annual
declaration has been submitted and since, as noted above, monthly readjustments to
previous estimates don't have to be spelled out in detail, changes which have occurred
may well be impossible to pick lip. These changes are, as the Court put it "widely
considered to be excused from internal and external control".46
45OJC316. 12.12.1988, P67.
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Another problem, in some ways closely related to the foregoing discussion is that
the profit or loss on individual lots coming into and going out from store cannot be
calculated. As noted above, data are often inaccurate as regards quantities going into
store and coming out of store, BUT even if the data were totally accurate, given the
method of booking the expenditure in terms of global averages, individual
consignments are lost. Specifically, the price at which consignments are taken in is
either taken as the intervention/buying-in price, or the global average purchase price
only as calculated at the end of the year. This sort of averaging calculation smoothes
over possible benefits from providing the best storage facilities to ensure minimum
quality deterioration in stock so as to minimise the loss on sales; and it lessens the
"penalty" on badly kept stocks which deteriorate to a significant degree.
A third problem as noted by the COUrt, again related to the above issues, is that
since the calculations relating to the value of stocks; and the losses made on sale from
intervention (even assuming accurate data) are based on ad hoc averaging procedures
not audited until the end of the year, the ongoing monthly figures can't form part of the
intervention agencies' accounts, so are not subject to normal double-entry accounting
procedures and safeguards.
1st Category Intervention
Storage
Turning now to first category expenditure, the problems faced with public
intervention storage have been covered above, and with private storage, similar
problems can be expected to exist. especially in respect of keeping a check on the
quantities in store and the value of those stocks. These may well lead to genuine
mistakes in any declarations made by farmers, but they could also conceivably permit
unscrupulous people to make fraudulent returns.
Production Aids
A second element, production aids, are paid for a number of products. For durum
wheat it is paid per hectare sown, which raises questions of how the areas are checked,
especially as durum is mainly grown in the Southern states where the administrative
infrastructure is weaker. This problem is manifold as it involves checking areas and
also ensuring the area recorded is sown to durum wheat. Furthermore the durum must
fulfill a number of criteria in order to be eligible for the payment.
With olive oil, a production aid is payable set at the difference between the target
46 see EC Court of Auditors. (1988), op cit, P12.
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price and the price producers should get from the market. The aid is paid on the basis of
regional standard yields, as established by government sampling. Many claims operate
through producer-groups, who have responsibility for checking the claims, and who
receive a percentage of the production aid to cover the costs involved in all this. In the
member states involved, agencies are being set up to police these producer groups and
their work. In their first year of operation, the Commission noted that "some member
states found aid claims dropping by up to 30%"47, a notable achievement given that
areas eligible for aid are set in terms of areas planted at 31.10.1978 (France and Italy),
1.1.1981 (Greece), and 1.1.1984 (Spain and Portugal), rather than current areas.
Given that producer-groups receive a PERCENTAGE of the aid, they have an incentive
to ensure the producers get as much as possible, thus checks are very necessary.
In the fruit and vegetables (f&v) sector, support for market prices is provided by
compensation paid by the intervention agencies for products withdrawn from the
market ("normal" intervention is impractical given the perishable nature of f&v), and
withdrawal is normally carried out via producers' organisations. This withdrawn
produce is, as provided for in the basic regulation48 to be disposed of in a number of
specified ways; for example free distribution to charitable institutions (subject to these
supplies being additional to normal demand), as animal feed, for processing into
alcohol, and 'use for non-food purposes'. In practice, most withdrawn produce
(around 80% in recent years) is destroyed, and the claim for compensation made under
the category 'use for non-food purposes'. Certain issues arise from this system:
Firstly, in disposing of withdrawn produce, if any revenue is received, this is to be
declared, and offset against the figure claimed for compensation for withdrawal from
the market.
Secondly, and following on from this, since destruction isn't an officially-
recognised outlet for withdrawn produce. it lacks an adequate, full control system.
There is therefore, no conclusive check to ensure such produce isn't subsequently sold
back onto the market, and the full amount of compensation still claimed for, though
Italy and Greece do have teams monitoring destruction. They involve, in each country,
2 local officials with the third coming from the Guardia di Finanza in Italy and,
interestingly in Greece, a member of the very producer organisation which could gain if
products declared as bring destroyed are then surreptitiously sold again! Moreover,
there also appears to be little or no detailed checking of the declarations of revenue from
47COM(87)694 13.1.1988. P4. This is actually a proposal for a regulation LO set up controls in the
wine sector.
48Council Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 OJLIIS 20.5.1972.
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the sale of withdrawn produce.
4.5.2: Export Refunds
In the House of Lords Report, one of the witnesses"? said he felt the main area
where fraudulent activity could be perpetrated was with export refunds. Whilst much of
the Lords report focuses on refunds for meat products, certain general features could be
applicable to cereals in particular. Firstly, refunds will depend on the quality and
quantity of the goods exported, yet given the volume of exports each year, it would be
all but impossible to closely monitor all lots traded. Secondly, as the Lords found to be
the case with certain other products, the fact that refunds vary between different
destinations can lead to an incentive to claim a particular export is going to a destination
with a high refund level, then actually export it to a low refund destination. Thirdly,
with the facility available, it is possible to fix an export refund well before export
occurs. Again it is administratively virtually impossible to monitor all export
consignments to ensure they all match the conditions on the export licence regarding
quantity, destination etc, or even that they are exported at all.
On the basis of the details given in the House of Lords Report, it appears on the
whole that with the product sectors under consideration here, the question of financial
mismanagement has generally been more applicable than that of export refund fraud.
Thus in terms of the EC's overall attempts at combating fraud, there appears to have
been relatively little significance for the cereals and oilseeds sectors. The main problems
it would appear lie with the way in which the intervention expenditures are estimated.
Here however, the main causes appear to be member state inefficiencies and the sheer
complexity of the regulations, although the latter does offer some scope for fraudulent
activity to take place. As with all the foregoing discussions however, it is impossible to
estimate at all precisely (he extent of the inaccuracies. Moreover, it could be inferred
that whilst the problems as they most affect cereals and oilseeds could be reduced by a
simplification of the rules concerning the way in which the expenditures are calculated,
this issue appears to be very low 011 the list of reform priorities with the CAP, and
therefore is likely to remain as it is, despite the possible adverse effects it could be
having on the budget.
49 Mr John Tomlinson, MEP.
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4.6: THE 1991/92 REFORMS OF THE CEREALS AND OILSEEDS SECfORS
4.6.1: Introduction
The general discussion of policy ref0l111Swithin the EC has so far focussed on the
1988 stabiliser package, and the 1992 MacSharry reforms. Whilst the latter package
included measures relating to the oilseeds sector, the major reorientation of this regime
occurred in 1991, under other pressures, in addition to the usual internal budgetary
ones.
4.6.2: The New Oilseeds Regime
In December 1987, the American Soybean Association, through the US trade
representative, lodged a complaint with the GATT that the old regime, as described
earlier, violated the EC's zero tariff binding agreed in GAIT. In December 1989, the
GA TT panel upheld the US's complaints, and required the EC to change the way in
which it supported oilseeds producers. Whilst the new regime retained the principle of
direct deficiency payments, certain important changes were made.
Firstly, under the new regime producers receive the payments directly, rather than
via the processors. In this way, the EC hoped to overcome US complaints regarding
the nature of the old system that processors only received payment for EC-grown
oilseeds, and they could retain pan of the payment. Secondly, the nature of the
deficiency payment was changed from a production-based payment to an area-based
payment. Thirdly, the payments recognise explicitly a link between the cereals and the
oilseeds sectors, and how the inter-relationships can lead to excess production efforts in
one or other of the sectors if the returns to each crop are out of line. The system, to
apply from the 1992 harvest, is illustrated below:
First, a balance must be struck between the cereals and oilseeds regimes, in order to
ensure that there is no significant switch in production between them with the
introduction of the new policy. For this purpose, the EC aims to achieve a price
relationship of 2.1: 1 between oilseeds and cereals prices. Multiplying the current
average cereals buying-in price by 2.1 gives the average oilseeds support price. Next,
in order to get the level of aid payable (ie the subsidy or deficiency payment), the
projected reference price - PRP - (ie the world/EC market price that is forecast for the
year ahead, and therefore the price expected to be paid to EC producers by EC oil seeds
crushers) is calculated. The deficiency payment (DP) is the difference between the two.
This is the return per tonne of oilseeds produced. In order to convert this to an area
payment, the level of the DP is multiplied by the average EC oilseeds yield to give the
Community Reference Amount - CRA -, that is the payment per hectare. This is then
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adjusted to account for regional variations in yields of both cereals and oilseeds, thus
giving a Regional Reference Amount - RRA. Moreover, if the actual market price
(Observed Reference Price - ORP) turns out to be more than 8% away from the PRP,
then a further adjustment to the payment calculation is made.
Price ratio for oil seeds to cereals
2.1:1
Current average buying-in price for cereals = 155 ECU/l.
Thus average current EC oilseeds support price = 155*2.1 = 325.5 ECU/t
PRP initially given in the regulation as 163 ECUlt
Thus oilseeds deficiency payment = 325.5-163 = 162.5 ECU/t
Average oilseeds yield per hectare = 2.36 t/hectare.
Thus CRA set at 162.5*2.36 = 384 ECU/hectare.
Regarding regionalisation, take for illustrative purposes the oilseeds yield in England of
3.08 tonnes per hectare, as against the EC average of 2.36 t/ha. The regional aid level
would be calculated as follows:
. . 384*3.08 /h
Regional AId = 2.36 = 501.2 ECU a
- allowing for rounding. Note that this is identical to simply multiplying the DP by the
regional yield. With the proposals regarding limiting payments to larger fanners not
being adopted, it appears that there is now no ceiling on individual payment levels.
4.6.3: The 1992 Cereals Reforms and Chan(:es to the Oilseeds Regime
The arable sector arrangements cover cereals, oilseeds, protein crops and dried
fodder (but not, eg, linseed, sugar beet and potatoes). The main motive for this, in
theory at least, is to try to balance the different sectors against each other, and reduce or
remove the incentive to move from anyone crop in surplus into another.
The basic support system for cereals is for a target price to be set such that, when
the basic compensatory payment is added, the farmer receives the same return as the
current average cereals buying-in price of 155 ECU per tonne (the same level as that
used last year in the establishment of the new oilseeds regime). Note that the term
'target price' now has a new meaning. It is no longer some notional price that the policy
is attempting to give farmers. It is instead now a 'reference price for aid'. 50 Over the
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period 1993/4 to 1995/6, the target price will be cut, but the compensatory payment
increased, to leave the same level of total payment to farmers. The intervention price, as
before, is set at a level below that of the target price, and falls over this same time
period. The threshold price is set at a level of 45 ECU/t above the target price, and is
also to be lowered over the three years of the initial scheme. By 1995/6, it will be equal
to the target price plus compensatory payment. The following table sets out all these
arrangements:
1993/4 1994/5 1995/6
Target Price 130 120 110
Compensatory Payment 25 35 45
Target Price plus payment 155 155 155
Threshold price 175 165 155
Intervention Price 117 108 100
It is important to note that the compensatory amounts above are 'basic amounts',
specified in terms of ECU per tonne. In practice, the payments are made on a per
hectare basis. Thus the cereals compensatory payment is given as the product of the
basic amount per tonne and the average regional cereals yield over the individual
producer's total production. Moreover, these payments have a number of conditions
attached. The first relates to the distinction made between 'small' producers and others.
Small producers are defined in terms of an area of land that represents production of not
more than 92 tonnes (using the regional yield figures used in all the other calculations).
In the UK, this translates to about 16 hectares.
Two schemes for compensation exist - the 'general scheme' for all producers, and
the 'simplified scheme', for which only small producers are eligible. For the general
scheme, farmers must set aside 15% of their land.>t Small farmers however are
exempt from this set aside requirement, and can receive compensation on all areas
farmed 'irrespective of the crops actually sown'.S2
50 SeeAgra Europe No 1492,22.5.1992.page P/14.
51 According to the preamble of Council Regulation (EEC) 1765/92of 30th June 1992,establishing
a support system for producers of certain amble crops, in OlL181. 1.7.1992,page 12, on page 13 it
notes that this set aside percentage should be re-examined to see if changes need to be made in the light
of production or market developments. Presumably, this suggests that the figure will need to rise as
cereals yields rise, so as to offset the effect of the lauer on the cereals market.
S2 ibid, page 13.
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The land set aside is to be part of the rotational scheme of the farm. Payments at a
higher rate will be available for non-rotational set aside. Land not cultivated in earlier
years will not be eligible for compensation, except where the land has been set aside as
part of the ongoing voluntary set aside scheme. The total area of land in any region
eligible for aid payrnents+' is however limited to the average arable area, plus land
fallowed under publicly funded schemes, for the period 1989-1991.54 As before,
compensatory payments will be made under the cereals regime to producers of potatoes
going for the manufacture of starch. A further point to note is that from 1993, there will
be no intervention quality standard set for feed wheat. Whilst this sounds significant
however, only about 2% of wheat currently taken into intervention is feed wheat.
The oilseeds regime has already been reformed, as set out above. The regulation as
set out in 376619155 will be replaced by those sections of Regulation 1765/92 that
relate to oilseeds from 1993/4. Whilst the projected reference price will be unchanged,
the Community reference amount (that is, deficiency payment multiplied by average
yield per hectare) will be cut from 384 ECU per hectare to 359 ECU per hectare. With
the average yield still given as 2.36 tonnes per hectare, this means a lower per unit
deficiency payment under the updated arrangements from 1993/4. Note that with the
GATT dispute with the US continuing, further changes to this regime may yet
appear. 56
With the set aside payments for cereals on large farms not being limited. as the
initial proposals had wanted. 'the Council of Ministers has effectively increased the
profitability of grains in relation to oilseeds.'57 It appears that the effect of this will be
to encourage farmers to minimise the area of cereals land set aside, and maximise the
set aside burden on other crops (the area to be set aside relates to 'arable' area as a
whole). A further point that will contribute to this is that when the new oilseeds regime
was established in 1991, a price ratio of 2.1 : I was used in the calculations, supposedly
53 where region can be a complete member state, or an area within, at the discretion of each member
state.
54 Further details specifically of the new cereals regime arc in Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92
of 30th June 1992 on the common organization of the market in cereals.
55 in OJL356. 24.12.91.
56 They are still unhappy about the nature of the regime, despite the changes made. In 1992. they got
the GAIT panel reconvened, who uphcld the US's continuing criticisms. The EC have not yet agreed
to further changes. despite the threat of trade sanctions being imposed, and the parties will be meeting
again in September 1992 to try and reach a compromise solution to the problems.
57 Agra Europe No 1495. 12.6.1992. page PIt.
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in order to ensure a balance between the two sectors. With a cereals price of 155 ECU
per tonne being retained, but the oilseeds price being cut, the calculation now works out
to give a new ratio of approximately 2.03: I:
The lower reference amount of 359 ECU per tonne (it was 384) gives a deficiency
payment of 152.1 ECU per tonne (it was 162.5). With the world price still given as
163 ECU per tonne, this implies an EC price of 315.1 ECU per tonne. Taking the
cereals price as still being 155 ECU per tonne, so a price ratio of 2.03 to 1 is obtained.
The set-aside part of the agreement really introduces cross-compliance into the CAP
for the first time in a key commodity sector58. All farmers other than those defined as
'small' must set aside 15% of their arable land in order to qualify for the compensatory
deficiency payments. In addition however, all farmers will receive payment for setting
aside their land. This is set at a level equal to that compensatory (ie deficiency) payment
which farmers would have received in 1995/6 had they sown the area in question to
cereals. It appears at the time of writing that if a farmer sets aside more than 15% of his
arable land, he will not receive additional payments. Note that land receiving these
payments must be part of the farm's rotation, in order to ensure the farmer doesn't
simply set aside his least productive land. If a farmer chooses not to rotate his set aside
land he will, from 1993/4, have to set aside a higher proportion of his arable land than
15% in order to offset any effects setting aside the least productive land could have on
total production.
Regarding the five year set aside scheme already in operation, no new participants
are permitted. Existing participants can choose whether or not to remain in the scheme.
If they choose to remain in the scheme, the land set aside is NOT included in the total
base area subject to the 15% set-aside requirement of the new scheme. There will
moreover be no temporary one-year scheme this year.
4.7: THE NEW REGIMES AND THE FRAUD/MISMANAGEMENT ISSUE
The 1991 Commission report on fraud states that during 1992, the EC should help
to cut fraud by simplifying agricultural regulations, and changing the methods of
control within the CAP. 59 The work above suggested that the old cereals and oil seeds
regimes tended to be such that fraud wasn't a major problem, certainly not in the way it
58 Cross-compliance is where farmers receive payment under one part of the policy (the area
compensatory payment) only when they fulfil obligauons set OUl in another pan (that land be set
aside). Note thal the compensation for selling aside land is not ~ compliant.
59Reported in Agra Europe No 1495 of 12lh June 1992, page E/IO.
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is with the dairy and meat regimes. The greater problem is that of mismanagement,
caused at least in part by complexity of the regimes and nature of the expenditure
calculations. Consideration therefore needs to be given to whether or not these new
policies fit in with the Commission's ideas of simplification.
At least in the short term, it would appear that no changes are on the way in tenus
of the calculations used in estimating intervention expenditure. Thus the main problem
with the old system seems to have been retained by the new.
The new regimes however do introduce one new problem in particular into the
system - the monitoring of areas to be planted to particular crops.60 It would appear
that aerial surveillance photography from satellites is increasingly offering the
opportunity to monitor areas plan red to different crops. Rape in particular is very easy
to identify, but other crop [00 can quite readily be examined from photographs. It is
also becoming much cheaper to carry our such exercises as the technology advances.
One problem in the Northern member states in particular is the question of cloud cover.
It could be pointed out though that these countries have better administrative
infrastructures to cope with ground level surveys, whereas the Southern states, with
better weather and less well developed administrative structures could particularly
benefit from the photography approach. Thus whilst it is still unclear how the member
states are going to police this particular issue, the technology is, or at least should be,
available to allow the governments to offer a viable threat to fanners considering
cheating. This technique could also be used to ensure that farmers do indeed rotate their
crops as required by the regulation.
A related problem however is that the system also relates to an historical 'base
area', covering the years 1989 to 1991. Here, it would appear that the best the EC can
do is to rely on the accuracy of past records.
4.8: CONCLUSION
This chapter has explained both the old and the new systems of support to the
cereals and oilseeds sectors. It has shown that the change in policy is from one that
burdened both consumers and taxpayers, to one where the burden is principally on
taxpayers. It also illustrated, for each commodity, the derivation of expenditures. In so
doing, it highlighted those variables which are most important in determining
expenditures. Subsequent chapters therefore focus on these variables, notably the
elements making up production and consumption. The chapter also highlighted the
60 This section has benefitted from discussions with members or the Geography Dept at Nouingham
University.
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problems of fraud and mismanagement, in order to see how these might adversely
affect attempts at maintaining budgetary discipline.
The next chapter begins the detailed analysis of the cereals sector. Then, both old
and new regimes are examined to consider future budgetary expenditures under both
systems. This chapter has outlined those systems and paved the way for this analysis.
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CHAPTER 5: EC CEREALS MARKET ANALYSIS
~ tfu machine gun was on tlie Somme, tfu C5tP is to sound rural
management.
9.lr Pfr.ifip Eliason, aeputy director, 'J{ptionaf :Farmers:Feaeration,
Canberra, _f;f_ustrafia,in a fetter to tfu :Financial 'Times, 16/7/91.
5,1: INTRODUCTION
For the last ten to fifteen years. the EC has been experiencing a rising structural
surplus in its cereals sector (specifically a net surplus - that is production plus imports,
less consumption less exports). A consequence of this has been the rising levels of
expenditure discussed in earlier chapters. This has been due to the need either to export
this surplus directly. or to store it in intervention stores first. and then export it.l This
chapter starts by examining the trends in production, imports, consumption and
exports. in order to quantify the rise in surplus production. It then moves on to
consider in greater detail the processes at work in the intervention operation, as well as
looking at the factors influencing the levels of stocks held, and the movements in those
stocks. Thus consideration will be given to the possible alternative functions for
intervention storage, in particular the short run stabilising role in the face of year by
year fluctuations in production, and the possible longer run role as a counter to the
rising trend in surplus production. The final section of this chapter considers how the
cereals market absorbs variations in production - to what extent do such variations lead
to variations in consumption. net trade, and intervention activity.
5.2: DATA SOURCES AND PROBLEMS
The work reported below was carried out on a crop year basis. The main sources of the
cereals balance sheet data were Eurostat publications (the 'Agricultural Situation in the
Community' and 'Crop Production'), updated by data from Agra Europe and the
Home-Grown Cereals Authority. as well as balance sheets from DG VI itself. The
intervention balance data set is from the HGCA's annual 'Cereals Statistics'
publication. as is the data for US production. The cereals balance sheet gives data on
production, consumption. trade and changes in stocks. and the intervention balance
sheet gives data on intervention stock purchases. sales from intervention to the home
and export (ie third country) markets. and also opening and closing stock totals.
1 There are other ouuets, for example food aid or resale back onto the demesne market, but
quantitatively these are much less significant.
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These terms require careful definition. Regarding production, the figure presented
in the cereals balance sheet is usable production. This is distinct from harvested
production. which is calculated as area times yield.2 Overall since 1973. usable
production has come to about 99.5% of total production, or currently about 1 million
tonnes less than harvested production. That loss occurs prior to the grain reaching the
market - losses sustained after then ie within the marketing chain - are counted as a
separate category of consumption. Consumption appears on the cereals balance sheet as
Total Internal Use, and equals the sum of five different end uses for cereals: animal
feed. seed. losses. industrial use. and human consumption (in grain terms). As has
been noted above, the dominant use quantitatively is animal feed. Overall therefore,
total cereals consumption is dominated by cereals use in animal feed (discussed in
greater detail elsewhere in this thesis).
With trade. the focus is on extra Community trade, as it is here that the EC incurs
major budgetary expenditures-'. and here too where the quantity of imports and
exports affects the TOTAL EC cereals balance that is the focus of this work. Further, as
regards exports, there are two distinct sources of supplies that the EC can draw upon -
intervention stores and the open market. In practical terms, there is no difference
between these two sources, but the distinction is nonetheless important as they are
treated differently in the EC budget, (see Chapter 3 above for more details). Thus when
cereals are exported from the open market, the expenditure incurred is classified as
export refund expenditure. but when cereals are exported from intervention. the
expenditure is classified as 'other public storage costs', although the two expenditures
are effectively used in the same way to achieve the same economic end. In terms of the
data used. the figure given in the cereals balance sheet for exports will include that
quantity of cereals which has been exported from intervention. as well as that quantity
exported from the open market.
In addition. a further distinction needs to be explicitly highlighted - that between
public (ie intervention) stocks. and private stocks. The intervention balance sheet from
the HGCA. as its name indicates. deals solely with public stocks. whereas the 'change
in stocks' data from the cereals balance sheet also appear to include figures for private
stockholdings, although the HGCA never explicitly makes this distinction, nor does it
(or any other source) present separate figures for private stocks. More will be said
2 Note !hat here too. there can be two estimates, one using planted area and one using harvested area.
The usual estimate is the one using harvested area. as is noted in earlier chapters.
3 although there will also be a minor net impact on the budget due to the continued application of
MeA's to intra-Community trade.
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about private stocks later.
When collecting data. it needs LO be borne in mind that the data are subject to
measurement errors, Not only are the figures updated as more information is known
(see below). but the figures may simply be wrong or totally unreliable. This point can
be illustrated by quoting from the Court of Auditors reports on intervention storage'[.
They comment on the irregular way in which most countries store their intervention
grain. With particular reference to Italy. they note that quantities and their movements
are reported in such round figures that they "can only represent global and
approximative estimations" (P9).
In their annual report. in referring to this and other problems. they draw the
following conclusions:
"In practice, the Court found that for these and other reasons to do with the
member states' administrative arrangements, the monthly declarations [for the
reimbursement of expenditure incurred in operating the intervention system]
submitted by member states bear only a tenuous relationship to the actual level
of the underlying expenditure. Its analyses showed. for example, that the
average rate of error for quantities declared as having entered public storage was
of the order of 25% and that the average error rate of quantities declared as
having left public storage, which determine the losses on sales from
intervention to be made good by the Community, was as high as 45%" (P67.
para 4.15)
"In the absence, taken overall. of adequate independent physical stocktaking and
quality control arrangements in the member states. in the Court's opinion no reliance
can be placed on published figures for the quantities and values of products held in
intervention storage at the end of the financial year nor on the related expenditure in the
year." (para 4.17). Unfortunately. the official data are all that is available, so it must
always be borne in mind that statistical calculations are being performed using data that
can be up to 45% away from the actual figure.5 Another issue. highlighted in recent
years by the Court of Auditors amongst others has been fraud against the EC budget
(see Chapter 4 for more details). Thus. to take an example, it appears that a common
4 see EC Court of Auditors. (1988) and the Court of Auditors Annual Report for the financial year
1987. OJC 316. 12.12.1988.
5 It is a methodological point that because the answer is given to two or three decimal places, it
might be perceived that this answer is necessarily accurate. It can only be accurate however to the
extent that the data used in the calculation are accurate.
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fraud is to declare a particular export consignment to be for a destination that can get a
high unit export refund, and then export it to a destination which is only eligible for a
low refund. It can therefore be difficult to tie up export quantities and expenditures
incurred. This can be compounded by the type of fraud described in paragraph 4.37 of
the Court of Auditors report for the financial year 19876. Here, exporters claim and
receive export refunds on goods that are not exported at all, but are diverted back to use
in the home market. Thus this 'trade' will appear in the expenditure data but not in the
trade data. Alternatively, the cereals could be exported. but then secretly re-imported
and sold on the internal market for the higher price.
During the period under consideration, the EC has expanded from 9 member states
to 10 and then to 12. As will be seen below, most analysis was carried out using two
sets of data. One had the figures for all years corrected to an EC membership of 10, and
the other had the data set using figures for EClO up to 1984/5, and EC12 from 1985/6.
For some variables such as production, the quantity pertaining to the EC2 was stated
directly, whereas with other variables such as imports and exports, a 'conversion
coefficient' had to be used. This utilised the fact that for some years, data were
available for both EC9 and ECIO, or ECIO and EC12. The ratio between the two items
could, for example. be used to infer the EC 10 position from the EC9 data, where EC 10
data were not available. It will be seen below from the data on the cereals balance sheet
that for the years 1975/6 and I976n , the balance sheet doesn't actually balance. This is
because the trade figures had to approx.imated in the aforementioned way. There is of
course no a priori reason to assume that the proportionate difference between EC9 and
ECIO trade in anyone year will be the same as in any other year - imports and exports
are determined by too many outside variables for that to be the case. Unfortunately,
there is no better alternative given the data available.
One caveat to note regarding any comparison between the cereals and intervention
balance sheets is that whilst the former was put onto an EC 10 basis right back to
1975/6, the intervention balance sheet was only available for the EC9 in the early years.
That is however generally a minor problem since Greek stocks represent a small
percentage of the EC total.
As was noted above, the data presented by Eurostat get updated in subsequent
years. This is standard practice. but does mean that the most updated data set needs to
be obtained. With, for example, the cereals balance sheet in the Agricultural Situation in
the Community, this occurs as a matter of course/, but with the intervention balance
6 Ole 316, 12.12.1988.
7 though as will be seen later with (he stock change figure for 198011, some care is still needed.
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sheet from the HGCA. this has not been the case. Each year. the table appears in the
'Cereals Statistics' publication. hut each edition only carries that year's data. and no
amending of the full table for the previous year. The only figure that is updated is the
closing stock figure from the previous year's table which reappears the following year
as opening stocks. hut updated as it is printed a year later. For some years however.
slightly updated tables did appear in the HGCA's Weekly Digest, and where this
happened. use was made of those updated figures (as will also be noted. where
relevant. in the tahles below). but this Updating hasn't been reported by the HGCA on a
consistent basis for all years. Thus whilst for all data the most updated figures were
always used, consistency across all data was not possible. This leads onto another
problem faced - that of inconsistency between sources. Given a lack of consistency
between sources, the difference in the extent to which data are updated could be a major
explanation. Indeed, given that, for example, Eurostat publishes the cereals balance
sheet in the Agricultural Situation in the Community, Crop Production. and the
Agricultural Statistical Yearbook. and a completely consistent set of data couldn't even
be obtained from these. one must assume that. if Eurostat only get their figures from
one source'[. then data revision must he perhaps THE explanation for the
discrepancies. With this problem between data from the one source - Eurostat - lack of
consistency between data from different sources should be expected. The problem is
that no single source offers all the data required, therefore different sources HAVE to
be used. An identification of some of the main inconsistencies between the cereals and
intervention balance sheets is presented later. hut the following table gives an indication
of the extent to which this process occurs (ASIC is the Agricultural Situation in the
Community. and CP is 'Crop Production'. all data are in '000 tonnes, and the figures
are for usable production. total internal use. and use of cereals in animal feed
respectively. all from the cereals balance sheet):
Source 8415 85/6 86n 87/8 88/9
173090 (usable production)
ASIC 1986 145380 (total internal use)
91804 (use in animal feed)
173258 160148
ASIC 1987 144854 140831
8 and even if they don't. why would they publish data from one source in one place, and from
another soerce in another place'?
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ASIC 1988
ASIC 1989
ASIC 1990
CP 411991
90677 87272
160431 153785
143202 138012
88670 85404
154501 153553
139571 134730
84862 81722
160433 154729 162750
142416 136084 134255
87797 81142 80293
163977
136654
80970
The main point illustrated by this table is the extent to which data can be updated
from year to year, but for 1988/9, it can also be seen that the difference between the
figures from the latest Agricultural Situation and the latest Crop Production vary too.
The variation can be up towards 1% each year, or up to about 1 million tonnes, but
with the figures for 198516. between the 1987 and 1988 ASIC's, the variations on the
consumption and animal feed figures is over 1.5%.
5.3: ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION. CONSUMPTION AND TRADE
5.3.1; Aims and MethodQIQ~y
The aim of this section of work is to examine the trends in EC cereals production,
consumption, imports and exports since the mid-1970's, as mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter. This has been done using OLS regressions, examining the data for time
trends in the first instance. Two sets of data were used, as has been noted before - one
using figures corrected to an EC 10 basis, and another using a combination of EC 10 and
Ee12 data. Initially, the ECI0 data will be considered, followed by a consideration of
the enlargement of the EC to twelve member states, and the impact of that on these key
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variables. For most of the following analysis. the data period begins in 1975/6 with the
most recent observation being 19901I (16 observations). Although cereals balance sheet
data are available before this year, the intervention balance sheet - only available in
HGCA publications - hasn't been found before this time.
5.3 2: Production
ECIO Cereals Production and Trend
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Initially, a linear time trend was fitted to the production data. A strong time trend
was found. but with large variations around that trend in certain years:
Q = 100223.9 + 3116.615t
(24.107) (7.249)9
Rsq=O.79 Rbsq=O.775 DW=1.743
198415 appeared as an outlier using the standard rule of thumb.I'' The observation for
9 Note that with all regressions reponed, the figures in brackets are the t-statistics.
10 That is, if the value of the residual of an observation is more than twice the regression standard
error, that observation is considered an outlier. These observations were so treated in acknowledgement
that their inclusion would incorporate the effect of very unusual years into the estimation of the
regression coefficients. In many cases. the incorporation of dummies has been accompanied by an a
priori explanation of why that particular observation should be excluded. Thus these observations
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197617 also had a large residual, but could not actually be classified as an outlier.
This regression was then re-run with a dummy added for 1984/5 that takes the
value I for that observation, and () for the rest:
Q = 99688.119 + 3022.065t + 21431.229084/5.
(32.185) (9.413) (3.505)
Rsq=O.892 Rbsq=0.875 DW=1.548
Here, with the effect of the 84/5 outlier removed, the 1976/7 observation was also
now classified as an outlier using that same rule of thumb:
Q = 102970.79 + 2746.5966t + 20903.247084/5 - 14530.98207617
(36.576) (9.728) (4.165) (-2.706)
Rsq=0.933 Rbsq=0.916 DW=2.409
The use of dummy variables for 197617 and 1984/5 has the effect of weakening the
estimated time trend. The lower figure is supported by the results achieved from an
analysis of a longer data set. The starting period of the data set used was the mid
1970's - a time when world commodity markets were highly volatile. The data period
was therefore extended back 10 197213. When this data set was regressed just against
time, with the longer data set, 1976/7 and 1984/5 again appeared as outliers. Re-
running the regression therefore with dummies on these two observations gave the
following result:
Q = 99797.6J + 2J84.6291- 17787.781076/7 + 20542.187084/5
(40.344) (11.154) (-3.415) (4.005)
Rsq=0.927 Rbsq=O.913 DW=2.473
Production (as distinct from usable production) can be split into two elements - area
and yield. The rise in cereals production in recent years has been essentially a yield-
driven phenomenon. The upward trend in production is generated by a very dominant
trend in cereals yields. rather than an upward trend in cereals area. Taking the cereals
yield data for the (calendar) years 1973-1989, and testing for a time trend. the
following result emerges:
ARE outliers to that extent,
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Y = 29.993 + 0.99t
(25.104) (8.488)
Rsq=O.828 Rbsq=O.816 OW=1.97I
Moreover, the 1984 yield observation is an outlier (though no other year in this data
period is found to be so). Re-running this regression with a dummy on that observation
gave:
Y = 30.039 + 0.943t + 6.344084
(32.591) (10.362) (3.348) Rsq=O.904 Rbsq=O.891 OW=1.933
When a regression was run for area, the following result was obtained:
A = 37075.301 - 109.654t
(140.69) (-4.264)
Rsq=0.548 Rbsq=O.518 OW=1.309
A detailed examination of the factors influencing cereals area and yield occur in
Chapters 6 and 8. These regressions illustrate that the strong upward time trend present
in the production data derives from the trend in cereals yield. For the data period, the
average yield is 3.89 tonnes per hectare, and the average area 36.1 million hectares.
From these averages, the regression coefficients indicate that yields are rising by 2.54%
per annum, with area falling by 0.30% per annum. Even though the data set for usable
production is over a different period, is for EC 12, and is for crop year rather than
calendar year, the growth per annum, calculated on the same basis, of 2.17% per year,
is still very close to the net effects of rising yields and falling area (2.54 - 0.3 = 2.24).
5.3.3: Consumption
Although consumption, or total internal use, consists of a number of different
elements, considered separately in greater detail in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, here
just the aggregate data are considered. Over the full data period. no significant time
trend is to be found:
C = 117192.675 - 147.903t
(79.288) (-0.968)
Rsq=0.063 Rbsq=-O.004 DW=1.386
The regression statistics confirm that a linear time trend is not the correct
specification for the consumption data.
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118000
-.
-~
~
~
116000
--
!:
-1:1 114000
•:::I
01
112000
110000
~
r- oo 0- 0 ::::: N ..... ~ Vl ~ r- oo 0- 0 -...... ...... ...... 00 ...... ...... ...... ...... ;0 ...... ...... 0- ......V'I >0 r- ee ...... 0
-
N ...., o:t V'I r- oo ...... 0
r- r- r- r- a- 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a- 0-
0- a- a- 0- r- 0- 0- 0- 0- a- a- 0- a- 0- 00 0-a-
- - -
a-
-
- -
Given the greater analysis on total internal use elsewhere, this is to be expected, as
consumption is the sum of five different end-uses, each with their own characteristics.
Thus whilst this merely confirms the absence of a time trend for current purposes, the
correct specification for each individual end use is considered elsewhere. No outliers
are present with this regression, indicating that consumption in total is much more
stable than production. not being subject to the same random influences that production
is vulnerable [0 (eg the climate).
As with production however, the regression was re-run with data for the longer
period from 197213.
C = 118284.491 - 194.77t
(94.222) (- 1.769)
Rsq::O.155 Rbsq=O.106 DW=1.429
This confirms the findings from the regression over the shorter data period. Again,
no observations were found to be outliers. I I
5.3.4: Trade
Over the data period, given the production and consumption trends. the significant
II Note mal comparable data wasn't available for exports and imports. so a full analysis over this
longer data period couldn't he carried out
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feature of EC trade patterns has been the move from a major net importer of temperate
agricultural product s to a major net exporter. Imports (M) and exports (X) have shown
strong opposite trends during this time:
ECIO Cereals Exports and Trend
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M = 24994.35 - 1508.15lt
(18.024) (-10.516)
with 1976n identified as an outlier.
Rsq=O.888 Rbsq=O.88 DW=1.196
x = 9184.25 + 1584.904t
(5.89) (9.828)
Rsq=O.873 Rbsq=O.864 DW=2.112
Re-running imports with a dummy for 197617 yielded:
M = 23322.153 - 1366.069t + 7431.98607617
(19.893) (-11.621) (3.32) Rsq=O.939 Rbsq=0.93 OW=O.647
Whilst this improved the explanatory power of the regression. the Durbin-Watson
statistic still indicates autocorrelation. although for current purposes. only the general
direction of import data is important. The graph showing actual and estimated imports
indicates that the pattern around trend is cyclical. but does follow trend. Also of
concern is the data just taken from 198213. In these most recent nine years. the general
movement has been much flatter. A regression examining the trend in the most recent
nine years data yielded the following result:
M = 9206.389 - 585.567t
(14.276) (-5.11) Rsq=0.789 Rbsq=0.758 DW=1.818
Indicating that although there is still a significant downward trend in imports. it is now
down to almost a third of the trend figure from the full data period.
A log transformation was then applied to the import data to allow for the falling
trend. Moreover. with a continued import requirement by the EC. it is improbable that
any downward trend in imports will be sustained to the extent of imports falling to
zero. This transformation allows for that:
InM = 10.355 - 0.135t
(109.596) (-13.769) Rsq=O.931 Rbsq=0.926 OW=1.854
With this transformation. no observations are outliers. Moreover. the coefficients
on the trend variables from the various regressions above approximately balance.
Rising production of 2.75 million tonnes a year. with approximately static
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consumption. is translated into ex pons rising at 1.58 million tonnes a year, and imports
falling at 1.37 million tonnes a year (full data period, with dummy variable included).
Excluding the consumption figure as insignificant, the balance on production, imports
and expons is just 200,000 tonnes per year. Taking the coefficient on the regression
with logged import data. the figure translates to imports falling at an average of 1.14
million tonnes a year, a net balance which leaves just 30,000 tonnes unaccounted for by
this (albeit) very simple analysis.
5.3.5: EC Enlar~emeot
Following on from the previous analysis. it needs to be considered how the
enlargement of the EC to include Spain and Portugal from 1986 has affected the EC
cereals market. A brief consideration of cereals production in the EC2 will be made,
before the analysis moves on to look at the impact of the enlargement of the Community
from 10 to 12 on the trends identified in the EC 10 data above.
Qsp = 11127.956 + 564.22lt
(8.36) (4.344) Rsq=O.557 Rbsq=0.528 DW=2.044
Qpt = 1283.221 + 14.034t
(10.963) (1.229) Rsq=0.091 Rbsq=O.091 DW=1.21
Qs+p = 12411.176 + 578.255t
(9.09) (4.34) Rsq=O.557 Rbsq=O.527 DW=1.99
where Qsp is Spanish production, Qpt is Portuguese production, and Qs+p is the sum
of Spanish and Portuguese production, and the data set is for the period 1973 to
1989.12 Those last regressions include the first four years of EC membership.D
An analysis of EC enlargement and its impact on EC production, consumption,
imports and exports was then carried out using dummy variables. Using data for the
EClO up to 1984/5 and the EC12 from 1985/6, a dummy variable was placed on the
Ee12 data in order to attempt to pick up the impact of enlargement. The data period is
from 1975/6. and the dummy takes the value 1 for the years 1985/6 to 1990/1 (and 0
for all preceding years):
12Data is for calendar year and is from FAO Production Yearbook:
13 Regressions run for the period 1973-1985 indicated the trend identified for the period up to 1989
was much weaker with the data up to 1985. The regression statistics were poorer also.
5.13
Production
Q = 94741.865 + 441O.77t + 6153.240
(21.419) (6.326) (0.927)
Rsq=O.93 Rbsq=0.919 DW=2.01
Consumption
C = 116481.155 + 44.79t + 20494.0130 Rsq=O.932 Rbsq=O.921 DW=1.167
(60.497) (0.148) (7.092)
Imports
M = 26959.845 - 1943.99t + 6265.1870 Rsq=O.922 Rbsq=O.91 DW=2.154
(19.923) (-9.114) (3.085)
Exports
X = 8203.465 + 1821.37t - 3906.2930 Rsq=O.882 Rbsq=0.864 DW=2.098
(4.634) (6.528) (-1.47)
The coefficients on the time variables all confirm in ordinal terms what was found
earlier, although here the net balance of production, import and export coefficients is
646000 tonnes, or 15% of the production coefficient of 4.4l1mt (if, as before, the
consumption figure is ignored). With the dummy variables; on production, the
coefficient is insignificant. A major problem is that the last year of the ECI0 period,
198415. is one with an exceptionally high level of total EC production. Moreover, for
198617 and 1987/8, the levels of production are below what is a very strong rising
trend. Thus because of these variations around that trend, the difference between the
later EClO observations and some of the EC12 observations is less than a long term
trend would suggest.
With consumption on the other hand. there is much less susceptibility to such short
term variations from these 'outside' influences and so the enlargement, as one would
expect, does cause an increase in overall EC cereals consumption with the addition of
the Iberian human and animal populations to the EC's total.
With trade, at the time of accession Spain was a slight net importer of grains, and
Portugal was far from being self-sufficient 14. With exports, one would expect these to
fall as the exports from the ECIO to the EC2 are now counted as intra EC trade rather
14 According (0 ASIC 1990, for the Ihree-year period around 198516, Spain was 83% self sufficient in
grains oIher!han rice, and Portugal was 33%. By 198819, Spain was 113% self sufficient and Portugal
was 46% self suffICient
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than extra trade, Given also the fact that the exports from the EC 10 to the EC2 are
relatively small. one could perhaps accept the negative but insignificant coefficient on
the EC lOll 2 dummy.
This analysis was then extended to see if enlargement affected either or both the
intercept and the slope of the regression function. IS
Production
Q = 91948.667 + 4918.624t + 41267.733D12 - 2902.024t12
(20.64) (6.851) (1.904) (-1.691)
Rsq=O.943 Rbsq=O.929 DW=2.492
1mpoOS
M = 28069.2 - 2145.691t - 7680.99D12 - 1152.577tl2
(22.515) (-10.679) (-1.266) (2.4)
Rsq=0.947 Rbsq=O.934 DW=3.814
Consumption
C = 115312.667 + 257.2421 + 35183.581D12 - 1214.14t12
(58.93) (0.816) (3.695) (-1.61)
Rsq=0.944 Rbsq=0.93 DW=1.287
Expons
X = 7339.867 + 1978.3881 + 6950.371D12 - 897.245t12
(3.933) (6.577) (0.715) (-1.248)
Rsq=O.896 Rbsq=O.87 DW=2.515
To test for any difference between the ECIO and the ECI2, an F-test can be used. It
was found that for production and exports. for the data period under consideration,
there was no difference between the data periods, ie the enlargement of the EC had no
significant impact on either cereals production or exports. With both imports and
consumption however, the enlargement of the EC had an impact. With consumption,
the intercept coefficient is different, but the slope coefficient is the same, ie the
enlargement affects the quantity of cereals consumed, but not the rate of change of that
quantity. The regression output for imports suggests there. it is the slope coefficient
that is different between EC sizes, with the intercept being the same.
15See Appendix 1 for the theory behind the results presented here.
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Given that only extra EC trade is being considered, exports from the EClO to the
Ee2, formerly included in the trade figures, are now excluded. Imports from the EC2
to the EC 10 have undergone that same change. Trade between the EC2 and the rest of
the world, formerly irrelevant to EC trade statistics, is now included in EC external
trade figures. Ceteris paribus. the impact of EC enlargement would be straightforward
to quantify from this. That ceteris paribus assumption however doesn't hold. Consider
for example the case of maize. Prior to accession to the EC, Spain imported large
quantities from the US, a low cost producer. On joining the Community however, US
exports to Spain were subject to the EC's Common External Tariff, as well as variable
import levies. The levy-inclusive price of US maize. likely to be higher than the price of
EC maize on the Spanish market. would induce consumers to buy less US maize and
more EC maize. With the higher price however, it is likely that the reduction in
consumption of US grain would be greater than the increase in consumption of EC
grain. This trade suppression may well result in lower demand for the commodity,
both via higher prices and lower consumer welfare. In the face of this, the US has
attempted to force the EC to agree to permit supplies of maize to continue to reach the
Spanish market.
The accuracy of the regression coefficients can be tested by quantifying the impact
of the EC enlargement by other means, and comparing the results with those obtained
from the regressions. For the period 1980/1 to 199011, data were available on
production, consumption. imports and exports for the ECIO. EC12 data were not
available for all years directly, but where only the ECIO figures were available, the
conversion factors referred to earlier (page 3) were used to derive them.
The impact of the EC2 was initially estimated by subtracting the EC 10 figure from
the EC 12. Taking production first. the average EC2 figure estimated for the whole
period was 19.8m tonnes. and for the period 1980/1 to 198516 was 19m tonnes. The
coefficient on the dummy variable in the production regression above was only 6.2
million tonnes. With that regression however, 1984/5 was an outlier. The re-run
regression (with a dummy inserted). yielded:
Q = 97383.21 1+ 3604.935t + 14390.659DI2 + 17907.434D84/5
(25.353) (5.441) (2.243) (2.564)
Rsq=O.955 Rbsq=O.943 DW=1.96
The dummy coefficient of 14.4 million tonnes is still below the 19 million tonne
figure. but is now closer to it. A further comparison for the production data set was
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performed using data from the FAO.I6 Here, the average of the data for the years
1973 to 1989 is 17.6 million tonnes.l?
Extending the two-dummy analysis to the longer data period starting in 197213, the
following result was obtained:
Q = 94449.231 + 3150.747t + 32717.369D12 - 1134.147tI2
(19.82) (5.248) (1.008) (-0.559)
Rsq = 0.909 Rbsq=0.891 DW=1.729
(The F-test statistic was 2.604).
The regressions suggest that the ECs enlargement has had no significant impact on
total cereals production. The main problem is that a clear picture cannot be obtained of
the events surrounding enlargement This may possibly be explained by the fact that the
year immediately before the EC 12 data, 1984/5, saw an exceptionally large harvest in
the EC 10. This would lessen the impact of the data on the enlargement effect being
picked up by dummies. The following regression and its correlation matrix may
indicate certain statistical problems:
Q = 95066.884 + 4068.2t + 38149.511D12 - 2051.6t12 + 15591.111D84/5
(23.158) (5.577) (2.026) (-1.336) (2.232)
Rsq=O.961 Rbsq=O.947 DW=2.166
QlO/J2
t 0.962
D12 0.845 0.84
t12 0.489 0.865 0.987
D84I5 0.183 0.084 -0.2 -0.197
Turning to consumption, the average figure implied from the EClO/EC12 data is
23.6m tonnes as the average of the period 198011 to 1990/1, and 24.6m tonnes for the
period 198011 lO J 985/6. The coefficient on the dummy variable from the regression
puts the figure at 20.5m tonnes. A further comparison was made here using data for
Spanish and Portuguese cereals consumption from Eurostat 18 for the years 1981/2 to
16Various years of the FAO Production Yearbook - note that this refers to calendar year.
17 For the years 1985 to 1989. the average is 21.9 million tonnes.
18 1be data for 1981/2 was from the Agricultural Statistical Yearbook. and for the other years. from
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1988/9. The average figure for this period is 24.2 million tonnes.I''
With imports, the regression coefficient came to 6.3m tonnes, whereas the averages
(as before) came to Srn tonnes and 8Am tonnes respectively. Similar to production
however, the earlier regression suggested that the year 1976/7 was an outlier, and so
the regression was re-run with an extra dummy inserted for that year. The result was as
follows:
M = 25097.576 - 1721.154t + 5119.175012 + 6366.733076/7
(23.104) (-10.543) (3.464) (3.7)
Rsq=0.964 Rbsq=0.9SS OW=1.133
Thus, the regression coefficient of 5.1 million tonnes is within a hundred thousand
tonnes of the average figure for the period 1980/1 to 1990/1.
Finally with exports, the regression coefficient suggests an 'enlargement effect' of -
3.9m tonnes, whereas the estimates based on the EClOlEC12 data put the figure at -
99000 tonnes for full period average. Although the technique used to estimate export
(and import) figures for different EC memberships is ad hoc, and possibly inaccurate,
the figures for the two years where this was done come out very close to the overall
average. Therefore if the actual EC12 figures for those years vary greatly from those
estimated. it is possible that the overall average will vary as well.
Data from Eurostat20 indicate that in the period 1986 to 1989, intra community
trade between the EC 10 and the EC2 has been declining in both directions, suggesting
the presence of trade suppression. Extra community trade by the EC2 in the same
period has not provided much support for any trade diversion argument. 21 With
imports. there was a slight fall from 1986 to 1987, a sharp rise in 1988, and a modest
fall in 1989. With exports. the trend has been upwards. but with the 1987 figure lying
well below that trend (EC2. quantity in tonnes):
the balance sheet in Crop Production.
19 This data also highlight the problem of data being amended and updated. For Portugal some
sources give the 198516 consumption figure as 3.358 million tonnes, and others give 4.162, and for
1984/5, the figures quoted are 3.681 and 4.158. In both cases the lower figure has been used as that
should be the most updated.
20 the monthly EXlemai Trade publication.
21 although the trade agreements discussed earlier may have influenced this.
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Year intra imports intra exports extra imports extra exports
1986 2077731 234598 4130128 1058136
1987 1289505 1163846 3930417 366665
1988 934250 1090799 5853510 1449243
1989 565679 1032145 5027142 1506503
The data therefore can be seen not to tally with the regression coefficients on the
variables.
5.4: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC STOCKS IN TIlE COMMUNITY
For the EC. any examination of the cereals market and its operation needs to go
beyond just looking at production. consumption, imports and exports - as noted before.
intervention plays a major role in the operation of the cereals market (as with most
markets where support is offered under the CAP). Thus. in terms of the simple
identities which define the 'net balance' within the EC, these storage operations need to
be accounted for. In Section 5.5.5 below. attention will be focused on intervention
operations since it is these which account for such a large element in the expenditure
incurred under the CAP (see Chapter 4).
First however, market identities will he presented that include private stocks.
With cereals. a disposable surplus needs to be identified, and then allocated
between alternative outlets. The 'surplus' can be thought of as usable production (Q).
plus imports (M), minus consumption (C). The outlets for this 'surplus' can be
identified as exports from the open market (X) and changes in stocks (Ak). This last
element can be split into changes in intervention stocks (dki) and changes in private
stocks (.1kP).
Q + M - C = X + .1k = X +Aki + .1kP 1
In estimating .1ki. there are two ways from the available data that this can be done.
One can either subtract opening stocks in year t from closing stocks in year t; or
subtract opening stocks in year t from opening stocks in year t+ 1. Whilst these two
approaches should theoretically give the same result, they sometimes give varying
results for purely practical reasons. the main one being that the latter approach allows
the closing/opening stock data to be updated (as noted above). This can be thought of
as being more accurate, with the extra time period involved allowing the authorities to
collect more up to date data. Thus:
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2where ko refers to opening stocks in the relevant time period.
This is also equal to net domestic intervention minus exports to third countries from
intervention. That is. total intervention purchases from the domestic EC market. less
sales back onto the domestic EC market (= net domestic intervention - NDI), less sales
to other markets:
~=NDI -Xi 3
i1kP can then be established from ~ and ~i.
Furthermore. X (ie exports to third countries) consists of both exports from the
open market (Xom) and exports from intervention (Xi):
X =Xom +Xi 4
Thus. if equations 3 and 4 are substituted into equation I. the expression obtained
is:
Q + M - C = Xom + Xi + NDI - Xi + L\kP 5
Cancelling the positive and negative Xi's leaves the following expression:
Q + M - C = Xom + NDI + ~kP 6
from which ~kP can be estimated. Unfortunately. neither the sources of cereals
going into private stocks. nor the destination of cereals coming out of private stocks can
be identified. Moreover. it is not inconceivable that some cereals (though probably only
a small quantity). could be counted twice if it is first classified as part of the
consumption (total internal use) figure when purchased by a farmer. but then for
whatever reason isn't consumed. but added to on-farm stocks instead. This quantity
would however probably be insufficient to seriously affect any estimates of private
stock changes.
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5.5: INTERVENTION BEHAVIOUR IN THE EC CEREALS MARKET
As was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, intervention plays a central role in
the operation of the CAP. In order to maintain levels of market support within the
Community, both intervention and refunds on exports to third countries are used
extensively. As that chapter showed, the EC has had recourse to the intervention
system increasingly as the net exportable surplus in the EC has grown, and this has
been reflected in the increase in the expenditure incurred for intervention operations,
detailed in that chapter. In the late 1970's, cereals intervention stocks totalled about 2
million tonnes. They peaked at almost 18 million tonnes in 198617, and after falling
slightly in the wake of that experience, and the US drought in 1988 which offered the
EC greater market opportunities to export and at higher world prices (therefore lower
unit refund costs). in the year 199011 they returned to that order of magnitude. By the
current 199213crop year however, cereals stocks have risen to their highest ever level -
over 24 million tonnes, or about 12-15% of current average cereals production.22
In the intervention balance sheet, data are available for stock opening and closing
levels, for movements into and out of store in general terms, and for details of the
different destinations for stocks sold from intervention (as food aid, back onto the
home market, and to third countries). Relating this to the budget, the main elements of
expenditure are financial costs (which are related to the level of stocks held), technical
costs (related to the volume of stocks moving into and out of store), and 'other public
storage costs', which are effectively export refunds on sales from intervention to third
countries (excluding food aid).
5.5.1: Intervention Purchases
From an average of just over 1 million tonnes per year in the mid 1970's,
intervention purchases (IP) have risen sharply. During the late 1980's, the average was
closer to 5 or 6 million tonnes hut in some years, the figure rose to over 10 million
tonnes. The factors potentially intluencing the level of IP are varied. Intervention may
have a short term market stabilisation role. in which case production residuals around
trend (Qres) would be intluential. 23 A longer term role for intervention may be picked
up by a lime trend (u, but this would have to be treated with extreme caution. Larger
purchases into intervention may reflect solely the rising trend in production - for
22 Se Agra Europe 1505.21 August 1992. page PI2.
23 For the following regressions. the production residuals are taken from the production regression
with time trend and (WO dummy variables. For the two observations with dummies, and therefore zero
residuals, the regression coefficients on the dwruny variables were inserted.
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intervention now to have taken on a longer term role, the stocks of products would now
have to be staying in store longer. Otherwise a significant time trend variable would
simply be reflecting the production trend, and a rising trend on IP would be
accompanied by a rising trend on sales from intervention - either back onto the domestic
market or for export to third countries.
ECIO Intervention Purchases
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Another possible factor influencing intervention purchase volumes is the state of the
world market. The use of United States' production residuals (USQres) is used to try
and reflect the ease with which the EC can export its disposable surplus. If US
production is above trend, it would be expected that there would be few opportunities
for the EC to export to other than its established destinations.24 A fourth factor to be
considered is the level of opening stocks (opst). If opening stocks are very large, this
may indicate that stores are near to capacity which without large sales from store,
would possibly act as a constraint on the quantity that could be sold into store. Having
set the model up like this, the following regression was run:
IP ==1390.576 + 332.116t + 0.016USQres + 0.262Qres + 0.1140pst
(1.225) (1.644) (1.01) (3.009) (0.631)
Rsq==O.784 Rbsq=O.706 DW=1.464
24 The converse holds 100· witness EC exports following the 1988 US drought.
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With this regression, the first three coefficients are of the right sign, but only Qres
is significant at the 5% level. A priori, the sign on the opening stocks variable is
expected to he negative. The estimated coefficient is however positive hut is not
significantly different from zero. Next, a regression was run with only time and
production residuals as the independent variables:
IP = 1380.281 + 419.309t + 0.286Qres
(1.255) (3.649) (4.109) Rsq=0.749 Rbsq=O.711 DW=1.496
Two interesting features emerge from the analysis. First, only a relatively small part
of the increase in cereals production finds its way into intervention. The trend
coefficient suggests that the rise in intervention purchases is only about 15% of the
trend growth in cereals production (see regressions from Section 5.3.2).25 Second,
just under 30% of production variation around trend is sold into intervention, with that
trend being adjusted for the presence of two outliers. Thus IP is shown to have an
important role in short term market stabilisation. Despite this, rp doesn't absorb all the
production variation. At least some of the variation will be absorbed by exports from
the open market and, to the extent that changes in production levels affect market
prices, consumption could absorb some production variation as well.
5 5.2: Net Domestic Intervention
Net domestic intervention (NOr) differs from intervention purchases in that it
allows for that quantity of stocks released back onto the internal EC market. This may
occur if there is a shortage of cereals on the internal market (unlikely to occur generally,
but which may occur in a localised area, or with respect to a particular quality of a
particular grain). or perhaps if the stock has deteriorated to such an extent that the grain
is released for non-food uses (for example the production of ethanol or certain bio-
degradable plastics). A priori, it may therefore appear likely that the coefficient on the
production residual variable would be negative. A further consideration however
indicates that is unlikely to be the case, as the quantity of cereals bought into
intervention each year has. with the sole exception of 197617. been greater than the
quantity sold back onto the internal market. Other than this, the same variables would
be thought of as having a possible influence on NDI as IP before.
2S Note that this is the marginal figure. The average figure around 1990 is 6-7%.
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EC 10 Net Domestic Intervention
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NOI = 1141.52 + 357.94lt + O.02USQres + O.268Qres - O.0330pst
(0.992) (1.747) (1.247) (3.042) (-0.18)
Rsq=0.767 Rbsq=0.682 OW=1.61
NOI = 1314.078 + 309.786t + O.323Qres
(1.188) (2.68) (4.614) Rsq=O.734 Rbsq=O.693 OW=1.876
Although the trend variable is on the border of significance, this regression
performs much better than one with just production residuals as the independent
variable. The adjusted R-squared is also better with half the number of independent
variables compared with the first regression. The lower t-statistic on the trend variable
compared with the regression on IP suggests that the factors determining the quantity of
sales from store back onto the internal market are not related to time. Thus the trend in
the IP data set is partially offset. and that trend weakened as a result. Net domestic
intervention represents about one third of production residuals around trend.
5.53: Intervention Exports
The volume of stocks exported to third countries (IX) gives rise to a large element
of EC budgetary expenditure - other public storage costs - as has been described in
Chapter 4.26 Again. a number of possible influencing variables were considered. EC
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and US production residuals were considered for essentially the same reasons as
before. as was a time trend. Opening stocks were considered. as they reflected the
quantity available for export and also. if store capacity was being reached, they'd also
reflect the need to export to release space for new purchases. In addition, the unit ECU
refund and $:ECU exchange rate variables were considered to see the extent of the
influence of the cost of exporting the stored commodity on the export decision itself.
Note that whilst the refund data set used is for open market exports, the principle is the
same when considering exports from intervention.
ECIO Exports from Intervention
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IX = 3137.846 - 15.131t - O.OO6l1SQres + 0.03Qres + 0.31opsl + 18.03REF - 2095.252er
(1.498) (-0.143) (-0.92> (0.79) (3.622) (1.487) (-1.236)
Rsq=O.913 Rbsq=O.848 DW=2.608
The coefficient on the trend is the wrong sign, but highly insignificant. Moreover.
concern that US dominance on the world cereals market might mean the existence of
collinearity between USQres and REF resulted in the regression being re-run with REF
excluded:
26 although Wli1 expenditure UNDER THIS HEADING is now lower following compulsory stock
depreciation - again. see Chapter 4.
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IX = 1810371 + 54.6961 - O.004USQres + 0.036Qres + 0.3480pst - 955.313er
(0.897) (0.54) (-0.591) (0.879) (3.971) (-0.593)
Rsq=0.889 Rbsq=0.828 DW=1.952
For most of the variables. the coefficients are qualitatively the same. With the time
trend however, the coefficient is now the correct sign, but still insignificant. Given the
collinearity between time and opst, a simple model of IX over time was looked at.
1990/91 was found to be an outlier, so with a dummy in place on this observation, the
regression came out as:
IX = 147.96 + 402.85t - 5383.5D90/91
(0.203) (3.899) (-5.115) Rsq=0.667 Rbsq=0.616 DW=1.677
Exports from intervention are shown to be growing at about 400,000 tonnes per
year, which is approximately equal to the rate of increase in intervention purchases.
After 1988, the financial arrangements for disposing of intervention stocks changed
(see especially Chapter 3, Appendix 2). The subsequent depletion of intervention
stocks may account for the appearance of 1990/1 as an outlier.
5.5.4: Conclusion on Intervention
At the beginning of this section of work, the notion of intervention having a short-
run stabilising role and a long-run market outlet role was mooted.I? Looking first at
the possibility of a short term role, it appears that there is such a role, but when
considering net domestic intervention, it appears that this role is limited - only about a
third of production variability around trend is involved. In looking at the longer term
role however, the notion was suggested earlier that this is unlikely unless stocks were
held for a long time. Otherwise, all that would happen is the volume of stocks passing
through intervention would increase - but just reflecting intervention's short term
stabilising role. The last sub-section seems to confirm that intervention doesn't have a
long term role - with 40% of opening stocks being sold each year (for export alone),
that represents, on ayerace, a maximum length of stay of no more than two and a half
years for surplus grain sold into intervention, (assuming grain operates on a first-in
first-out principle). It is technically feasible for grain to be stored longer than that
without suffering significant quality deterioration-S, and the fact that the EC isn't
27 Where the short tenn is conceived as being under about three to three and a half years, and the long
term above that.
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storing its surplus grain for up to the maximum possible period SUppOl1Sthe notion that
intervention indeed is not operated with a long term structural aim in mind. What
appears to be happening instead is that with the rising structural surplus in the cereals
market. the cereals management committee is having to accept greater and greater
quantities being sold into intervention. As was noted at the beginning. that is supported
by the intuitive notion that for intervention to perform such a deliberate role. stocks
would have to be accumulated indefinitely in the face of the rising structural surplus.
Further. it should be noted that opening stocks exhibit an upward trend. but so do
exports from intervention. especially when the impact of 1990/1 is removed by a
dummy variable.29 Thus it appears that the use made of intervention is that just of
short term stabilisation. that the quantities passing through intervention are in general
rising over time. but that their length of stay appears not to be rising.
ECIO Opening Stocks
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There is no LONG TERM build-up of stocks. as the regression coefficients indicate
quite a fast turn round of under three years. but rather an increase in the volumes
passing through intervention in the short term. If the data set on opening stocks is
examined. whilst it shows stocks building up to very high levels in three to four year
periods. it then generally falls again before rising once more (even though a rising trend
appears to underpin the data).
28 so long as the grain is kept dry and cool.
29 as. it has been argued. it is considered quue valid to do.
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One final point on the regressions In the above section is that if the trend
coefficients are examined. they tend to suggest that more is coming out of intervention
than is going in. They key aspect here however is that each was examined in tum to see
the influencing factors. Thus each regression has different independent variables
included. rendering them incompatible for the sort of comparison carried in the
previous section for production. consumption. imports and exports.
5.6: CEREALS MARKET RESIDUALS ANALYSIS
5,6.1; Introduction
The work above that analysed the cereals market demonstrated that most if not all of
the key variables are dominated by time trends. From a statistical point of view,
carrying out a regression analysis on trend-dominated data can cause serious problems.
Data exhibiting a trend have mean and variance depending on time, and are known as
non-stationary series. This violates one of the basic assumptions of regression analysis.
namely that the series should be stationary. with constant mean and variance ou2.
Granger and Newbold30 indicate that such errors can lead to spurious regressions with
inefficient regression estimates. sub-optimal forecasts based on the regressions. and the
usual significance tests invalidated.
The fact that trends dominate so many variables examined in this analysis however
comes as no surprise. Most variables under consideration derive their values in some
way from production. which itself is dominated in the EC by a rising time trend via
yields.31 As the earlier analysis has demonstrated. these trends are actually consistent
with each other. Being based on balance sheet data. this too is not surprising. What all
this means however is that for this analysis to be advanced, whilst avoiding "equations
having such symptoms". yet being "presented as though they have some worth"32, a
different approach must be adopted. The approach taken in this section is to examine
the residuals around the trends for each of the variables. rather than the core data
exhibiting the trend. Whilst this is not strictly the most accurate approach for some
purposes (see Chapter 6). it does permit certain useful analyses to be carried out
Put another way. the approach is one of seeing which variables have 'absorbed'
production VARIATION over time. The absorbents considered have been
consumption. net exports and net domestic intervention.
30 see Granger. C. W. 1. and P Newbold. (1974).
31 For more details, see McClelland, 1.W. and H. Vroomen. (1988).
32 see Granger. C. W. 1. and P Newbold. (1974), p117.
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Consumvtion
The reasoning behind having consumption as an absorbent is two-fold. Firstly, to
the extent that. within a protected market like the EC. variations in production can affect
market prices. then this will feed through to impact on the demand for cereals.
Secondly. there is scope for on-farm substitution between purchased and own grains in
animal feed especially if. for example. a very large harvest is associated with lower
quality grains. perhaps only fit for consumption by animals. Whilst it wouldn't be
expected that consumption would vary such as to absorb great quantities of production
variation it would, for the above reasons. be expected to absorb at least some of them.
Net Exports
This variable can be separated into three distinct elements, imports from third
countries. exports from the open market to third countries, and exports from
intervention to third countries. The earlier trend analysis showed that with stable
consumption. imports have fallen and exports risen so as to fully account for the rise in
production over the period under analysis. Itmay well therefore also be expected that
short term variations around the production trend would also, to a large degree. be
accounted for by net exports. The distinction needs to be made between exports from
the open market and intervention for budgetary reasons. In the EC budget, expenditures
incurred by exporting from these two distinct sources are treated quite separately.
Moreover, even if it is assumed that cereals from both sources are sold on third country
markets at the same price. and if the 'internal' price of cereals from either source is the
same. giving the same unit refund33, cereals from intervention incur additional costs
for the budget in the form of storage costs. Thus the quantities need to be identified
separately.
Exports were felt to be very important as the quantities exported from the EC are
controlled directly by the Commission's Cereals Management Committee. via the
setting of refund levels. the acceptance or rejection of tenders for exports (from either
source). and by the quantities it wishes to release from intervention in a given period.
Imports were also included as it was felt that to the extent that imports can substitute for
domestic production. if for example production was below trend, imports might rise.
Net Domestic Intervention (NOD
This variable consists of quantities of cereals sold into intervention from the EC
33 Ihougb note that for exports from lnrervenuon, this is actually termed 'Other Public Storage Costs'
in the EC Budget.
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market. NET of quantities sold back onto the EC market from intervention. The earlier
trend analysis suggested that intervention had an important short term stabilising role in
the cereals market. Therefore in the analysis of the cereals market now being
undertaken. which utilises residuals around trend. this short term role would be
expected to reveal itself by showing that variations in production around trend are
absorbed. to a significant degree. by variations around trend in NDI.
Thus in these three variables. all the major outlets for cereals have been
incorporated. Cereals produced can either be consumed domestically directly, or after a
period spent in intervention. or can be exported to third countries, again either directly
or after a period in intervention. Offsetting this is imports of cereals, which can also
increase domestic consumption. One would. therefore. expect a positive relationship
between variations in production and variations in consumption. NDI and exports from
the open market. a negative relationship between variations in production and variations
in imports. and probably a negative relationship between production variations and
variations in exports from intervention. if higher production means higher exports from
the open market. and if total exports are subject to some constraint. either financial (the
costs of exports refunds). and/or diplomatic (implicit market shares with other cereal
exporters). resulting in reduced export opportunities for exports from intervention. If
there is also some stockholding constraint. one would expect this in turn to mean that
NDI would be relatively lower in years of high production variation than in years of
low variation, through lower scope to export. and a pressure to sell additional stocks
back onto the domestic market. in order to remain within the stock capacity limit.
5.6.2: A Note on the Data
Before considering the results of the residuals analysis in detail. a note must be
made of how the residual data set was arrived at. Initially the data for the variable in
question were regressed against time and the residuals saved. In most cases, at least
one observation was found to be an outlier.34 A dummy was inserted for that
observation. and the regression rerun with the variable regressed against time and the
dummy. This process was repeated until no more outliers were found (at most, four
dummies had to be used. typically two or three). The coefficients on the dummy
variables were then inserted as the residuals on those observations. and the residuals
around trend for each variable had been established. without loss of observations. and
without outliers distorting the position of the trend line. and hence the residuals around
trend.
34 According to the definition set out earlier.
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5.6.3: Analysis of the Data
5.6.3.1: Introduction
Two data sets were used in two separate analyses. One was for the EC 10 over the
whole period of analysis. and the second was for EClO up to 1984/5, and EC12 from
1985/6. This was done to see if the enlargement of the EC affected the relative roles of
the different absorhents with the accession of the Iberian countries.
For each data set. a number of regressions were initially run individually for each
absorbent against production residuals (Qres). Following this, the regressions were run
in a system with the restriction imposed that the coefficients on the absorbents had to
sum to unity - that is, production residuals (Qres) had to be fully accounted for by
consumption residuals (Cres), net export residuals (XMres) and net domestic
intervention residuals (NDIres). For reasons to he discussed later, net exports had to be
considered in aggregate within the system, rather than each of the three individual
elements being considered separately.
The systems were rerun a number of times, with additional independent variables
added, each with their own restrictions imposed. These will be discussed below.
5,6.3,2: Individual Ret:ressions. EC 10 Data
For this analysis, the constant term was suppressed in all regressions. Xres refers
to total exports. Xom to exports from the open market, IX to exports from intervention,
and Mres to imports.
Cres = 0.218Qres
(3.029)
Rsq
0.396
Rbsq
0.353
DW
2.133
Xres = 0.187Qres
(2.239)
0.264 0.211 2.205
IXres = -O.033Qres
(-0.517)
-0.015 -0.088 0.739
Xomres = 0.194Qres
(2.406)
0.293 0.243 1.649
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Mres = -O.218Qres
(-3.115)
0.39 0.346 1.587
XMres = 0.42Qres
(3.526)
0.451 0.412 1.68
•
NOIres = 0.326Qres
(4.207)
0.481 0.444 1.451
From the above figures, it can be seen that the residual of consumption absorbs
about 22% of variations in production, NDI about 33% and net exports about 42%,
with roughly 22% reflected in changes in imports, 19% in open market exports, and
3% in exports from intervention. It can also be seen that the diagnostics presented for
IX are particularly poor. The earlier trend analysis suggested that cereals remained in
store for an average of two to three years, and so IXres was regressed against Qres
lagged two years and then three years to reflect the time held in store. The following
results were obtained:
IX = -O.064Qres t-2
(-1.427)
0.126 0.053 1.975
IX = -0.024Qres l-3
(-0.468)
-0.023 -0.116 1.86
Thus for a two year lag if not a three year lag, the specification for IX appears to be
much better with regard to the Durbin-Watson statistic, as well as making more
economic sense by lagging the independent variable.
Returning to the initial set of results, one feature is that whilst each regression was
run separately, and no restriction was imposed on the coefficients to ensure they
summed to unity, the results came out very close to that figure, although the exact
figure depends on whether XMres is considered, or the sum of each of the different
elements. At worst, the sum of the coefficients on Cres, Xres, Mres and NOIres is
0.946, and at best, by separating Xres into Xomres and IX, 0.984. Thus even this
simple analysis identities the absorbents of between 95% and 98% of production
variation around trend. The signs on the coefficients are all as one would have
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expected, a priori.
5.6.3.3: Individual Regressions. ECI0/12 Data
Here, the residuals were established as for the EC 10 data, but with the addition of a
dummy variahle on the ECl2 observations:
Cres =O.253Qres
(2.665)
Rsq Rbsq DW
0.337· 0.289 2.138
Xres = 0.236Qres
. (2.728)
0.347 0.3 2.674
IXres = 0.037Qres
(0.499)
-0.018 -0.091 0.834
Xomres =O.I99Qres
(2.181)
0.254 0.2 1.818
Mres = -O.126Qres
(-1.553)
0.114 0.051 1.687
(X-M)res = 0.362Qres
(2.557)
0.291 0.241 1.791
NOIres = 0.326Qres
(3.559)
0.421 0.379 1.291
Comparing these results with those for the EClO data, it can be seen that NOIres
absorbs exactly the same Qres in either situation. Consumption absorbs more with the
ECIOl12 than with the EClO. and net exports less. The absorption of imports nearly
halves, open market exports rises only marginally. and IXres interestingly becomes
positive. This last point may be accounted for by the fact that the period of ECl2
approximates to the period when the EC was disposing of its accumulated surpluses
and attempting to impose budgetary discipline. Thus the positive relationship could be
described as a spurious one in that it occurred as a quirk of fate for these reasons.
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For the drop in ahsorbency of imports, a possible explanation could be found in the
imports of Spain. At the time of accession, the USA was concerned about continued
market access for its exports of maize to Spain, and so a temporary agreement was
signed. This could be thought of as making total imports and domestic production less
substitutable - an above trend year for production won't be reflected in greatly lower
imports as those imports are controlled by an outside factor - the trade agreement. The
sum of the coefficients on the variables indicates that 94.1% of variation in production
is accounted for by the variables considered. Given an average annual variation in
production of 4.8 million tonnes (in absolute terms), this leaves less than 25000 tonnes
per year of variation unaccounted for.
5.7: REGRESSION SYSIEMS35
5.7.1; Introduction
The initial system was run with a single independent variable in each regression,
Qres. The coefficients on this variable were set to sum to unity, so that the dependent
variables in the system were to fully account for variations in production. The earlier
unrestricted work, reported above, suggests that this can be fully justified in that no
other variable could absorb significant production variation. Further systems were then
set up that added different independent variables. For each variable added, the
restriction was imposed that the coefficients on that variable should sum to zero. This
was done so that the absorbency of each dependent variable could be established IN
THE PRESENCE of additional considerations.
The second system added a variable representing production variation in the rest of
the world (ROWQres). This was to see if the role of anyone absorbent changed
significantly when world market conditions, as represented by production variation on
that market, were taken into account. The third system added the variable OPres to that,
residuals around the trend in opening stocks. Earlier work had found this to be an
insignificant absorbent, but was re-run here to see if its presence in the system had a
different effect, should there be an effective stock capacity constraint to EC market
operations. Finally a system was run that replaced OPres with ER, the $;ECU exchange
rate_)6 The earlier analysis had found all the 'economic' variables to be insignificant in
their role of determining operations in the cereals market, but again it was felt that this
35 The regression systems were run on Shazam, a package that allows a number of regressions to be
run simultaneously, and also for restrictions to be imposed on the coefficients in the regression system.
36lbat is to say,the exchange rate expressed in !he number of $ per EClJ.
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might change when the variable was considered within a system.
The dependent variables used were Cres, XMres and NDIres. Ideally, XMres
would have been separated into IXres, Xomres and Mres, and ROWQres separated into
US, USSR and THEN rest of the world production residuals, but this was not
possible.I?
Presented below are the regression results for the EC 10, followed by those for the
EC 10/12. After that. a table summarising the independent variable coefficients is
presented comparing data sets and system specifications. Next a table is presented
which summarises some of the regression diagnostics, and which is followed by a
discussion pulling together all the results from above.
5.7.2: Recression Systems, EC 10 Data
Presented here are the regression results. Summaries of the results are given below.
5.7.2.1: One Independent Variable
Cres = O.22Qres
(3.22)
XMres = 0.45Qres
(5.64)
NOIres = O.33Qres
(4.44)
5.7.2.2: Two Independent Variables
Cres = O.18Qres + O.02ROWQres
(2.61) ( 1.64)
XMres = O.5OQres - O.02ROWQres
(6.30) (-l.99)
37 The problem lay in how the restrictions could be specified in Shazam. With all these different
variables identified, some had negative coefficients (for example, imports, and exports from
intervention). The restriction however had to be specified linearly, and couldn't be set out in terms of
summing the absolute values of the coefficients to unity. In the linear restriction, putting a negative
sign on the coefficients where a negative sign was expected on the variable distorted the estimates
derived.
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NDIres = 0.31 Qres + 0.01 ROWQres
(3.88) (0.55)
5.7.2.3: Three Indewndent Variables - OPres
Cres = 0.18Qres + 0.02ROWQres - 0.020Pres
(2.47) (1.65) (-0.14)
XMres = 0.5OQres - 0.02ROWQres - O.070Pres
(5.91) (-1.95) (-0.44)
NDIres = 0.32Qres + O.OIROWQres + 0.090Pres
(3.85) (0.52) (0.57)
5.7.2.4: Three Indewndent Variables - Exchance Rate
Cres = 0.18Qres + 0.02ROWQres + 179.72ER
(2.53) (1.67) (0.39)
XMres = 0.52Qres - 0.03ROWQres - 1195.2ER
(7.89) (-3.02) (-2.85)
NOIres = 0.3OQres + O.OIROWQres + 1015.5ER
(4.25) (1.10) (2.23)
5.7.3: RecressiQn Systems, ECIO/12 Data
5,7.3.1; One Indewndeot Variable
Cres = 0.26Qres
(3.16)
XMres = 0.4OQres
(4.26)
NOires = 0.34Qres
(4.33)
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5.73,2: Two Independent Variables
Cres = O,18Qres + O.02ROWQres
(2.47) (1.67)
XMres = 0.51 Qres - O,02ROWQres
(6,27) (-1.98)
NOIres = O,31Qres +O.OIROWQres
(3.79) (0.52)
5.7.3.3: Three Independent Variables - OPres
Cres = 0.18Qres + 0.02ROWQres + 0.OO30Pres
(236) (1.66) (0.018)
XMres = 0.5OQres - 0.02ROWQres - 0.1OPres
(5.91) (-1.96) (-0.66)
NOIres = 0.32Qres +O.OIROWQres + O,lOPres
(3.79) (0.51) (0.64)
5.7.3.4: Three Independent Variables - Exchange Rate
Cres = 0.17Qres + 0.02ROWQres + 193.6ER
(2.38) (I. 71) (0.43)
XMres = 0.53Qres - O.03ROWQres - 1214.7ER
(7.95) (-3J)7) (-2.91)
NOIres = 0.3OQres + OJHROWQres + 1.021.IER
(4.10) (1.09) (2.23)
5.7.4 Re~ression Systems - Symmal)' and Diagnostics
Note that the figures may not sum exactly to one, because of rounding.
OCIQIlATA a b c d e
Cres 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.18
XMres 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.52
NOIres 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.30
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ECIOl12 DAIA a b c d e
Cres 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.17
XMres 0.36 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.53
NDIres 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.30
KEY
a) regressions run individually for each variable against Qres
b) a system run with Qres as the sole independent variable
c) a system run with Qres and ROWQres as the independent variables
d) a system run with Qres, ROWQres and OPres as the independent variables.
e) a system run with Qres, ROWQres and exchange rate as the independent variables.
The following table shows for each variable in turn (Cres, XMres and NDIres),
each data set and each system specification, the R-squared, Durbin Watson, and R-
squared between observed and predicted, respectively. For the regressions run
individually, the diagnostics are presented with the regression results above.
KlQ
b c d e
0.3958 2.06 0.3970 0.4563 2.47 0.4585 0.4510 2.50 0.4549 0.4581 2.49 0.4622
0.4482 1.64 0.5028 0.5741 1.35 0.6516 0.5595 1.36 0.6242 0.6871 1.67 0.6875
0.4809 1.31 0.6228 0.4851 1.24 0.6421 0.5049 1.38 0.6294 0.6060 1.64 0.6101
ECIOll2
b c d e
0.3358 2.03 0.3366 0.4599 2.47 0.4623 0.4597 2.47 0.4624 0.4622 2.50 0.4663
0.2883 1.78 0.3309 0.5721 1.35 0.6509 0.5530 1.37 0.6133 0.6886 1.68 0.6889
0.4197 1.26 0.5243 0.4844 1.25 0.6412 0.5070 1.40 0.6277 0.6059 1.66 0.6099
5.7.5: Discussion
The first point to note from the summary table above is that with systems c. d and
et the results are virtually identical, regardless of whether EClO or EClOIl2 data are
used. Moreover, with both data sets, the inclusion of more than one independent
variable has a very similar impact - the role of consumption and net domestic
intervention falls, and that of net exports rises. Thus the outputs from regressions a and
5.38
b, by excluding external independent variables, overstates the roles of Cres and NOIres
in absorbing Ores, and understates XMres.
In moving from a system with just Ores as the independent variable to one with two
independent variables. including ROWOres as well, it can be seen that whilst in the
individual regressions the influence of this second variable is statistically insignificant,
in terms of its impact on the roles of the three absorbents it IS very important. The
summary table above indicates that its addition reduces slightly the role of net domestic
intervention. but reduces the role of consumption markedly. with the role of net exports
rising against this background. With regard to the signs on ROWQres in each
regression within this and later systems. they are exactly as expected. If for example
there is a particularly good harvest in the rest of the world. then export opportunities are
lowered. and hence the coefficient on XMres should be and is negative. This would
then require a greater role for domestic consumption and domestic intervention in
disposing of any domestic production variation. If domestic consumption from current
production rises. this would reduce the scope for sale of products from intervention
back onto the domestic market, hence reinforcing the positive coefficient on ROWQres
in the NDIres regression.
The impact of adding residuals around the trend in opening stocks has a negligible
impact on the role of any of the absorbents in the system. This is reinforced by the fact
that in all regressions including OPres. this variable has a t-statistic of never more than
10.661.This suggests that there is no effective stock constraint in EC cereals market
operations, as more stock capacity can readily be brought on line from the private sector
as and when required, and thus this variable has no impact on the role of the
absorbents, as could be expected if there WAS a stock capacity constraint. 38
Finally there is the system which replaces OPres with the $:ECU exchange rate.
With both data sets it can be seen that the addition of this variable is important as its
inclusion results in a greater role for net exports, at the expense of net domestic
intervention. In the individual regression outputs from the systems, it can also be seen
that now, in the XMres regressions. ROWQres has also become statistically significant.
In the Cres regressions, ER is insignificant, and this is reflected in a much lower
coefficient than on ER in the other regressions in the systems. As with ROWQres, all
the signs on the coefficients are as would be expected. With the exchange rate
38 In National Audit Office. (1986). it was indicated that with regard to the UK, commercial stores
were obtained by tender on short term contracts, typically year by year. Moreover, "nearly 30% of
IBAP's expendilure on hired cereals storage in the past five years has related to capacity reserved but not
used." Although written in relation to financial 'wastage', this indicates that indeed there has been no
difficulty in obtaining more storage capacity, in the UK at least.
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expressed in US dollars per ECU. a fall in that rate means that EC exports have become
relatively cheaper, when expressed in US$. Thus the competitiveness of EC exports
has risen and. ceteris paribus. one would expect from this that net exports would rise
with that fall in the $:ECU exchange rate. This confirms the negative coefficient on ER
in the XMres regressions. From this. as with ROWQres earlier. one would expect the
coefficients on ER in the other regressions to be positive - that as the exchange rate
rose, and the competitiveness of EC exports fell, then greater use would be made of
'domestic' outlets for cereals production variation - consumption and intervention
purchases (remember from what was said earlier. 'trade' is perhaps THE main variable
controllable by the cereals management committee. If this economic variable acts to
restrict this function. then they will resort. directly or indirectly. to the other variables).
Turning to the diagnostics table. even a brief examination shows that the best
system overall is that including the exchange rate as an independent variable. Thus this
system specification is the one that can be used in the later analysis.
One problem remains however. This last system gives a figure for the absorbency
for net exports, but not for the individual elements of imports. exports from the open
market. and exports from intervention. As before however, individual regressions were
run of Mres, Xomres and IXres against Qres, ROWQres and ER for EC 10 and
EC I0/12. The following results were obtained:
EC10Data
Rsq Rbsq DW
Mres e -O.247Qres + 0.0l2ROWQres + 706.492ER
(-3.374) (1.053) (1.511) 0.509 0.386 1.603
Xomres :::0.2Qres - 0.OO2ROWQres + 25.917ER
(2.135) (-0.168) (0.043) 0.295 0.118 1.646
IXres::: -0.031Qres -O.OOIROWQres - 407.45ER
(-0.425) (-0.095) (-0.888) 0.047 -0.191 0.784
ECIOI12 Data
Mres = -0.165Qres + 0.0l3ROWQres + 559.75ER
(-1.923) (1.262) (1.244) 0.274 0.093 1.611
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Xomres = O.187Qres +O.004ROWQres + 151.237ER
(1.771) (0.3) (0.272) 0.262 0.078 1.827
IXres = 0.051 Qres - 0.OO5ROWQres - 451.053ER
(0.614) (-0.5) (-1.035) 0.072 -0.16 0.797
All these regressions were run individually, without any restriction imposed. The
outcome of this is that for the EC 10 data, the sum of the coefficients on Qres is 0.478
and for the EClO112 data 0.403. With the systems reported earlier, the figures came to
0.52 and 0.53 respectively. For the reasons discussed earlier, these regressions cannot
be run within a system where the coefficients could be constrained to 0.53
5.7.6: Conclusions on Residuals Analysis
The residuals analysis reported above has taken cereals market data, which trend
strongly owing to the dominance of the production data set in determining so many of
the other variables, and which itself is very heavily determined by cereals yields, which
trend strongly. and attempted to analyse a particular feature of the operation of the
cereals market. Owing to problems caused by the statistical properties of data that trend
strongly. the earlier trend analysis was inappropriate in this case. so residuals around
trend were taken. and then used to examine how production variation around trend is
accounted for in the management and operation of the cereals market. Owing to
limitations in the computer package used, this couldn't be performed in the detail
desired. but an alternative approach is available to give the required detail, even if the
approach is less satisfactory.
5.8: CONCLUSION TO CEREALS MARKET ANALYSIS
This chapter has provided a general overview of the cereals market. as well as an
analytical introduction to certain features of the market The opening section considered
trends in certain key variables. It showed that. for the period 1973-1991 production is
rising. on average. at 2.75 million tonnes per year, or 2.2%. This can be attributed to a
yield increase of 2.5% per year. against an area decline of 0.3% per year. Consumption
is shown to be roughly static over the period of analysis. with the increase in
production therefore reflected in changes in trade volumes. Exports are rising at over
1.5 million tonnes per year, with imports falling at over 1.1 million tonnes per year. On
average, less than 4% of grain goes into intervention, but when the proportion of the
increase in production is considered, that figure rises to 15%.
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The second section considered the impact of fluctuations in production on the other
key variables in the market. The three absorbents of production are net trade,
consumption and intervention storage. The main one of these has been shown to be
trade. taking up to 50% of production variation each year, on average. Despite price
support, consumption has taken 20%, with intervention absorbing the other 30%. It
has moreover, been shown that these proportions are influenced by world market
conditions, especially fluctuations in third countries' production. It has also been
shown how exchange rate movements also influence these shares, particularly of trade
and intervention.
From this. the next two chapters go on to look at the key variables of the cereals
market in more detail. The nature of the analysis in this chapter has focussed on certain
statistical properties of the data. in particular utilising the fact that much data exhibit a
time trend. This is considered more in the following chapters, where such features are
more important to the outcome. Chapter 6 and 7 go on to examine and model cereals
production and consumption, accounting specifically for the trends present in the data.
The residuals analysis in the later part of Chapter 5 is able to allow different estimates
of future expenditure to be made given different end uses of production and variation in
that production.
APPENDIX 1
Following Stewart39, two 'regions' can be identified using the following models:
Yt = al + PIXt + Ut
Y t = a2 + J32Xt + Ut
in region I
in region 2
Region I is taken to be the period 1975/6 to 1984/5, that is the period when the data
set is for the EC 10; and region 2 is the period 1985/6 to 1990/1, when the data set is for
EC 12. The above equations suggest that both the y-intercept term and the slope
coefficient are different in the two regions or data periods, The procedure here is used
to consider this hypothesis.
By creating two dummy variables, the two equations above can be re-written as one
estimable equation.
39 Note that this follows very closely pp138ff of Stewart. J. (1984).
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01 t = I in region I and 0 in region 2
02t = 0 in region I and I in region 2.
Thus:
Given the data set however, this cannot be estimated as it is singular. Since D It +
02t = I for all t however, 0 I can be eliminated from the regression by replacing it with
I-D2. This gives an equation that can be estimated of:
Yt = al + 0202t + J3IXt + Y2(02X)t + Ut
where
02 = a2 - al
'Y2 = J32 - J31
If for any of these regressions 02 is insignificant, the intercept is the same for both
regions, and if Y2 is insignificant. the slope of the regression line is the same for both
regions.
In the regressions described on pages 12 and 13, Yt is respectively production,
imports, consumption and exports. D2 is the dummy which takes the value I for the
last six years, ie those years with data for the EC12, Xt is the time trend for the whole
data period, and D2X is the trend for the last six observations.
For production:
al = 91948.667
02 = 41267.733
J31= 4918.624
il = -2902.024
The null-hypothesis is set up to test the statement that there is no difference between
the two regions. That is, the test is considering the restriction 02=0. and Y2=0. If this is
so, the enlargement of the EC has no statistically significant effect on, in turn,
production, imports, consumption and exports of the EC grouping. The test statistic is
given overpage:
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F = (SR - S)/g / S/(n-k)
where:
S is the residual sum of squares without the restriction imposed,
SR is the residual sum of squares with the restriction imposed,
g is the number of restrictions under test (here, g=2),
n is the total number of observations in the whole of both regions (here, n=16), and
k is the number of parameters estimated in the unrestricted equation (here, k=4 - a 1-
hat, a2-hat, ~ 1=hat, and y2-hat).
The degrees of freedom dfl=g and df2=(n-k).
This gives critical values for the F-test of 3.89 at the 5% level and 6.93 at the 1%
level.
The estimated F values for the four variables are as follows:
Production = 1.921
Imports = 9.379
Consumption = 29.527
Exports = 1.906
Referring back to the earlier regressions using one dummy variable, it would appear
that with consumption. it is a rather than ~ that is significantly different, ie the intercept
coefficient is different. but the slope coefficient is the same. ie the enlargement affects
the quantity of cereals consumed, but not the rate of change of that quantity. The
regression for imports suggests there, it is the slope coefficient that is different between
EC sizes, with the intercept being the same. For production and exports, the
enlargement of the Community has no statistically significant effect.
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CHAPTER 6: PRODUCTION ANAL VSIS
%e thre.shingf{oors wi£[ 6e luff ofgrain, the vats ouerfiot» with wine and oil.
(Joe{ 2:24, Jerusalem 'lJwfe).
6.1: INTRODUCTION
From the discussion of policy in Chapter 4 above. it can clearly be seen that the
level of production of cereals has been a key variable in determining the level of
expenditure incurred by the EC in supporting the cereals sector under the CAP. In the
analysis which follows, the level of production is treated as the product of area and
yield. These two variables are influenced by a number of factors. As will be seen, time
series data on both of these variables exhibit distinct patterns, and an analysis
considering just production could result in important influencing factors being
overlooked. and important information being lost.
Before turning to the analysis however. it needs to be stated clearly what is meant
by 'area', in order to see what is meant by 'production'. The area of a crop can be
defined either as the area planted to that particular crop. or alternatively the area of that
particular crop that is harvested. These two will generally diverge to some extent,
depending on such factors as local prices, or local weather conditions, and the influence
this will have on crop quality and potential profit or loss opportunities from harvesting
and selling the product. Thus the production referred to in the following analysis relates
to harvested area rather than planted area (though the term 'harvested production' seems
rather superfluousj l, This chapter develops by first considering the data used, and
more importantly. certain key problems with the data, before discussing the analysis of
cereals yields. then cereals area. The latter analysis extends beyond just the cereals
sector to consider land use for other crops, principally oilseeds, which can be viewed
as the main substitutes for cereals in the use of land.
6.2: YIELD AND AREA DATA
The data used in the analysis have been obtained from a number of sources. The
principal source has been the Agricultural Situation in the Community, published by
Eurostat, Where data from here were quoted only for EC9 and EClO, supplementary
data were obtained from the FAO's Production Yearbook. in order to obtain a data set
1 Note that for the purposes of Chapter 8 below. an analysis of expenditures under the old cereals
regime refers to harveSled area. For the new regime however. both harvested and planted areas impact on
budgeaary expenditures.
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for the EC 12 for the full data period from 1973. For 1991, the only source that
excluded the live Hinder of the former East Germany was the HGCA's Weekly Digest
1813of 15.7.1991. One point to note is that the data for yields, area and production are
not precisely consistent because of errors due to rounding.
6.2,a: DATA PROBLEMS - NON STATIONARY SERIES2
In recent years, there have been a number of advances made in the analysis of
supply response, utilising certain new statistical techniques. McClelland and
Vroomen- (McC&V) are just two of many applied economists to have incorporated
these new ideas into their analysis. Of particular relevance for the current work is the
development of a framework that tests for stationarity in data. Such analysis has
highlighted particular shortcomings in traditional econometric analysis with respect to
much economic data (especially relating to agriculture), as well as providing a means of
overcoming such difficulties.
What is required for the statistical tests employed in regression analysis to be
reliable is that the data set is invariant with respect to time, and for it therefore to
possess a constant mean and variance, and a covariance between observations
dependent only on distance apart in time. If non-stationary variables are incorporated
into a standard regression, the R-squared is biased towards unity, t-statistics are biased
upwards, and the Durbin Watson tends to zero. Adding a time trend variable can appear
to give 'good' statistical results, but as Nelson and Kang point out, such an indication
can be misleading.f Granger and Newbold have shown how regressions between
unrelated non-stationary series suggested statistically significant relationships when the
regressions are actually spurious.f
Many data sets however exhibit a time trend, and if the following representation
accurately fits the data for a variable Yt, it is said to be trend stationary'':
Yt = a + bT + Ut 6.1
2 A great debt of thanks is owed to Tim Lloyd for explaining the following ideas so accessibly,
although any misunderstandings are my own fault.
3McClelland. J. W. and H. Vmomen (1988).
4 Nelson, C. R. and H. Kang. (1984).
5 Granger. C. W. J. and P. Newbold. (1974).
6 That is to say. the data can be de-trended either by using the residuals from a regression of Yt
against time, or alternatively by incorporating a time trend variable in the model. Either approach is
acceptable in making a trend-stationary series stationary,
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where Ut is itself a stationary series. Here, the data exhibit a zero mean and constant
variance AROUND a rising trend. Note that with many series where the absolute data
rise over time. the variance rises in absolute terms also, although remaining at a stable
percentage rate. It is therefore common practice with such data to take the natural
logarithms. as this eliminates such problems, and allows the use of standard statistical
tests.
The second form of stationarity exhibited by much economic data is that of
difference stationarity (where the data exhibit a stochastic trend rather than a
deterministic one). Here. if the data set is not stationary in its absolute form, but
becomes stationary after first-differencing, that absolute data are said to be integrated of
order one - I(1) - and have a unit rOOLHere:
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where Ut is stationary, and 'a'. the mean. is a constant. Yt is said to be difference
stationary with drift (drift being where a~). If the series of first differenced data are
found to be stationary, this differenced data are then said to be 1(0). In practice. much
economic data are actually difference stationary. although historically, much empirical
analysis has simply added a time trend variable in regression analysis, making the
implicit assumption that because the data set exhibited a trend it was, in Nelson and
Plosser's terminology. trend stationary.
Thus in the following analysis, attention is given to the statistical properties of the
data used, to establish if they are trend stationary (TS) or difference stationary (PS).
This then allows the main focus of the work. the policy analysis. to be carried out with
confidence in the statistical results gained. It must also be noted however that the
current work. in dealing just with data since 197~. involves a relatively very limited
data set. The significance of this can be seen simply by noting that the tables of
significance values for the test statistics calculated by Dickey and Fuller quote a sample
of 25 as the smallest
6.3: CEREALS YIELDS
The use of a deterministic time trend variable in the modelling of agricultural crop
yields has long been an unquestioned practice. Typically, the use of time has been
justified as a proxy variable for technical change. that implicitly being taken as a key
explanatory variable, perhaps THE key explanatory variable for yields. Whilst
individual changes in technology could be thought of as being 'lumpy' in terms of their
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effects on yields. the net effect over all technological advances is however assumed to
be smooth and deterministic.
A further issue that needs consideration is whether or not yields are increasing at a
fairly stable absolute rate or percentage rate. Other than the matter referred to earlier
about statistical considerations, this will determine whether it is appropriate to log the
data or not. This was examined in a very simple way. Looking first at the first-
differenced yield data for the period 1973 to 1991, the average year on year change for
the second half of the period (1983 to 1991) came to 150% of the average annual
change for the first half (1974 to 1982). This hopefully smoothes out the impact of any
outliers. and also suggests that annual changes in yields have been increasing over
time. Next. those annual changes were taken as a percentage of the previous year's
yield level. Here. the average for second half (2.824%) was 122.5% of the average of
the first half (2.306%). These figures suggest that yields are increasing at a rising
absolute rate. and a fairly steady, though slightly rising, percentage rate. This supports
taking logs of the yield data.
In examining cereals yields in the EC, even a cursory glance at the data over the
period under consideration demonstrates a persistent tendency for yields to rise over
time (see graph below). Following from the above discussion however, it can't simply
be assumed that yield data set is trend stationary - this process must be tested for:
6.3.1: Testin~ for Stationarity in EC Cereals Yield Data
Consider the following regression.
Y t = a + bY I-I + eT + ul 6.5
If b-el (ie there is no unit root), and e:;l!:{), Yt is trend stationary. If b=l (ie there is a
unit root) AND e=O, YI is difference stationary." Testing is usually carried out on the
transformation:
Yt - Yt-I = a + (b-l)YI_I + cT + UI 6.6
Of
6Yt = a + (b-I)Yt-1 + cT + Ut for t = 1 to n. 6.7
7 Note that the test (or b= 1 is also conditional on c=O. I( the latter condition doesn't hold. the series
wiD still be concluded to be trend stationary.
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and the test for (h-I)=O is identical to the test for b= 1. With 6.7, if the coefficient
(b-l) is not equal to zero, the null is rejected.
To test further however, the Augmented Dickey Fuller regression (ADF) is run. In
this regression, a constant. a deterministic time trend, a non-differenced lagged yield
variable, and a series of lagged differenced yield variables are all included. These are
added until the error term in the ADF regression is white noisef
d
~lnYt = a + cT + (b-1)InYt_1 + L~lnYt_i + Ut
i=l 6.8
with the corrected t-statistic for (b-I) (Ho:(b-l)=O) given by Dickey and Fuller as the
fT (tau-hat-tau) statistic with a critical value of -3.95 for the 0.95 confidence level. The
test for c (Ho.c=O) is Dickey and Fuller's iPr statistic (tau-hat-beta-tau), and the critical
value for the 0.95 Confidence Level is 3.20. For the intercept a, the test involves
comparing the t-statistic with Dickey and Fuller's far statistic (tau-hat-alpha-tau), with
a critical value also of 3.20.9
Below are the regression results relating to stationarity tests on the yield data.
DF DF
variable Yt InY.
constant 29.068 3.132
t-statistic (l1.617) (9.674)
trend 0.984 0.024
(9.33) (9.406)
Yt-l 0.047
(0.663)
InYl_1 0.089
(0.998)
ADF
MnYt
3.96
(9.20)
0.031
(6.402)
-1.15
(-8.96)
8 That is, until the series is purely random. Such a series has no pattern or structure to it, and future
values of the series cannot be predicted from past values - the best least squares estimate of future
values is the mean of the series. For further details on Ibis, see Granger, C. W. J. (1989), p47ff.
9 The system aimed for is parsimonious; that is, d is minimised for Ut being white noise. It must be
noted however that it might be that in examining the ADF regression, Ole parsimonious specincauon
requires no lagged dependent variable terms, and the ADF regression collapses to the Dickey Fuller
regression. Note also that wilb the Dickey Fuller equation, the dependent variable isn't expressed in
first difference terms, whereas with the ADF equation, the dependent variable is.
6.5
L\lnYt-1 0.19
(1.23)
Rsq 0.867 0.860 0.538
Rbsq 0.849 0.842 0.431
OW 2.065 2.037 2.147
If the Dickey Fuller regression results are considered, firstly with the data in
absolute values. and secondly in natural logarithms, it can be seen that it is strongly
suggested that cereals yield is a trend stationary series. In extending this to the
Augmented Dickey Fuller specification. it was found that the most parsimonious
specification was acceptable regarding the absence of autocorrelation and therefore
white noise rcsiduals.U'
The residual correlogram. reproduced below. indicates the presence of white noise
residuals.
LM-test for HJ:RHO(J)==O.statistic is standard normal
LAG RHO STDERR T-STAT LM-STAT DW-TEST
1 -.0752 .2425 -.3100 .3566 2.1472
2 .1602 .2425 .6607 .7977 1.4447
3 -.2815 .2425 -1.1606 1.2071 2.3163
4 -.080} .2425 -.3303 .3588 1.8588
chi-square with 4 D.F. is 1.989
With the ADF regression however. the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
is insignificant (Critical Value=1.77111 for a l-tailed test). and so it is deemed
appropriate to return to the simpler-still DF regression specification. This is supported
by the OW on the DF regression indicating no autocorrelation. These regressions
demonstrate that cereals yield in the EC is a trend stationary process. requiring the use
of residuals of yield around trend, or alternatively a time trend as an independent
variable in the model specification of yield.
Beyond this however. all variables considered for inclusion in any regression
modelling yields must also be tested for stationarity. This is required in order to ensure
that all variables included in anyone regression are integrated of the same order.
10 Shazam permits the printing of the autocorrelation function of residuals. and associated test
statistics.
II Under the null hypothesis. all terms are stationary, and thus the estimation of the parameters using
standard t-tests is efficient
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Having established that cereals yield is 1(0)12,all other variables used in the estimation
of yields must similarly be tested and adjusted to that same order of integration as
appropriate (ie other variables must be either TS or 1(0».
6.3.2: The Simulation of Cereals Yields
The starting point for the analysis was to consider other people's work in this area.
A number of articles were found, almost all of which were American. Virtually all the
work done on yields included consideration of at least one weather variable in the
regressions. For the US, the data are readily available. For the EC however, nothing of
practical use is available.13 Thus the decision was taken to proceed without any
weather variable in the models.l'l
All earlier work included a time trend. Most also included a variable to account for
fertiliser - either a measure of rate of use, or a (real) fertiliser price, or ratio of cereal
price to fertiliser price.
The motivation for including the variables used came from two sources. Firstly,
earlier work has shown certain years to be significant outliers. Thus dummy variables
were examined for these few years to see if their inclusion was justified in this setting.
Secondly, James Houck and Paul Gallagher (H&G)15 included in their examination
deflated fertiliser price to deflated cereals price. This idea was adopted as it was felt an
important 'economic' variable in determining yields, as well as being one variable used
in published work for which comparable data could be obtained for the EC12.t6 It
12All trend stationary variables are integrated of order 1(0).
l) Eurostat do publish climate data for 160 meteorological stations around the EC, but this data is
too disaggregated to be of practical use in the current work.
14 Having established that yields are TS however. it could be argued that climatic variation. although
likely to generate some yield variation. has an insignificant impact on the overall pattern of cereals
yields.
15 see Houck. 1. P. and P. W. Gallagher. (1976).
16 The nominal price data is princtpally from Eurostat's ANNUAL Agricultural Prices. For 1990 and
1991.it is from the QUARTERL Y Agricultural Prices. and for 1991 is the average of data for January
to October. rather than the full year. as that is all that is available. The detlator is the annual percentage
change, in national currency terms, of price deflator GDP at market prices. from European Economy
No 46 of December 1990. The cereals included in the final figure were soft wheal and barley, in ECU
per tonne, for Germany. France and the UK. Each nominal price was deflated for each member stale.
then a weighted 'EC' figure was derived. For wheat the weighting was IWG:2FR: 1UK, and I: 1:1 for
barley. For the 'cereals' price. the weighting was 1.5wh:lbar. All these weightings were based on the
approximate relative shares in total cereals production. which were fairly stable over time. The fertiliser
price is for ternary fertiliser 1:1:1, in ECU per tonne (sources as for cereals). The 1990 and 1991
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was however modified hy inverting the ratio, as the focus of the work is on cereals
rather than fertiliser usc. Below is a graph showing cereals yield over time.
EC12 Cereals Yields
~ 5.0
..
&.
ell
U 4.5
..
=
.. 4.0
..
Cl,
.. 3.5..
c
c
0
- 3.0._,
'a] 2.5>-
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
The modelling of cereals yields proceeds helow, by first considering the absolute
data. Note that the data presented in EC sources quote yields in quintals per hectare. All
the following regressions have converted this figure to tonnes per hectare:
Rsq Rbsq OW
Y = 3.00 + O.0987r
(28.173) (10.575) 0.868 0.860 1.852
Supporting earlier findings, 1976 and 1984 were found to be outliers. Isolating
those observations with dummy variables gives the following result:
Y = 3.060 + O.0919t + 0.607D84 - 0.447076
(42.4) (14.847) (4.133) (-2.953) 0.953 0.943 2.159
With 15 degrees of freedom, the critical value for a 0.95 confidence level is 2.131
(2-tailed test), so all variables are significant. For the 0.99 level, a critical value of
2.947 indicates that the dummy on the 1976 observation is now only marginally
significant. The DW indicates no autocorrelation.
Whilst this indicates the presence of a strong time trend (also adjusted for the
distorting effect of outliers). it excludes 'economic' variables that might influence
cereals yields.
figures include a guesstimated fertiliser price for France as no figure was given. This figure was chosen
after looking at the relative prices in WG, UK and FR in earlier years, and estimating a similar
relationship for 1991.
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6.3.3: Stationarity and Price Valiahles
In the forecasting of cereals yields. the cereals to fertiliser price ratio must also be
examined. Although this will be done in detail in Chapter 8. the series are introduced
here. Below are presented graphs which show the nominal series. the deflated series,
and then the nominal and deflated series for the ratios. The nominal cereals series can
be seen to rise to 1983. and then gradually fall thereafter. Once deflated however, the
series exhibit a strong downward trend over the period to 1991 as a whole, with
slightly higher than trend prices for the period 1982 to 1984. The trend continues into
1991, but the observation for that year appears to be slightly above trend.
With the fertiliser price. the nominal series exhibits a generally similar pattern to the
cereals price. but with more short term fluctuations. This also applies to the deflated
series. though the slowdown in the decline of the series appears to date from 1987, the
year when anti-dumping legislation was enacted over cheap imports from Eastern
Europe. the Gulf States. and allegedly the US as well. Thus for current ends. with this
legislation up for renewal. the most important data to consider are the last five
observations. This is too few to perform any statistical analysis on. but a priori it would
appear that a significant qualitative change occurred in 1987.
Note also how the value of the ratio relates to movements in oil prices (thus fertilise
prices). Oil price hikes in 197314 and 1979/80 lead to sharp declines in the ratio in those
periods. and the fall in oil prices in the mid 1980's led to a rise in the ratio.
Turning now 10 the price ratio. again both the nominal and deflated price ratio series
exhibit similar patterns - perhaps an even stronger parallel than with the individual price
series. Fitting a line of best fit 'by eye' for the period since 1980 suggests that the ratio
is following a fairly stable trend. though with a notable low in 1985 and high in 1987.
Nominal Cereals and Fertiliser Prices
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Deflated Cereals and Fertiliser Prices
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Next. it must be established as to which process of stationarity applies to the price
data. The following table summarises the results.
DF 6.7 ADF
variable In(PclPt) L\ln(PclPt) L\in(PclPf)
constant -0.203 -0.203 -().262
t-statistic (-3.576) (-0.678) (-3.364)
trend -O.O(B -0.003 -0.007
(-0.874) (-0.874) (-5.343)
In(PclPOt-1 0.101 -0.899 -1.297
(2.925) (-26.115) (-4.964)
L11n(pclPOt-1 0.544
6.10
(4_()4)
Rsq 0.076 0.521 0.641
Rbsq -0.048 0.457 0.558
OW 1.689 1.689 2.096
These results indicate the price ratio is trend stationary.
Modellin~ Cereals Yields
The regression results from the section above provide evidence that the price data
set is trend stationary. Its inclusion in a regression against yield therefore requires that it
be incorporated in the form of residuals around trend. In addition, such analysis as
reported below has also identified an outlier, and isolated it by means of a dummy
variable:
InY = 1.131 + 0.026t + O.470ln(Pc/Pf)reSt_l + 0.135084
(98.422) (16.967) 0.26) 02.232)
0.956 0.947 1.763
The trend variable is of the correct sign. In terms of lagging the price variable, it is
important to note that the price figures are annual, calendar year data. It therefore relates
to the January-December period, with the yield figure taken at July (or thereabouts)
during that particular year. Thus if the price variable is not lagged, the model relates
yield to some prices the farmer won't receive for up to another 6 months or so.
Moreover, the yield in time t is in part determined by fertiliser applications in time t-I
which a priori will be affected by fertiliser prices in time t-I, and the relationship of
that price to the price of cereals in t_l.17 Note also that the DW indicates no
autocorrelation (the critical value is 1.69).
17Thus affecting the attractiveness of applying fertiliser then.
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6.4: CEREALS AREA
EC12 Cereals Area
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As noted above. the use of a time trend in the analysis of agricultural crop yields
has for a long time been unquestioned. With regard to crop areas, the use of a time
trend hasn't been so widespread or frequent. although a number of studies have used it
as an explanatory variable. 18 The justification for using time as an explanatory variable
for area can be summed up from Morzuch et aI. It "is inserted to capture the effects of
omitted variables that may have exerted systematic effects over time. For example, if
technological change has tended to increase wheat yields less rapidly than the yields for
competing crops. then for a given expected relative price, acreage planted to wheat
would likely decline. "19
The work of McClelland and Vroomen however indicates that. on the basis of their
findings. area appears to be a difference stationary process. Therefore stationarity
should be achieved by first differencing the area data. not by inserting a time trend.
6.4.1; Testing for Stationarity in EC Cereals Area Data
The area data set was examined in exactly the same way as the yield data above for
stationarity. The results are set out below:
variable
constant
t-statistic
DF
lnAf
7.013
(4.419)
6.7
.1lnA(
7.013
(4.419)
ADF
.1lnAc
1.776
(0.642)
18 See for example Houck, J. P. and M. E. Ryan. (1972); Morzuch, B. J. et at (1980); Shideed, K.
H. et al (1987); and some of the elements in Skold, K. D. and P. Westhoff. (1988).
19 ibid p30.
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trend -0.297 -0.0()3
(-2.852) (-2.852)
0.334 -0.666
(2.216) (-4.423)
Rsq
Rbsq
DW
0.682
0.640
2.242
0.347
0.259
2.242
-0.002
(-1.132)
-0.169
(-0.643)
-0.637
(-2.734)
0.490
0.372
1.780
InA1_l
AlnAt_1
With a critical value of 3.20. it can be seen from both the DF and ADF regressions
that area is difference stationary (even with the DF regression, the DW indicates no
autocorrelation).
6.4.2: The Simulation of Cereals Area
The general pattern of area shown in the graph above is one where area is relatively
stable until the late 1970's. from which time it moves downwards quite markedly. This
suggests a possible structural break in the data. The stationarity tests above are on the
data for the full data period. As will be shown below, this has caused a problem in that
none of the work carried out was able to account for such a pattern. Thus much work
has been carried out using a shorter data period, starting in 1979. Below is the ADF
regression for the shorter area data set.
AInAl = 8.218 - 0.007t - 0.7801nAt_1 - 0.494AlnAt_1
(4.503) (-10.365) (-4.495) (-18.339) 0.782 0.710 2.461
Whilst the statistical reliability of such a regression with so few data points could be
questioned. this nonetheless indicates what might be expected - that this shorter data set
for cereals area is a deterministic function of time. Initially however. the analysis has
proceeded assuming a unit root in the area data, but over both periods.
As with yields. the starling point was a consideration of other people's work in this
area. The first model is a Nerlovian-type model including lagged price and lagged area.
This is however rather a narrow analysis, as potentially important variables are omitted.
A priori reasoning suggests that, at least in the EC. the price of cereals is by itself
perhaps insufficient - what needs to be examined is the cereals price relative to the price
of one or more competing crops (eg oilseed rape). Moreover, the area planted to cereals
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is declining over time. hut consideration needs to be given to whether or not this trend
applies to all crops. or if area formerly planted to cereals is now planted to, say,
oilseeds, with the total area unchanged or perhaps even rising.
The first model to be examined. as already indicated. is the Nerlove model. over the
full data period. The variables are expressed in logs and first differences, and the price
data are deflated:
L1lnA= -0.007 + 0.OOSL11nPrCt_1- O.S38L1lnAt_l+ 0.223AlnAt_2
(-1.274) (0.381) (-2.511) (1.421)
0.402 0.253 2.019
As can clearly be seen. the test statistics are generally very unsatisfactory. They
tend to support the a priori reasoning set out above, that such a specification,
considering one incomplete 'economic' variable (cereals price. excluding the price of
competing crops). and lagged values of the dependent variable, is too simplistic. In
addition to this specification. an error correction model was examined, incorporating
current price, and lagged area minus lagged price. but again the results were generally
unsatisfactory.20
In considering the economic variables possibly having an influence on the area
planted to cereals, the analysis started by examining what were considered the key price
variables. real weighted EC prices for oilseed rape and cereals, and the ratio of cereals
price to rape price.21
Below are graphs of the individual rape price series (see above for cereals) and also
their ratio.
20 For details of the methodology, see Stewart. J. (1991).
21 The cereals price is that used in earlier analyses. The rape price was chosen over an 'oilseeds' price
as the EC only publishes very limited price data for soya and sunflower. The price was taken as a
weighted average of French and German prices in ECU/t from the same source as the cereals data. The
production for IDOse (WO countries was stated as a percentage of the EC12 production. then the EC
price was calculated with IDe French price given a weighting of I. and the German price given a
weighting of output relative 10 the French OUIPUI - usually between one third and one half. Note t1Jat
the weighting wasn't fixed for all years, as happened for cereals, as IDe relative production shares
changed significantly during the period under consideration. As with cereals the relative output level
was compared with the EC12 level for the FULL data period. ASIC data being supplemented where
necessary by FAO data.
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Deflated Oilseed Rape Price
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It can be seen that, like cereals, the rape price moves down over time, although
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there is more fluctuation in the rape series. This can clearly be seen from the last graph
above. Also. the rape data initially fall more slowly than the cereals price. This could be
accounted for hy noting that the crisis in expenditure on oilseeds came much later than
with cereals. Moreover. in the early eighties when cereals prices were already being cut
back with the introduction of Guarantee Thresholds, attempts were being made to
actually expand the supply of rape and other oilseeds to crushers from domestic
production. By 1987 however, price cuts were also being implemented for rape under
the arrangements for guaranteed maximum quantities.22 With the introduction of the
stabiliser measures in 1988. an oilseed cobweb was set up as the price cuts were non-
cumulative (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of this). The impact of this can
clearly be seen in making prices much more unstable in the years from 1988. The
impact of these can also be seen in the graph illustrating the ratio of cereals to oilseeds
price.
Turning now to the analysis of the price data. as before. the series have been
examined using Dickey-Fuller (OF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions.
First. the cereals price data set is considered:
OF 6.7 ADF(llag) ADF (21ag)
variable InPc ~lnPc ~lnPc ~lnPc
constant 1.543 1.543 0.766 1.593
t-statistic (2.701 ) (2.701) (0.925) (3.153)
trend -0.018 -0.018 -OJH2 -0.019
(-3.987) (-3.987) (-1.46) (-3.484)
InPCt_l 0.670 -0.330 -0.169 -0.344
(5.356) (-2.633) (-0.953) (-3.162)
~lnPcl_l -0.372 0.059
(-1.243) (0.298)
~lnPcl_2 0.176
( 1.310)
Rsq 0.979 0.376 0.312 0.505
Rbsq 0.977 0.293 0.153 0.325
DW 2.294 2.294 1.336 1.54
The signs on the trend coefficients are as would be expected. Subject to the now-
22 Note thaI this is NOT the same as the MGQ introduced Ihe following year as part of the stabiliser
package. See EC Commission (1987h) for details of the price package.
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familiar caveat regarding the small size of the sample, and given the OF test statistics
for a sample of 25 of about 3.6. both the trend variable and lagged dependent variable
in the OF regression are statistically significant. The OW statistic too is significant.23
With the AOF regressions, again the signs correspond to that which would be expected
from a casual examination of the data. The OW is however of concern. With the second
AOF specification, the sign on the ~lnPct-l variable has changed but in both
regressions they were statistically insignificant from zero anyway. The OW is only
marginally less bad.
From this the main point to note is that, given the acceptability of the OW statistic
from the OF regression, it would appear that cereals prices are trend stationar:y. Given
the ECs practice in recent years of holding nominal ECU prices stable, and bearing in
mind that the prices are deflated, such a consistent downward trend is not surprising. It
must be noted however that acceptance of the suggestion that prices are a deterministic
function of time requires that it is also accepted that the process of setting prices in ECU
terms has been treated relatively passively by the EC, and that rising price levels,
reflected in the rising deflators, is similarly persistent over time, or at least for the time
period under consideration.
Repeating for the rape price series:
OF 6.7 AOF (Hag) AOF (2Iag)
variable InPo ~lnPo ~lnPo ~lnPo
constant 4.118 4.118 1.236 2.591
t-statistic (8.182) (8.182) (2.321) (1.364)
trend -0.025 -0.025 -0.029 -0.021
(-5.54) (-5.54) (-2.379) (-2.014)
InPot-l 0.244 -0.756 -0.006 -0.476
(2.468) (-7.637) (-2.301) (-1.349)
~lnPOt_1 0.169 -0.057
(0.597) (-0.221)
~lnPOt_2 -0.481
(-1.364)
Rsq 0.737 0.394 0.337 0.503
Rbsq 0.702 0.3 I3 0.184 0.323
OW 1.624 1.624 1.432 1.826
23 With n=18 and k'=2, the CV is 2.47.
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Again. no definitive conclusion can be drawn from this about the nature of the data.
The OW of 1.624 indicates no autocorrelation.P' Examining the data for rape prices
suggests that the downward trend is fairly consistent over the data period. but the
variation in the data. especially for the most recent few years, makes it very hard to tell
for certain. .
Turning therefore 10 the consideration of the ratio of cereals to rape price using the
same four regressions. the following results were obtained (PR is the ratio of cereals to
rape price):
DF 6.7 ADF(llag) AOF (2Iag)
variable InPR l\lnPR l\lnPR l\lnPR
constant -0.788 -0.788 0.776 0.575
t-statistic (-5.122) (-5.122) (5.098) (6.193)
trend -0.018 -0.018 -0.012 -0.009
(-4.984) (-4.984) (-6.360) (-6.367)
InPRt_l -0.068 -1.068 -1.621 -1.233
(-0.297) (-4.650) (-5.(26) (-6.412)
alnPRt-l 0.678 0.435
(3.856) (5.526)
alnPRt_2 -0.284
(-2.333)
Rsq 0.530 0.463 0.609 0.628
Rbsq 0.468 0.392 0.518 0.493
OW 1.787 1.787 1.526 1.832
As before with the individual series. the signs are as expected. and with the OF
regression. the OW is not significantly different from two. This indicates that the price
ratio is a trend stationary series. This is on the face of it contrary to what would
probably be expected and. if accepted with the caveats noted. says a great deal about the
decision making process in the EC with regard to setting prices. if they can be viewed
as a deterministic function of time.
To summarise therefore. cereals area is DS. and the price ratio is TS. Strictly. these
are incompatible over the full data period. but the structural break appears to nullify
this.
From this. it was decided to proceed by testing certain regressions with cereals area
24 The critical value is 1.53.
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regressed against both logged and logged & differenced price data. The results were
generally very unsatisfactory. One version that was run included the price ratio lagged.
Note that with the price data relating to calendar years. and the area figure being for area
harvested, it would have been the previous year's price that the farmer knew when
planting at least some of that particular area. Therefore in general, lagged prices have
been used in examining cereals area. Moreover, as the prices relate to the FULL
calendar year, some part of the figure relates to months after harvest in time t, therefore
having more influence over areas planted for harvesting in t+1:
AlncerA = 7.061 + O.l291n(PclPo)t_1 - 0.03IAln(Pc!Po)t_l - 0.663InAt_l
(4.372) (4.599) (-0.531) (-4.360)
0.353 -0.204 2.308
The lack of data points and hence degrees of freedom causes problems interpreting
the DW. A similar regression was also run for the shorter data period, with similar
results.
Finally in this section, a partial adjustment model was tried, with cereals area
regressed against lagged cereals area and alternately current and lagged prices. Both
cereals price and the ratio of cereals to rape price were tried, and the regressions were
run in both logged and logged/differenced forms. All four models tried gave better
results than earlier models, but the regression statistics still perform only modestly:
variable InA InA AlnA dInA
constant 9.379 6.433 -0.010 -0.007
t-statistic (5.317) (3.052) (-2.624) (-1.694)
InPct_1 0.094
(3.905)
L11nPct_1 -0.040
(-2.613)
InAt-l 0.067 0.396
(0.380) (2.005)
AlnAt-l -0.629 -0.647
(-11.598) (-7.970)
In(Pc/Po)t_1 0.114
(2.581 )
Aln(PclPo)t -I 0.038
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Rsq
Rbsq
DW
0.734
0.699
2.254
0.687
0.645
2.495
(0.772)
0.410 0.431
0.326 0.351
1.693 1.898
6.5: TOTAL ARABLE AREA
The regression results above all have rather poor test statistics. The main problem
appears to be the structural break in the data. What was done to try to get round this
problem therefore was to broaden the analysis to what has been termed for simplicity
total arable area. It was argued above that it was valid to incorporate rape prices in
considering the change in the area planted to cereals in the EC. This section argues that
this can be extended to include the change in the actual area of land used for these other
crops. which can be seen as substitutes in production for cereals. The reasons for this
relate to seeing whether or not the general downward movement in cereals area in more
recent years reflects a downward movement in the area of all arable crops, or if it is
occurring against a generally static or rising arable area planted.
The crops considered in addition to cereals were rape, sunflowers and soya. As
was noted earlier. the EC only produces very limited price series for these other crops,
but the area data set is better.25 The total area of these four crops was termed total
arable area (or AA). Crops such as sugar and potatoes were excluded as their
substitutability for cereals is much more limited - specialised equipment would be
needed, as well as quota to actually provide the entitlement to produce. It is conceivable
that fanners already producing cereals and these other root crops could possibly expand
their production. but the overall impact on AA was felt to be relatively insignificant.
Secondly there is the question of set aside. Here it has been assumed that all land
set aside was planted to the crops included in the calculation of AA. In this way, the
problem of trying to guess the proportion of set aside land coming from other crops has
been avoided.26 The data that incorporates land area set aside have been termed net
25 ASIC contains such data. and this can be supplemented by data from FAO in the standard way to
gel a complete series for the ECI2. Note also that whilst the FAO produces some prices for these other
two crops. the data is both incomplete. and also estimated on a different basis to the EC rape and
cereals data.
261be source of data for land set aside under bo!h the 5 year and I year schemes has been the HGCA's
Weekly Digest 18135 of 2.3.1992. This and other sources just give total figures for land area set aside.
With crop rotations however. it would be impossible to realistically be able to do anything else. Note
also with regard to work for Chapter 8. land to be set aside is from that area planted to arable crops,
essentially as defined here.
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arable area or NAA.
It can be seen from the graph below that since the mid 1970's, sunflower has been
planted to the largest area of all oilseeds. All three oilseeds follow the same general
pattern however. with the Spearman correlation coefficient between the different series
never falling below 0.92.
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The following regressions consider NAA. As can be seen, they suggest the NAA
data set is trend stationary. The graph of the NAA data is presented below the
regression results.
variable
constant
t-statistic
trend
InNAAt_1
~lnNAAt_l
Rsq
Rbsq
OW
OF 6.7
InNAA .1.lnNAA
10.581 10.581
(4.872) (4.872)
0.004 0.004
(3.934) (3.934)
-0.006 -1.006
(-0.(27) (-4.868)
ADF
~nNAA
11.016
(5.881)
0.005
(4.51)
-1.047
(-5.87)
-0.085
(-0.702)
0.643
0.561
1.548
0.797
0.770
2.017
0.511
0.446
2.017
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Cereals Area, Arable Area and Net Arable Area
Turning now to compare cereals area with NAA:
Cereals Area as a Percentage of NAA100,-----------------------------------~~------------~
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This clearly illustrates the decline in cereals area as a percentage of NAA. Below are
the regression results that indicate the percentage of cereals area to NAA is trend
stationary:
DF 6.7 ADF
variable In% ~lnPo ~In%
constant 0.702 -0.788 -1.236
t-statistic (1.415) (-4.984) (-5.226)
trend -0.002 -0.018 -0.031
(-2.253) (-4.650) (-6.324)
In%l_l 0.848 -1.068 -1.699
(7.896) (-5.122) (-5.402)
~ln%t_1 0.732
6.22
(3.998)
Rsq 0.974 0.463 0.643
Rhsq 0.971 0.392 0.561
OW 2.488 1.787 1.548
Although the OF regression is inconclusive. the two versions of the AOF
regression both indicate that cereals area as a percentage of NAA is a trend stationary
series. A brief examination of the data presented in the graph above would suggest that
this isn't unrealistic. with the figure clearly declining steadily over time. Note that the
DW statistic for the '6.7' regression indicates no aurocorrelation.s?
6.6: AN ALTERNATIVE CEREALS AREA ESTIMATE
Given all the factors considered above about cereals area being part of a larger
whole. an alternative method of estimating cereals area is to model NAA and cereals
area as a percentage of NAA. and thus derive cereals area indirectly. Any shortcomings
in modelling cereals area directly in terms of omitted variables relating to oilseeds can
thus readily be overcome. Initially however. NAA was considered very simply in terms
of a trend plus dummies on outliers28:
NAA = 37207 + 156.22t - 1348.7D77 - 782.02D90
(164.42) (8.475) (-9.636) (-6.013)
Rsq=O.924 Rbsq=O.908 DW=1.702
The main point to note from this is that whilst cereals area is clearly falling over
time. the area defined here as NAA is rising over time. albeit at less than 0.5% per
annum.
27 The critical value is 1.53 with n=18 and k'=2.
28 According to HGCA Weekly Digest 16/51 of 25.6.90, there are a number of factors contributing
to what turned out to he the lowest ever ECI2 cereals area in 1990. In Spain in particular. plantings
were very badly hit by wet weather just before Christmas. Other factors quoted by the HGCA are
increased participation in set aside, and higher returns in 1989/90 for oilseed rape and linseed. The bad
weather conditions can he expected to be just a one-otT, and work discussed elsewhere suggests that the
'cobweb' in the oilseed rape sector would lead to falling area the following year. Thus as is confirmed
by 1991 estimates. the very low area planted in 1990 can be thought of very much as an outlier - an
exceptionally low figure which is unlikely to signify a change in trend. Note also that the percentage
figure doesn't seem unduly disrupted by this, suggesting that this 'alternative' approach to model cereals
area is appropriate.
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The next step was to consider 'economic' variahles that could possihly affect NAA.
The ratio of cereals to oilseeds prices was excluded here as a priori it would be
expected not to influence the total area planted to cereals and oilseeds - only the balance
planted between the two alternatives. What was tried instead was a variable that
attempted to pick up the relative returns from crop production and alternatives - milk
production and livestock production. Two variables were considered: the ratio of
cereats-? price index to animal production price index, and the ratio of cereals price
index to milk price index (all in nominal terms, converted to a consistent base of 1980,
and ECIO as far as possible, and lagged one period). Both were difference stationary.
The regressions for NAA over the full data period showed the price variables to be
insignificant. Over the shorter period from 1979, both were significant, but the Durbin
Watson's in both cases were around 3. The regressions were therefore re-run using
maximum likelihood to correct for the autocorrelation. The following results were
obtained:
InNAA = 10.544 + 0.005t + O.099L\lnPctPat_l
(6358.5) (20.010) (3.894)
0.950 0.940 P = -0.724
t-statistic (-3.785)
InNAA = 10.544 + 0'(x)5t + O.081L\lnPctPmt_1
(4000.6) (l0.708) (l.603)
0.908 0.889 P = -0.625
(-2.888)
where PetPa is the ratio of cereals to animal products price indexes, and Pc/Pm is
the ratio of cereals to milk price indexes. It can be seen that the latter performs less
significantly than the former. This is perhaps not surprising, given that for much of the
data period, milk quotas have been in operation, making dairy production a much
harder enterprise to move in to.
Having examined NAA in detail, it is then necessary to consider cereals area as a
percentage of NAA in order to arrive at an estimate for cereals area. Initially, this
percentage was examined in relation to time alone. Given the note earlier about the
pattern in cereals area, the percentage figure, not surprisingly, follows a similar pattern.
To try to get round this problem. with the cause of the structural break never having
been assigned to any variable considered. the regressions were run with the data just
29 Ideally. an index for cereals and oil seeds would have been used. An index for oilseeds however is
not available. An index for crop products is. bUl this includes other <"TOPS100, including some whose
production is governed by quotas. A point to note with Olis is that cereals area dominates NAA -
declining. but still over 80%.
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from 1979. The results are summarised below in the first two regressions reported. The
second pair of regressions incorporate an 'economic' variable. The first one is the ratio
of deflated cereals to rape price. The second is the ratio of cereals to rape returns. This
is defined as the price (as used in the above ratio) multiplied by the trend or expected
yield. This variable is incorporated to reflect not just the unit returns to farmers but the
EXPECfEO total payments to farmers for each crop. A priori, this would be expected
therefore to affect the areas planted by farmers to each crop to a different extent than the
price ratio.
variable % In% In% In%
constant 98.233 4.590 4.587 4.589
t-statistic (290.66) (1038.4) (1420.3) (1135.4)
trend -1.03 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(-24.100) (-20.075) (-36.812) (-26.525)
In(Pc/Po)res t-I 0.288
(5.682)
InRRres t-l 0.035
(3.913)
Rsq 0.978 0.974 0.981 0.978
Rbsq 0.976 0.972 0.977 0.973
OW 1.680 1.528 1.319 1.217
All variables used are significant. The OW's in the first two regressions against
time alone are borderline. As can be seen, the price and return variables are significant,
with the correct signs, and improve the R-bar squared, if only slightly. The fact they
have the same trend coefficient is due to rounding (they differ by the fourth decimal
place). The OW's are however of concern. As before therefore, the latter two
regressions were corrected for autocorrelation using a maximum likelihood procedure:
IncerA%NAA = 4.588 - O.01lt + 0.047lnRRres t-l
(882.72) (-16.935) (2.164)
0.981 0.977 P = 0.393
(1.542)
IncerA%NAA = 4.586 - O.Ollt + O.J18In(Pc/Po)res t-I 0.982 0.979 P = 0.304
(980.36) (-18.00?) (2.429) (1.149)
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6.7: CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown how yields have been progressively increasing over time.
Variations in yields have reflected changes in the intensity of inputs. and the
cereals.fertiliser price ratio was shown to intluence cereals yields. For data reasons.
weather factors were not specifically included in the analysis but 1976 and 1984 - years
of unusual weather patterns. were shown to be outliers in the yield series.
A two-stage process was used in analysing the behaviour of cereals area. In the first
stage. the combined area of cereals and oilseeds - which use similar production
technologies - were modelled. It was shown that these actually increase over time. For
recent years. the data series was extended to include set aside land. This helped to
reinforce this movement. This was shown to be related to the relative prices of cereals
and animal products. From this. cereals area was estimated as a percentage of this 'net
arable area'. This was shown to be declining steadily in recent years. and that it is
related to the relative returns to cereals and oilseeds. In the last section. a procedure for
correcting for autocorrelation was adopted that will be important in the forecasting of
cereals area in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7; CEREALS CONSUMPTION
''Wliat costs Iittl« is uaiued less'. Ceroantes, 'Don Q{l~ote
7.1; INTRODUCTION
Cereals consumption. or total internal use (TIU). consists of five elements that need
to be considered individually. Those five are losses. seed. human consumption,
industrial use and animal feed. An earlier examination found that seed losses and
human consumption exhibited no significant short term trend. Only the short term trend
was considered initially as the member of DG VI who works on this for the
Commission annual budget forecasts stated that they only considered such trends. I
The Commission however is only concerned with forecasting the expenditure one year
at a time. so it may be that for current purposes, a longer term view is more
appropriate. A further factor that may be of significance in examining TIU is that the
data for the last two years (199011 and 1991/2) are for the ECl2 INCLUDING eastern
Germany. As each end use for cereals can be thought of as independent of the others to
a large degree. each is examined separately. The next section considers the first four
end-uses for cereals listed above. as these represent a relatively small element in the
total figure. Animal Feed. the main end-use for cereals. is considered in much greater
detail in section 7.3.
7.2: LOSSES. SEEp. HUMAN CONSUMPTION AND INDUSTRIAL USE
7.2.1: Losses
Losses represent the smallest of the five end-uses for cereals. constituting between
1% and 2% of total internal use. It can be seen from the graph below that for the period
during the early to mid 1970's. the figure was relatively low and fairly stable. The late
1970's and earJy 1980's saw a period of greater fluctuation in losses. as well as a
general rise in the quantity of cereals lost each year. Since then however. except for the
1989/90 observation. the quantity of losses has generally stabilised. Mainly because
losses represent such a small percentage of TIU, the approach taken in estimating a
figure for future losses has been a very simple one. It has involved considering patterns
in the data and first differences of the data. As noted above, the data appear to exhibit
particular patterns in particular periods. The average of the last 8 observations is 1.9 mt
1 Personal communication. February 1990.
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(for the period as a whole. the figure is about 2 rnt). Given the point that losses are
such a small part ofTIU. it seems not too unreasonable to take the figure for losses as
about 1.9 rnt, whilst acknowledging that the last two observations include the former
East Germany. and thus may be biased upwards.f
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7.2.2: Seed
EC12 Cereals used for Seed
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Seed. like losses. constitutes only a small percentage of total internal use. In recent
years, excluding the two most recent observations (which include eastem Germany), it
has represented an almost perfectly stable 4.05%. Thus as with losses, future levels of
cereals use for seed will not be considered in too much detail.
Excluding the last two observations, it appears that the general pattern of seed use
has been one of fluctuations around a stable trend. Thus the approach was a simple
2 It has proved impos."ible 10 gel a breakdown of TIU data for the last Iwo years excluding East
Germany.
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trend analysis. with the last two observations isolated by a dummy variable (DEG). and
other observations examined to see if they ought to be regarded as outliers. The
following regression was found to be the one where no further outliers were observed:
InS = 8.616 + O.OOlt - 0.074D197617 + O.064DEG
(1056.8) (1.249) (-12.275) (7.887) 0.663 0.595 l.549
The DW is in the indeterminate range (CV=1.68). but for current purposes. no
further attention is being given to this. As with earlier work. 197617 was found to be an
outlier because of exceptional weather conditions, and thus the dummy variable can be
justified on a priori grounds. The time trend variable was insignificant. Excluding the
last two observations. the average quantity of cereals used for seed comes out at 5.56
mt per annum for 1973/4 to 1989/90. For the old EC12 therefore. excluding the former
East Germany '. a reasonable figure could be taken as 5.5-5.6 million tonnes per
annum. As noted before. this is a fairly rough and ready approach. but one that could
be justified given the small percentage of total internal cereals use represented by seed.
A consideration of cereals production as a possible explanatory variable proved
fruitless.f 5
7.2.3: Human Consumption
Human consumption (HC) of cereals represents around a quarter to three tenths of
total cereals use. and thus a simple approach may be less valid or excusable. Earlier
work followed the Commission by assuming stable consumption in the short term. As
can be seen from the updated data set however, this assumption is perhaps
questionable. One feature observable from even a cursory glance at the data on the
accompanying graph below is that there is a remarkably consistent cyclical pattern over
the period under consideration. It can also be seen that the data exhibit a rising trend. It
has been established that residuals around this trend aren't related to residuals around
the trend in production.
3 Further consideration of the handling of eastern Germany is given in Chapter 8.
4 The idea here was that if production was higher, more grain would be available for use as seed.
S Note also that the HGCA Digest 18/31 of 3.2.1992 has an article that notes that since 31.3.1992,
organo-mercury treatments of seed have been banned. They feel this wiII result in more untreated own
seed being used tty fanners, as alternatives will be very costly. Thus this end use of cereals could rise in
the future, though they give no indicalion of by how much they expect this to rise. Moreover they note
that such a move could result in lower yields. The main problem with such information is how it can
be used practicafly in any modelling wort.
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Because of the greater significance of human consumption In total cereals
consumption. certain 'economic' variables were examined to see if they had an
influence on human consumption. Variables considered included population, GOP,
GDP per capita. long run and short run interest rates. level of cereals production and
percentage change in 'occupied population'v None of these variables were able to
explain the cycle in the consumption data. Moreover. unlike say 1976 and 1984 with
yields and production. no a priori reason could be established for why 197617. 1982/3
and 1989190had such markedly low consumption levels.
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A simpler representation for human consumption was therefore considered. Two
assumptions were made. Firstly, consumption was assumed likely to rise over time
with population increases (assuming further that for the period under consideration,
population would continue to increase - not unrealistic for the EC as a whole, even if
the populations of some member Slates are roughly stable). Secondly, that the increase
in consumption was likely to be at a progressively slower and slower rate. reflecting
such factors as the Engel relationship. as well as a physical capacity constraint on food
consumption. Thus the fonn of the regression examined was:
He = 32324 + 1566.2InT
(60.747) (6.713) 0.803 0.791 1.56
where He is the quantity of cereals consumed by humans. and InT is the log of a time
trend.
6 All data from European Economy No 50, December 1991.
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Note that at the 5% level. with n= 18 and k'= I. the critical value for the DW statistic is
1.39, thus the low-looking DW figure is actually insignificantly different from 2, and
therefore indicates no serial autocorrelation. Note also that with this specification, no
observations are found to be outliers.
7.2.4: Industrial Use
EC12 Industrial Use of Cereals
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In the earlier work on cereals use by industry, the results confirmed the EC's belief
that the short term trend was rising. It currently represents about 8.5 - 9% of total
cereals consumption. That earlier work suggested that cereals use by industry was
rising at over 200000 tonnes per year. Discussion with DG VI confirmed this trend
would be likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
In 1989, the EC Commission issued a report explicitly looking at the use of
agricultural commodities for non-food uses.? The House of Lords responded to this
by examining the issue themselves.f Moreover, the EC's submissions to both the
GATT negotiations and the debate on reform of the CAP have included analyses of
non-food uses of agricultural raw materials. Both the old and the new regimes offer aid
to producers of cereals and potatoes (under the cereals regime) which go into the
manufacture of starch. This is given in order to offset the price-increasing effect of
support for cereals under the CAP and to make starch made from such commodities
protected under the CAP manufacture competitive against starch made from other raw
materials. It is also encouraged because of the continuing surpluses produced in the
cereals sector. The personal view of DGVI is that the use of cereals in such end-uses is
likely to continue to rise, In the HoL report however, in considering 'non-food' uses
7 see EC Commis.'iion (l989b). Note thaI III and non food uses aren't exactly congruent
8 see House of Lords. (1991).
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they cast doubt on any Illil.iill upward trend in the quantity of cereals used for such
purposes.
In looking for variables that could influence this end use of cereals, the first that
could he included is the level of refund available for cereals going for the manufacture
of starch. Unfortunately however, a run of such data does not seem to be available. The
real price of cereals was also considered (suitably adjusted for non-stationarity), both
lagged and not, but proved to be insignificant in both cases.
From the graph, it appears that the latter few years exhibit a trend from 1983/4. It
was felt that there were far too few data points to justify a detailed examination of
stationarity, but if a trend is put through those last 9 data points, the following
regression is obtained:
InIU = 9.124 + 1.035t
(550.87) (11.221) 0.925 0.914 1.780
Thus it appears that the quantity of cereals going for industrial uses is growing at
about I% per annum.
At the time of writing. the EC Commission are preparing legislation regarding
'non-food set aside'. A wide range of CAP commodities are to be included in the
legislation. including oilseeds, the meals from which can only really be disposed of on
the animal feed market Payment are to be made in such a way as to ensure farmers
don't receive returns from selling the crop for non food uses, and also claiming
payments under the new regime as if the crop had been sold for food uses. Overall
however, it would appear that the legislation is such that the overall impact on non-food
uses of agricultural production, especially cereals (given current purposes), is going to
be very limited.9
9 See Agra Europe 1502 or 31.7.1992, page E3.
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7.1: ANIMAL FEEP
Cereals Use in Animal Feed
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Within the overall framework of this thesis. the consideration of the determinants of
the quantity of cereals used in animal feed is very important. The reason for this lies in
animal feed being the dominant end-use for cereals. Thus the trend for total cereals use
has generally been dominated by the trend in this particular end-use for cereals.
For the ECI2. the quantity of cereals going to animal feed. as expressed as a
percentage of total internal cereals use. has remained very stable. In 1973. it was 65%.
by 1980 had gently fallen to 62%. and by 1989. had fallen slowly to become 60% of
total cereals consumption. In absolute terms however, the figures indicate a very
different pattern. Whilst total ECl2 cereals use fell from 144mt to 133mt between 1973
and 1989 (a 7.6% fall), the quantity of cereals going into animal feed fell from 93mt to
79mt (15.05% fall). Later. the results of attempts to quantify the determinants of the
use of cereals in animal feed (hereinafter referred to as AF) are discussed. but initially.
certain likely factors can be considered.
1.3.1; Demand for Animal feed
Demand for animal feed is a demand derived from the number of livestock. with the
number of animals in the EC taken as a proxy for this.IO Rather than simply take the
number of head of each type of animal however. a series was constructed that tried to
10 Animal numbers were taken from the FAO's Production Yearbook. In a private communication
wilh F Pariboni. the chief of the basic data unit, statistics division, it was confirmed that this data is
based on December census figures: "In the S(1eciraccases of the EEC countries, the data refer to the [last
day) of !he preceding year or the first day of the indicated year." Note that FAO data were used in order
to ensure a consislent data set for the full ECI2 for the full data period for all animal types.
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reflect the quantity of feed demanded by each animal type, and the likely contribution
that cereals would make to this overall intake (given the information available, this had
to he rather ad hoc. but hopefully fairly consistenu.U This was done by reference to
cereals' contribution to energy requirements for different animal types.
From EC Commission (1990b), examples were given of the energy requirements
(in Mjlyear. or per litre of milk), required by certain different types of animal. From EC
Commission (1988b). table 1 on page 8/6 showed the share of energy requirements of
dairy, beef and monogastrics provided by grains. In Kenneth Wilson (l985?), for
barley (the main cereal going to animal feed), the stated energy value (in Mj/kg DM -
'dry matter'), was given as 13.0. From this information, estimates can be made
regarding cereals consumption by animals in the EC.
Before examining the estimates in detail, certain points need to be made. Firstly,
within each animal type, there exist different categories, each with different feed
requirements. For example, EC Commission (1990b) breaks cattle into veal, beef and
milk producing animals. To a large extent, such a disaggregated approach just isn't
possible here. given data limitations. Thus a certain amount of what might be called
aggregation errors will arise. A second point is that different data sources give slightly
different figures for the energy content of barley. Reported below are two approaches.
The first uses the Kenneth Wilson figure for barley. Because however different cereals
have different energy contents, a second estimate was made using a weighted estimate
of energy content of different cereals, using MAFF datal2.
The approach used started by taking the energy requirements for different animal
types. The main source of this information was EC Commission (1990b). Energy
requirements were used as the basis as cereals are generally referred to as an energy
source, although they do provide some protein as well. Details weren't given however
for all animal types so for some. figures were taken from similar animals for which data
were provided (see below for details). Secondly. reference was made to EC
Commission (1988b). There. figures are quoted which show the proportion of total
energy requirements for different animal types that are derived from grains. Again, data
weren't provided for all different animal types, so certain assumptions had to be made
from the limited data available (again see below for more details). Finally, a figure for
energy content in Mj per kg dry matter of grains was needed. As noted above, the first
estimate was made using just a figure for barley. This was taken from the Kenneth
II The main source s of the data were as follows: I) Wilson, K. (l985?), 2) EC Commission. (l990b)
3) EC Commission. (I988b), in particular Chapter 8, Linkages in me EC animal feed sector. (Is it
significant that this document stretches to 20 chapters and 711 pages?!)
12 MAFF (1986).
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Wilson document. and was quoted as 13Mj/kg DM. A second estimate was used using
MAFF data for different cereals. These energy content figures were then weighted by
their different proportionate contributions to total animal feed. The energy content
figures in Mjlkg DM were:
barley 12.8
maize 13.8
oats 12.0
wheat 13.6
These were then weighted by relative importance in animal feed. I3 In this source,
data were given for production and consumption, for 1990/91 and 1991/92. The
consumption data were used. with 'other' cereals in the Agra Europe table being
proxied by oats from MAFF (1986). These calculations showed the average weighted
energy content of 'cereals' to be 13.182Mj for 1990/91 and 13.196Mj for 1991/92. A
figure of 13.l9Mj was taken for the calculation set out in more detail below. This then
allowed an estimation of the quantity of cereals consumed by each animal type per year
to be made. Cattle numbers were split up with dairy cattle considered separately. These
were treated slightly differently to the other animals. and the approach taken is set out
below. For the other animals however, the following table sets out the figures used in
the calculations, with comments on certain figures used made after it.
animal type energy reqt %energy energy (in Mj) cereals consumption
Mj/ann/head from grains from grains kg/head/year
a bl4
cattle 17012 11.6 1973.4 151.8 149.6
pigs 10678.5 57.7 6161.5 473.96 467.1
hens 509.7 57.7 294 22.6 22.3
horses 20477 10.6 2171 167 164.6
donkeys 13475 10.6 1428 109.8 108.3
ewes 4754 10.6 504 38.8 38.2
dairy see below 10.6 see below 162.6 160.3
13 Data from Agra Europe 1494.5.6.1992, page M/IO.
14 'a' is abe implied cereals consumption estimated from the Kennell} Wilson data for barley, and 'b' is
abe figure using the weighted cereals figure from MAFF data.
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As noted above, EC Commission (1990b) discusses a number of different
categories of cattle. The energy requirement figure of 17012Mj per head per annum is
the average of len different cattle types' energy requirements, unweighted owing to lack
of appropriate data. 1~ This is one of the main potential areas for so-called 'aggregation
errors', but data constraints prevent a more disaggregated and accurate analysis.
Moreover. the 11.6% figure for the energy content of grains is for 'beef animals,
whereas in practice. it may well be that not all 'cattle' are for beef production.
fW
Again, EC Commission (1990b) had a number of different examples to work with.
The IWO examples used were fattening pigs and requirements for producing piglets.
The former were indicated as needing 26.7Mj per day, which multiplies up to an annual
requirement of 9746Mj. For producing piglets, the stated figures were 9104Mj for
maintenance. 2501M.i for replacement, and 8604 for piglets. It was taken that just the
first two figures related to the main pig. and so the sum of those two figures, or
11611Mj. was used. Then the unweighted average of 11611 and 9746. or 10678.5Mj
was used in the calculation.
Ikns
The one comment to be made here was that although the 57.7% figure from EC
Commission (1988b) relates to 'monogastrics', presumably principally pigs. this figure
was also used for poultry. as it was assumed poultry production is similarly feed-
based.16
Mules and A$SCS
From the FAO. there are data for mules and asses. In EC Commission (1990b), a
figure is quoted for the energy requirement for donkeys. For these purposes, these
different animals were treated as having the same energy requirements,
Sheep and GoalS
The figure used for sheep is the one quoted in EC Commission (1990b) for
breeding ewes. No directly comparable figure was given for goats, and so for
IS "scandard- heifer. under t year and 1-2 years, and male and female animals for meal production,
v.-ioo51y under I year. 1·2 years, over 2 year.I. and intensively or extensively fed.
161bcre ill no sredfie indicalion in the lexi as 10 Ibe accuracy or nOIof Ibis assumption.
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simplicity the same figure was used as for ewes. Note that there is only a relatively
modest goat population in the EC.
DaicyCows
The data from FAD are for 'Cows Milk Whole Fresh'. The first point to note is that
this figure is consistently higher than the MMB data for deliveries to dairies. That is not
surprising, assuming that some milk will be used on farm by the farm family, or in
animal feed, or in a farm dairy for small scale dairy product manufacture, for example.
This figure was chosen as the MMB type data would naturally exclude some milk
whose production would still require cereals in the animals' feed, regardless of the end-
use of the milk.
Given the slightly different nature of the production of milk in terms of the current
analysis, a different procedure was used to estimate the cereals requirement for dairy
animals' feed. The average yield per cow (in kg/year) was multiplied by the energy
requirement per kg as stated in EC Commission (l990b). This figure will vary
depending on the fat content of the milk. The two examples given are 5.27Mj for milk
with 4% fat, and 4.82Mj for milk with 3.3% fat. Not knowing the average fat content
of EC milk, an energy requirement figure of 5Mj per kg was used in the calculation.
From here, the same procedure as before was used to get a figure for the contribution
of grains to the energy intake required for that year's level of milk production.
Throughout the 1980's, it appears that the rise in the contribution of grains to energy
requirements has flattened out, and so the figures appearing in the above table are the
average grain intake figures for the period 1981 to 1991.
The livestock categories for which data are available from Eurostat are horses,
mules, asses, caule, buffaloes, pigs, sheep, goats, chickens, ducks, and turkeys.
Buffaloes were given the same energy requirement as cattle, mules and asses the same
as donkeys, goals and sheep the same as ewes, and ducks and turkeys the same as
chickens.
The purpose of the above work is to enable all the data for the different animal types
to be expressed as a single figure. This is achieved by weighting the raw numbers of
population size for each animal type by the cereals intake for enen~YpurpOses relative to
that for cattle. What is then derived is a 'cattle equivalent' figure for the total animal
population in the EC, based on cereals consumption. The weightings are derived from
the figures in the last column of the above table (the data in column 'a' and column 'b'
give the same weightings). The following weightings have been used:
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cattle
pigs ~.I
hens 0.15
horses 1.1
donkeys 0.72
ewes 0.26
dairy 1.07
Mules and asses were then given the weighting as donkeys, buffaloes the same as
cattle, goats the same as ewes. and ducks and turkeys the same as hens. This. as noted
before, may not be very accurate, but there is insufficient information available for a
more accurate approach than this.
From this. a calculation can easily be made to see if these figures feed through to
give a figure for cereals consumption close to the figure given by Eurostat. The final
estimate is close to the actual figure. 84.37 million tonnes being about 5-6% above the
actual figure for 1991.17 With so many approximations made in getting to this figure,
it is probably acceptably close.
73.2: The Substitution of Cereals
The last 25 years has seen the increased substitution of other feed inputs for cereals.
Note that it is better to talk of inputs other than cereals as non-grain feeds (NGF's)
rather than cereals substitutes, given the technical inaccuracy of the latter term.If
Despite this however. the term cereals suhstitutes is nonetheless frequently used to
describe one group of NGF's. specifically the group known as Annex D products
(since they appear in annex 0 to Regulation (EEC)2727/75, the regulation governing
the common organisation of the market in cereals up to the beginning of the I99314
marketing year). The other inputs into animal feed are then normally classified in
accordance with whether they provide primarily energy or protein.
17 Although this actual figure is in reality hard to obtain. as all Eurostat quotations include the 5
Uinder of the fonner Ea.st Gennany.
18 That is, the ability of ol.her feeds 10 replace cereals exactly in terms of its contribution of energy
and protein 10 the feed.
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Annex D products are as follows!";
manioc (cassava)
maize and rice brans: max 35% starch
wheat brans: max 28% starch
maize gluten feed
brewers and distillers grains
maize germ cake: 3-8% fat
citrus pulp
sweet potatoes
maize and rice brans: over 35% starch
wheat brans: over 28% starch
sugar beet pulp
maize germ cake: less than 3% fat
grape marc
other fruit waste
In addition to these. which are classified as 'energy-rich', there are molasses and
compound feedingstuffs (as an imported product), which are also classified in this
way20.
There are also products classified as 'protein-rich'. These are specified as soya
beans. soya cake. other seeds. other cake (except maize germ cake). meat and fish
meal. and 'other', given as "oilseed meals, lucerne, lupins, fodder beet, hay, etc".
The Problem This Causes
The main reason why these products have been substituted for cereals over time is
the price at which the inputs can be bought by feed manufacturers. Cereals have been
supported under the CAP at a price above the world price, whereas domestically
produced NGF's such as oilseeds (from which meal is made) trade internally at a price
around the world level, and imported NGF's are allowed into the EC at low or zero
rates of tariff (see Chapter 4 for more details). Thus the relative prices of cereals and
NGF's may well be influential in determining the level of cereals demanded for animal
feed.
Discussion of the Data Series
First, the AF series represents the quantity of cereals going into animal feed each
year in the EC. It would appear that the data from Agra Europe include eastern
Germany for 1990fl and 1991/2, and no source separates their data OUl from the rest of
the EC 12. An estimate of east German cereals use in animal feed has therefore made in
the following way in order to gel a set of data that totally excludes eastern German
consumption. Firstly, using data from a personal communication with the FAO, the CE
total animal numbers were established for 1990 and 1991 for eastern and western
19as amended in Annex III of Reg (EEC) 3989/87. OJL377. 31.12.87. PI3-14.
20 see 1988 ASIC page T245.
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Germany. Over the two years. the average figure for the west was found to be about
94.67% of the total 'German' CE figure. Making the assumption that eastern and
western German farmers use the same quantity of cereals in feed to their animals, the
data for total German cereals consumption in animal feed were taken from Agra Europe
No.1463 (25.10.91). 5.33% of this was calculated (1.012 million tonnes for each of
the two years). and subtracted from the total AF figure to give a quantity for the EC12
excluding eastern Germany.
The results of the ADF regression on the AF data reported below clearly indicate a
trend stationary process.
The background to the CE series is given above. In essence, it is concerned with
converting all animal numbers in the EC into a single series, on the basis of the
estimated relative cereals requirements for the provision of energy in their total feed
intake. As with the AF series. the ADF regression result below for CE also clearly
indicates trend stationarity.
The price ratio consists of the nominal cereals price. discussed at length elsewhere
in this thesis. and the nominal price of a 'cereals substitute'. From other work21 it
would appear that the closest substitute to cereals in terms of energy and protein
provision in animal feed is a combination of manioc and soya bean meal (weighted 80%
manioc to 20% SBM)22 This data set is from the FAO and is calculated principally
from monthly figures for crop years matching those for cereals. In the EC. this was
August to July up to 198516. and from 198617. was July to June. This means that the
crop year 1985/6 was only 11 months long (ie from August 1985 to June 1986). For
some early years, the FAO only had annual price data. and so the crop year figures
were based on 5112 of the calendar year figure for the first year, and 7112 of the
following calendar year's figure. 2~
The manioc price is for pellets. cif Rotterdam; and the SBM price is for US 44% cif
Rotterdam up to and including 1989/90, and Argentine 45146% cif Rotterdam for the
last two years (for which period this quotation has replaced the US quotation in the
FAO publications). Note that for both series, the 1991/2 figure is actually the average
of July to Scptemhcr 1991 as those were the only figures released.
21 Hulbcrg. A. M. (1986).
22 This ratio to provide the best substitute for cereals has been in my mind for some time now.
Unfortunatcly. I can't for the life of me remember where I got it from. and I have been unable to track
it down in all my notes.
23 So for example, the price for the crop year 1973/4 consisted of 5/12 of the 1973 calendar year
figure. and 7/12 of the 1974 calendar year figure.
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The FAO quotes both series in terms of US dollars. The ECU exchange rate has
been calculated from monthly data from Eurostat on the same crop year basis as the
price figures. From 1973/4 to 1980/1. this meant deriving the figure from annual data.
For the 1991192 figure. only July 1991 to March 1992 data were available.
The regression results below indicate that the nominal price ratio series is
stationary.
Data Analysis
As before. prior to any regression analysis of the quantity of cereals going to animal
feed. stationarity tests need to he run on the data to be used. Below are reported the
Dickey-Fuller. Augmented Dickey Fuller. and '6.7' specifications for, respectively, the
quantity of cereals going for use in animal feed (AF). the cattle equivalent series of
livestock numbers (CE). and the ratio of cereals to cereals substitute price (PCPS). The
data series themselves are discussed further after the stationarity test results.
variable
constant
t-statistic
trend
InAFI_1
L1lnAFt_1
Rsq
Rbsq
DW
variable
constant
t-statistic
trend
InCEt_1
DF 6.7
InAF ~lnAF
4.535 4.535
(2.936) (-4.984)
-0.003 -0.003
(-1.433) (-1.433)
0.603 -0.397
(4.473) (-2.590)
ADF
~lnAF
7.059
(5.892)
-0.004
(-5.177)
-().617
(-5.880)
0.585
(5.288)
0.470
0.348
2.097
0.742 0.201
0.707 0.095
1.253 1.253
DF 6.7
InCE L\lnCE
5.799 5.799
(:4.961) <3.961 )
0.005 0.005
(2.648) (2.648)
0.557 -0.443
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ADF
~lnCE
11.265
(4.657)
0.010
(4.080)
-0.863
(4.953) (-3.947) (-4.648)
~lnCEt_1 0.788
(5.790)
Rsq 0.947 0.208 0.662
Rbsq 0.940 0_102 0.584
OW 1.178 1.l78 2.168
DF 'n.7' ADF
variable InPCPS ~lnPCPS ~lnPCPS
constant 0.122 0.122 0.154
t-statistic (2.583) (2.583) (2.601)
trend -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(-1.273) (-1.273) (-1.572)
InPCPSt_1 0.252 -0.748 -0.869
(2.565) (-7.599) (-4.397)
~lnPCPSt_1 -0.075
(-0.502)
Rsq 0.157 0.597 0.515
Rbsq 0.044 0.543 0.403
OW 2.370 2.370 2.166
In addition. each of the nominal price series were examined separately for
stationarity. Reported below are the Dickey-Fuller's for both series. The Augmented
Dickey Fuller's were not needed as the regression Durbin- Watsons below indicate no
serial autocorrelation.
InPn cer = 0.738 - 0.005t +O.8681nPn cert_1
(2.6) (-2.155) (13.694) 0.946 0.939 2.052
InPn cersuh = 2.403 + O.OlOt + 0.4921nPn cersubj]
(4.889) (2.009) (4.507) 0.566 0.512 1.872
Both confirm stationarity.
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7.4: THE MODELLING OF llJE DEMAND FOR CEREALS FOR ANIMAL FEED
This analysis follows the approach taken earlier, where the total demand for feed is
considered, followed by an examination of the substitution of non-cereal feed inputs for
cereals.
The following graph presents a feed use index and the cattle equivalent animal
number series:
Feed Use Index and CE Series Q
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where the index (l973/4=I (K» has been calculated in the following way:
AF QSt
Indext = IOO«Wct_1 ... AFt) + (Wst_1 ... QS »
I I
where
PCt ...AFt
We =-~--
I R
I
PSt'" QS,
Ws =--::--
I R
t
where
R := Pc ...AF + Ps ...Qs
I tit I
AF I is AF in the base year 1973/4, and QS I is the QS figure in the base year
1973/4.
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From this. the following regression was obtained:
Index = (U)0022CE + O.944t
(73.477) (5.348) 0.932 0.928 1.181
The following graphs show the balance of cereals and non cereal feed inputs in total
animal feed. and also the weights given to the cereals content of animal feed (AF) and
the non cereals content (QS):
Cereals Use in Animal Feed and Non Cereals Use in Compound Feed
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From this base. the following model was run. which took the ratio of the quantity
of cereals used in animal feed (AF) to the quantity of non cereals used in compound
feed (QS).24 The number of animals in the EC could be expected to influence this. as
well as the roltioof cereals to cereals substitute prices. For the period 1973/4 to 199112.
24 This being me only variable for which dara was available.
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the following result was obtained:
AF/QS = 6.369 - 0.<103t- 0.OOOOO7CE- O.S78PR
(4.372) (-1.595) (-2.516) (-2.988) 0.943 0.931 1.365
where t is a time trend, CE is the cattle equivalent series and PR is the ratio of
nominal cereals to cereals substitute prices. This set of price data is presented in the
following graph:
Nominal Cereals and Cereals Substitute Prices
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Thus a model has been formulated that relates the quantity of cereals used in animal
feed to the price of cereals, the price of cereals substitutes, and also the number of
animals in the EC.
7.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined all the different factors that go to make up the
consumption of cereals. Four of those factors, seed, losses, human consumption and
industrial use are relatively easily dealt with. The first two, seed and losses, together
represent less than 10% of total cereals use each year. Each of the other two are
modelled using very simple approaches in each case. The most complex element, and
also the most important in terms of cereal usage, is animal feed. Different animals have
different energy/protein requirements. and also generally require different amounts of
cereals and feed generally. This was dealt with by the construction of a series that
expressed the requirements for different animals relative to that of cattle, and in relation
to energy requirements (cereals providing more energy than protein). From this, the
demand for feed has been estimated in terms of the ratio of AF to the quantity of non-
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cereals inputs in compound feed, to reflect the changes in the use of cereals in total
animal feed over lime. This has been related to three key variables - the price of cereals,
the price of cereals substitutes and the number of animals.
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CHAPTER 8: SIMULATING POLICY CHANGE
IN THE CEREALS MARKET
"Pon my u/ord, Watson, you art coming along wonderfu[[y. 9"ou liave
really done very we([ irufutl. It is mu tliat you haue missed everytfiing
of importance, hut you liave fiit upon tfu method.'
Sir .!!frtfa.urConan 'lJoyk, _q Case of Identity.
'Life can only be ruukrstootf hack:!vards,
hut it must he {ived forwards.' Sorer: 'l(ierf(f.gaard
8.1: INTRODUCI10N
Appendix 3 of Chapter 2, and the first section of Chapter 3, detailed reforms to the
CAP in general, and the cereals regime in particular, prior to the 1992 MacSharry
package. In comparing the new system of support with the previous approach, it must
be noted that the 1992 reforms (operative from 1993/4) were the first to bring about a
fundamental change in the nature of support in the EC. The change, from price support
to a system based principally on direct government payments, will have very important
implications for the EC budget. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore these
changes, and the impact they will have on the EC budget.
The previous two chapters introduced the analysis of cereals production and
consumption, upon which much of the work in this chapter is based. In addition,
sections of earlier chapters will be returned to, in order to build up a complete picture of
the cereals market and the budgetary expenditures incurred in its operation. Each
variable will be considered in tum, as was the approach in earlier chapters, before the
different parts are drawn together to give a picture of the whole market.
As has been highlighted already with certain data series, the period under
consideration is a very short one, starting in 1973. During that time moreover, there
have been three enlargements of the EC (1973, 1981 and 1986), two oil price shocks
(1973/4 and 1979/80), two commodity price booms (1973/4 and 1980/81), a series of
major budgetary crises for the EC (most of the 1980's), and a serious drought in the
US (1988). All these factors act against there being any long run relationships being
established between data series. The focus has therefore been primarily on short term
relationships. At times, as will be seen, this has necessitated the use of judgement in
forecasting the future value of certain variables as much if not more than econometrics.
This applies most significantly to the assumptions used in evaluating the impact of the
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abandonment of stabilisers, and the adoption instead of the 'MacSharry' reforms. It
must always he remembered that this analysis is essentially short term. If a long term
analysis were to be carried out. it is likely that very different assumptions would have
to he made. and possibly a rather different approach to modelling employed.
The approach taken in this chapter is to compare the impact of the MacSharry
reforms with two 'base' models. The first assumes that stabilisers continue to be
applied strictly over the forecast period to 1999. The second assumes that prices are
held at 1992 levels for the forecast period: Whilst unsustainable. this shows the
consequence of an unreformed policy.
8.2: CEREALS YIELDS
8,2.1: Introduction
From the work in Chapter 6. the model for cereals yield that has been chosen is:
InY = 1.132 + 0.026t + 1.8051n(Prc/Prf)reSt_l + 0.131D84
(95.748) (16,671) (3.007) (10.813)
0.956 0.946 1.769
In specifying a model with lagged prices. it is worth reiterating that the price data
set is of annual. calendar year data. It therefore relates to the January-December period.
with the yield figure taken at July (or thereabouts) during that particular year, Thus if
the price variable is not lagged. the model relates yield to some prices the fanner won't
receive for up to another 6 months or so. Moreover. the yield in time t is in part
determined by fertiliser applications in time t-l which (J priori will be affected by
fertiliser prices in time t-I, and the relationship of that price to the price of cereals in t- I.
A priori. it would he expected that a higher cereals price relative to fertiliser price (ie
higher income to expenditure) would encourage farmers. at the margin. to use more
fertiliser and hence increase yields. I
The OW is inconclusive at the 5% level. but indicates no autocorrelation at the 1%
level.
1 The ratio of REAL prices was used rather than nominal prices as it was felt more appropriate,
given Ihe role of oil prices in fertiliser production.
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8.2.2: Forecastin~ Cereals and Fertiliser Prices
In forecasting future values for cereals yield, the key variables that need to be
considered as inputs into the yield equation are the prices that go into the price ratio
variable. In the ratio, both are specified in real terms.
Real Cereals Price
The movement in nominal cereals support prices in recent years have been
dominated by the operation of the stabiliser mechanism. Under this, every time the
MGQ has been exceeded, support prices have been cut by 3% cumulatively. Moreover,
the intervention price has been undermined throughout the 1980's and early 1990's by
a number of measures. The principal one is that buying-in now takes place at the
buying-in price, set below the intervention price. There are however a number of other
factors that have acted to reduce the effective returns to producers from selling into
intervention. These include delaying payments to farmers when they sell into
intervention, tightening quality requirements before intervention purchase will occur, as
well as MCA manipulations in some member states. The HGCA2 estimate that these
together are equivalent to significant real cuts in the intervention price. They estimate,
for example, that in real terms, the effective barley intervention price in the UK fell by
38% between January 1984 and January 1989.
In considering the movements of the cereals price variable therefore, it is important
to bear these points in mind, given that the data set is defined as the 'selling price' of
cereals, rather than any institutional price, per se. If the intervention prices of wheat
and barley, and the nominal cereals price series are examined, it can be seen that since
all the measures noted above have been implemented, the nominal selling price of
'cereals', generally below the common wheat intervention price, has also now fallen
below the barley intervention price. Estimating a 'cereals' intervention price on the
same basis as the nominal selling price3 indicates that since 1984, the selling price of
cereals has averaged 89% of the 'cereals' intervention price:
2 see HGCA Weekly Digest 15130 of 30.1.1989.
3 Using the weightings 1.5 wheat to I barley.
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The following data set is for the nominal cereals price. The data sets for the
intervention prices can be found in the data appendix on page app.ll.
year Pn cer
1973 96.90
1974 112.87
1975 114.09
1976 133.30
1977 137.98
1978 141.40
1979 150.24
1980 158.50
1981 172.61
1982 184.69
1983 192.16
1984 183.75
1985 174.16
1986 170.27
1987 163.00
1988 155.28
1989 155.23
1990 149.91
1991 154.96
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1992
It can be seen that whereas the intervention prices have continued to fall, given the
practice in recent years of not changing the 'basic' intervention price, but operating
price cuts under the stabiliser system on top of this, the selling price of cereals has
started to flatten out somewhat.
Given that the prices in the regression are stated in real terms, the rate of inflation
needs consideration also. It is becoming clear that, even with German unification, and
the economic difficulties they face, the key EC economies appear to be keeping the
'fight against inflation' at the forefront of the political and economic agenda, even at the
expense of economic growth+, Thus it seems reasonable to assume a continued
decline in the Ee's rate of inflation. It is beyond the scope of the current work to model
future EC inflation rates, and thus the impact on nominal cereals prices, so assumptions
must be made in the light of the above observations.
Under the stabiliser mechanism, nominal price cuts of 3% are imposed every time
the MGQ is exceeded. Given German unification with no increase in the MGQ, it is as
certain as anything can be that the MGQ would have been exceeded every year. Thus
the decline in nominal support prices would have continued (in the short run at least).
Selling prices too would almost certainly follow these prices downwards, although in
local markets in short term periods, prices could always rise. On the whole however,
one would expect the price decline to have continued.
Given this, it is perhaps inappropriate to simply look at the future movements of
institutional prices and inflation rates in seeing what will happen to selling prices of
crop products, but one would expect a price decline of about 5-7% per year. If the
actual decline in the real cereals price over recent years is considered, it can be seen that
over the 6 year period 1986 to 1991, the decline averaged 5.5% per annum. Thus as a
base figure, this rate of decline in the real price would appear to be not out of line with
a priori reasoning based on the above evidence.
Real Fertiliser Price
Initially, a formal modelling procedure was adopted for this variable. Augmented
Dickey Fuller regressions showed that both the real fertiliser price and the real oil price
(used as an input in fertilisers) were both difference stationary. The following
regression was then run:
4 Though at the time of writing. the future of the ERM is in question. If this breaks up, the ability
of some governments to comrol inflation as effcctively as in the recent past could be undermined.
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~lnPtf = -0.028 + 0.135~lnPr oil
(-1.910) (2.622) 0.316 0.274 2.295
There have however been so many political influences on fertiliser selling prices
that it was felt pointless trying to model those prices using economic variables. As with
the cereals price series therefore, judgment was reverted to.
Turning first to the oil price, it would seem likely that prices won't rise much, if at
all, in real terms, in the short to medium term, The following quote from a senior Shell
manager sums up the likely future price movements:
"Taken together [OPEC and non-OPEC], surplus capacity means
that price levels can only be maintained at present levels by a sustained
effort of production restraint on the part, mainly, of major Gulf
producers. In the past, they have never found this easy and there is no
reason why, with the additional pressures of paying for the ravages of
the Gulf war, they should find it any easier now. I repeat, I can see
little logic in expecting higher prices and many reasons for testing new
investments against lower ones. ,,5
Other than for unforeseen circumstances causing another oil price hike, it would
therefore appear unlikely that oil price movements would lead to higher fertiliser prices.
The comment highlighted in the above quote suggests rather that prices will fall
slightly. This suggests that the real fertiliser price is likely to be fairly stable over the
next few years, though possibly with a slight decline. The market currently is very
depressed, with cheap imports entering the EC despite the anti-dumping legislation
currently being operated. Moreover, there is still a significant degree of excess capacity
amongst fertiliser producers.
On the basis of the features of the price series outlined above, the decision has been
taken to assume that the real fertiliser price will decline by 2% per annum over the
forecast period. This decline is assumed to remain unchanged under MacSharry.v
Note that under the second base scenario, the fertiliser price remains unchanged at 1992
5 Jennings, J. J. (1991), Page2. Shell. London, this author's emphasis.
6 It could be argued that the switch to area-based payments could encourage more environmentally
friendly farming with fanners using fewer inputs, with less support based on the volume of output.
This could result in a different rate of change in the fertiliser price.
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levels."
The assumptions made about the cereals price are also based largely on the
comments set out above. The first scenario - the continuation of the stabiliser
mechanism - assumes a price cut of 5.5% per annum, for the reason given above. The
second scenario has the real cereals price unchanged from 1992 to 1999.8
The third scenario is a little more complex. The movements in institutional prices
under MacSharry are specified in current nominal terms. This has been translated to the
deflated price series used in the yield model by reference to the percentage change year
by year. The price cut for 1992/3 to 1993/4 has been taken as the percentage difference
between the 1992/3 soft wheat intervention price'' and the 1993/4 intervention price
as specified in the reform package. This implicitly also makes the assumption that there
is a fixed differential between the 'selling price of crop products' and the intervention
price. Note also that it has been assumed that once the (nominal) intervention price level
of 100 ECU per tonne is reached, no further price cuts are imposed for the rest of the
forecast period to 1999. It is also assumed, perhaps more controversially, that the
compensatory payments made to producers under the reforms are production-neutral
and therefore yield-neutral. They are therefore excluded from this calculation.
From these calculations of cereals and fertiliser prices, it is then possible to obtain
the price ratio. Finally to move to the residuals of price ratio, as specified in the yield
regression, the difference between the trend value for the price ratio (that is, the trend
through the data for the period 1973 to 1991, extrapolated to 1999) and the value of the
price ratio as estimated under each of the three scenarios, is taken.
8.2.3: Forecasts of Cereals Yields
From this, the three estimates of cereals yield under the three scenarios can be
made. The figures are presented overpage, after the historical series for yields from
1973 to 1991:
year cereals yield
1973 3.31
1974 3.4
1975 3.19
1976 2.98
7 That is. the 1991 price less 2%.
8 That is for 1992. the 1991 price less 5.5%.
9 as quoted in CAP Monitor.
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1977 3.4
1978 3.71
1979 3.62
1980 3.91
1981 3.68
1982 3.97
1983 3.83
1984 4.77
1985 4.49
1986 4.34
1987 4.41
1988 4.44
1989 4.64
1990 4.71
1991 4.96
base 1 base 2 MacSharry
1992 5.21 5.21 5.21
1993 5.27 5.27 5.27
1994 5.34 5.43 4.64
1995 5.41 5.59 4.59
1996 5.47 5.76 4.55
1997 5.54 5.93 4.72
1998 5.61 6.11 4.89
1999 5.67 6.29 5.08
These are based on the following price ratios:
base 1 base 2 MacSharry
1992 0.92 0.92 0.92
1993 0.91 0.92 0.83
1994 0.90 0.92 0.81
1995 0.89 0.92 0.79
1996 0.88 0.92 0.79
1997 0.87 0.92 0.80
1998 0.86 0.92 0.80
1999 0.85 0.92 0.80
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The first aspect to note concerning the yield forecasts is the extent to which price
cuts reduce cereals yields given the model specification of the model. Much thinking in
the past has suggested that price cuts will not affect yields and production significantly.
If however the model is correct in assuming the structure of yields as modelled up to
1991 still holds after the change in policy. then significant red uctions in yields can be
realised. at least in the short term. The key point here however is that the price cut from
199213 to 1993/4. of between 28 and 29% (31% in real terms)lO. is far greater than
has ever been implemented under any policy operated before by the EC in the cereals
sector. The low point of 1996 though STILL only cuts yields back to just below their
1989 level. After that. they soon rise rapidly again.
8.1; CEREALS AREA
83.1; Forccastin~ Net Arable Area
As was detailed in Sections 6.4 to 6.6. the approach taken in modelling cereals area
has been an indirect one. It arrived at a model for cereals area as a percentage of net
arable area (NAA). having first represented NAA itself.
Three different representations were given for NAA. reproduced below:
NAA = 37207 + 156.22t - 1348.7D77 - 782.02D90
(164.42) (8.475) (-9.636) (-6.013)
Rsq=0.924 Rhsq=0.908 DW=1.702
InNAA = 10.544 + 0.005t + O.099L\lnPc/Pat_l 0.950 0.940 P = -0.724
(6358.5) (20JHO) (3.894) t-statistic (-3.785)
InNAA = 10.544 + 0.005t + 0.081L\lnPC/Pmt_l 0.908 0.889 P = -0.625
(4000.6) (10.708) ( 1.6(3) (-2.888)
where the latter two used a maximum likelihood procedure to correct for
autocorrelation. The first model is over the full data period from 1973. whereas the
second two. for the reasons outlined in Chapter 6, are over a shorter period. from
10 The 1993 price cui is taken as 28.44% in nominal terms, 31% in real terms: for 1994. it is
7.69%/10.2%. and for 1995. 7.41%/9.9%. This assumes 2.5% price inflation. derived from the point
above that the average price cut in real terms recenLly has been 5.5%. This has been assumed to consist
of 3% stabiliser cut. and 2.5% inflation effect.
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1979. The first model is self explanatory, with a trend variable and dummies on the two
outlying observations. The second and third have as an added variable the ratio of price
indexes to try and account for land given to arable crops rather than alternative
enterprises. The reasons for just using a cereals index, rather than an index relating to
the crops include in NAA was given in Chapter 6. With the third regression, correcting
for autocorrelation resulted in the price ratio variable becoming insignificant. This is not
surprising, given that milk production has been governed by quotas since 1984. It
therefore seems most appropriate to examine the second regression, with the price ratio
cereals to animals for slaughter and export index. II
The graphs below illustrate both the individual series (in absolute terms), and also
the ratio of cereals to animals for slaughter and export price indexes. They clearly show
that the two series have moved very closely together over the years, with the only
divergence coming in the last two years.
Cereals and Animals Price Indexes
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11 Strictly speaking, cointegration theory shows that TS and DS variables are generated under
different systems. There can thus be no long term relationship between them, and they ought not to be
included in the same regression. The key problem with this regarding the current model is that there is
only a very limited data set. Moreover, as has been discussed elsewhere, it is highly unlikely that long
run relationships will be determined in many of the regressions discussed in this thesis. given the
number of factors that could generate 'structural breaks'. Thus a priori reasoning was given a higher
priority in this model than econometric theory.
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Cereals to Animals: Ratio of Price Indexes
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The average value of the ratio over the period of the regression (the last 13
observations). is 0.981 (including those two divergent observations). Data discovered
very late on indicate that for 1991. the ratio returns to its previous level (the 1991 ratio
figure is actually 0.978). Excluding the observations for 1989 and 1990, the average
value of the ratio over the 14 year period to 1991 is 0.994. The closeness of the ratio to
I can be seen on the second of the two graphs above. especially in the more recent
years covered by the model above.
In considering the above model it therefore appears quite reasonable. in taking the
value of the price ratio over the last few years as I. to say that the log of the ratio is
zero. with the expected value of the 1st difference of the ratio also being zero. Whilst
this notionally therefore reduces the model to the specification of the first one presented
above. it is a trend-based model where the trend coefficient is estimated in the presence
of the price ratio. It also means that there is no difference between the base 1 and base 2
estimates of NAA. as prices are excluded from their estimation.
In correcting for autocorrelation with maximum likelihood, the following procedure
can be used. where Y is cereals area. X is the time trend. and p is taken from the
regression output given above:
let
Y I = a + hXI + ul
where
ul = pUt-l + El
therefore
YI = a + bXI + p(YI-J - a - bXt_J) + El
or
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In forecasting therefore
~+ 1 = a + bX:,+ 1 + U1+ 1
where
UI+ 1 = P ('( - a - bX,)
That applies to BOlli base models. What has to be decided next is how the price
ratio is likely to change under MacSharry. Considering the cereals index first, it will be
assumed that the cuts in support prices under MacSharry will be fully reflected in
changes in the price index for cereals. The nominal cuts will therefore be 3% in
199212,28.44% in 1993,7.69% in 1994 and 7.41% in 1995. With the animal series,
It will be assumed that the series falls at half the rate of the cereals series. For beef,
intervention prices are being cut, but headage premia are being increased. It is therefore
assumed that these two offset each other to result in an approximately neutral policy.
This applies to sheep as well. With pigs and poultry however, it is assumed that the fall
in the price of cereals will be fully reflected in a fall in the price index for these animals
and their products. To arrive at a fall in the index of half the rate of the fall in the cereals
index, it must also be assumed that these two groups of animals make up equal weights
in the index. From this, an estimate of NAA from the second regression above can be
made.
8.3.2: Cereals Area as a Percentage of NAA
In Section 6.6, two alternative ways of estimating cereals area as a percentage of
NAA were given. These are reproduced below:
IncerA%NAA = 4.588 - 0.011t + 0.0471nRRres t-t
(882.72) (-16.935) (2.164)
0.981 0.977 P = 0.393
(1.542)
IncerA%NAA = 4.586 - O.01It + 0.31 81n(Pc!Po)res t-l 0.982 0.979 P = 0.304
(980.36) (-18.007) (2.429) (1.149)
The key feature from these is that the t-statistic on the ratio of returns variable is
insignificant.13 Thus the model from which cereals area as a percentage of NAA will
12 The regressions were run with data up to 1990. The 1991 index figures arrived in the library soon
enough for this calculation to be carried out, butlOO late to incorporate in a full re-run of the model.
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be estimated is the latter, involving the price ratio (specified as residuals around trend).
As with the yield work for base 1 above, it is assumed that real cereals prices fall at
5.5% per year to 1999. For base 2, the real cereals and rape prices are held at 1992
levels (the cereals 1991 price is cut by 5.5% and the rape price set as 2.1 times that, in
accordance with the 1991 oilseeds reform package - see Chapter 4). Note that this last
point can be justified even in non MacSharry case, as the oilseeds reforms establishing
this price relationship were agreed in 1991, independently of the 1992 MacSharry
reforms. As has already been demonstrated, these latter reforms actually changed this
established price relationship. Note that with base I, there are a whole host of possible
scenarios that could be considered. One could assume that the cobweb will continue. If
so, assumptions would have to be made as to the extent of the overshoot one year, the
impact of this on prices, the effect of this on the following year's area, and so on. For
this reason more than any other, a very simple (too simple?) approach is being taken in
looking at future rape prices.
For MacSharry, the real price cuts will be as for the yield prediction
(28.44%+2.5% for 1993), then (7.69%+2.5% for 1994), then (7.41 %+2.5% for
1995), ie cuts of 31%, 10.2% and 9.9%. The real oilseed rape price will then be based
on these cereals prices. The 1992 price ratio is set to be 2.1: 1. After that, Section 4.6.3
demonstrated that from 1993/4, this is set to fall to approximately 2.03:l. Thus these
figures will be used in determining the real rape price - as a percentage of the real
cereals price.14
These estimates then give the following figures for NAA, the percentage of NAA
planted to cereals and finally, the estimates for cereals area under the different
scenarios. Set aside is not included here - it receives a separate analysis later. This
allows for an assessment of MacSharry with and without the compulsory set-aside
obligation.
NAA{f is derived from the estimate of NAA from the first NAA regression above,
against time, with dummy variables on the outliers. The second pair of area estimates
'NAA[f ML' are based on the second NAA regression above, incorporating the price
ratio, and corrected for autocorrelation using maximum likelihood.
13Critical value=2.228.
14 This assumes that the cost inflation faced by producers of both crops is the same. This seems quite
reasonable. a priori.
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year NAA
base 1
T T/ML
1992 40331.40 40654.94 NA
1993 40487.62 40938.00 NA
1994 40643.84 41085.51 NA
1995 40800.06 41333.42
1996 40956.28 41510.06
1997 41112.50 41740.35
1998 41268.72 41933.41
1999 41424.94 42155.36
Cereals Area Estimates
NAA/f
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
MacSharry
34967.57
34129.22
33508.25
34453.12
33481.01
34140.75
33394.63
33663.09
base 1
34289.00
33938.85
33754.47
33544.19
33326.29
33106.29
32885.84
32665.44
base 2 MacSharry
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
41129.55
40489.25
40153.13
41734.77
40945.92
42155.93
41633.71
42374.85
cerA%NAA
base 1 base 2 MacSharry
85.02 85.02 85.02
83.83 84.51 84.29
83.05 83.79 83.45
82.22 83.01 82.55
81.37 82.23 81.77
80.53 81.44 80.99
79.69 80.66 80.21
78.85 79.89 79.44
NAA/fML
base 1
34564.07
34316.38
34121.27
33982.70
33776.90
33611.87
33415.51
33241.41
base 2
34564.07
34596.02
34425.48
34312.42
34131.92
33993.04
33822.92
33675.82
base 2
34289.00
34215.41
34055.41
33869.66
33676.57
33481.72
33286.79
33092.32
8.4: CEREALS PRODUCTION
The estimates made are for MacSharry, and two for each base model, one with
NAA estimated by the trend model, one with the corrected trend and price model.
Remember that these are estimates based on no set aside.
year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
MacSharry
182030.18
179945.47
155602.64
158234.49
152247.87
161038.62
base 1:T
178497.74
180399.94
181829.90
183097.07
184295.83
185454.40
base 1:TML base 2: T base 2: TML
179929.67 178497.74 179929.67
182406.69 178941.78 180932.31
183805.80
185490.61
186787.74
188286.59
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183290.14 185281.90
187593.76 190046.09
191946.99 194542.35
196380.35 199379.40
1998
1999
163406.49 186580.65 189585.77
170889.12 187676.23 190985.43
200904.53 204140.36
205524.00 209147.90
When set-aside is incorporated into the model later, it will need to be remembered
that in a recent Agra Europe article, it was felt that the changes to the price relative
(discussed above) will result in farmers concentrating most of their set aside
requirement into non cereals arable crops. If this is so, it will also have to be decided
how much of their set aside requirement will be put against cereals.
8.5: CEREALS CONSUMPTION
8.5.1: Losses
An examination of the graph presented in Chapter 7 shows that from 1973/4 to
197617, there is a fairly low and fairly stable rate of loss of cereals. There is then a
sharp increase with greater fluctuations. Since 1984/5, the figure has been much more
stable, with the exception of 1989/90. In Chapter 7, it was suggested that a constant
rate of losses could reasonably be assumed. The average for the full data period is
2.047mt. For the last 8 years, when the data set has been much more stable again, the
average is 1.914mt; and for that period, but excluding 89/90, the average is 1.977mt.
Given the small amount of total cereals consumption represented by losses, and the
points made above, it seems reasonable to take that last figure above of 1.977 million
tonnes as the quantity for losses over the next few years.
8.5.2: Seed
At first sight, the data shown in the graph in Chapter 7 seem to suggest an upward
trend. Note however that the last two figures include eastern Germany. Moreover, the
regression from Chapter 7 confirms that those two observations are outliers. That
regression shows that when those observations. and also the figure for 197617, arc
excluded with DV's, the trend coefficient is insignificant. Thus it again appears
reasonable to tak.e a single figure for cereals use for seeds for each year in the
forecasting period. The regression in Chapter 7 has an intercept of about 5.52 million
tonnes. The average quantity of cereals going for seed over the full data period is 5.609
million tonnes. Excluding the observations that include eastern Germany, this falls to
5.56 million tonnes. Excluding 197617 as well gives a figure of 5.586 million tonnes.
A figure that seems reasonably consistent with these is 5.59 million tonnes. It is close
to the last figure, based on the data excluding the outlying observations, and the
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rounding-up can he justified by noting that as the HGCA pointed out (see footnote in
Chapter 7) the use of cereals for seed may go up a bit with the banning of the use of
organo-mercury treatments.
8.5.1: Human Consumption
Unlike the first two end-uses of cereals, the figure for human consumption of
cereals should be estimated rather more formally. This was done using the regression
model reported in Chapter 7. where the quantity of cereals consumed by humans is
regressed against the log of time. Overall, the quantity appears to be rising, but at a
progressively slower rate. as would be expected, a priori. This formulation captures
that. Note that with no quantity reported for 1973/4, in that regression, n= 18 and
observation number I is the 1974/5 figure.
8.5.4: Industrial Use
The regression reported in Chapter 7 suggested that industrial use of cereals is
growing at about 1.035% pa. This figure shall be used here. The graph in Chapter 7
generally suggests a steady growth in recent years. With moves to continue subsidies
for starch production, and also recent moves to encourage the use of set aside land for
non-food uses. it seems likely that this upward trend will continue. That having been
said. it appears likely that such moves won't substantially increase the quantity of
cereals used by industry. Therefore. such a figure, that allows for a constant percentage
increase, and a small absolute increase each year, seems appropriate.
8.5.5: Animal Feed
From the models of animal feed in Section 7.4. the forecasting equation for the
quantity of cereals used for animal feed is:
where
i can be estimated from the regression in Chapter 7:
Index = 0.00022CE + 0.9441
(73.477) (5.348) 0.932 0.928 1.181
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During the period 1985 to 1987. the CE numbers rose sharply owing to increases in
the numbers of pigs. poultry and sheep and goats. Since then. they have been very
stable. as the graph in Chapter 7 illustrates. For forecasting purposes, a constant CE
figure is to be assumed. The average of those last seven observations for CE is
564.910 million head of animals. cattle equivalent. From this, future values of the
index can be derived.
The following regression then allows estimation of the ratio of AF/QS:
AF/QS = 6.369 - 0.003t - 0.OOOOO7CE- 0.578PR
(4.372) (-1.595) (-2.516) (-2.988) 0.943 0.931 1.365
This requires the future values of nominal cereals and cereals substitutes prices PR
to be examined. The forecasting of cereals prices will follow the approach taken earlier
in this chapter. With the price of cereals substitutes, the graph in Chapter 7 shows that
whilst they have fluctuated year by year, for a number of years now the general path
has been fairly flat. Therefore a constant figure will be taken. The average of the last 12
observations, which include a peak at the time of the 198011 price boom, is 153.22
ECU per tonne. For the last 8 years, the average has been 149.48 ECU per tonne. A
figure of 150 ECU per tonne will therefore be taken for forecasting purposes.
In the forecasting equation therefore, this leaves the lagged weights to be derived.
These are calculated using the equations given in Chapter 7. Note that in each case, QS
is derived from the equation above, from AF/QS (ie r-hat) from the regression, and AFt
as estimated using the lagged weights.
The table below shows the weight of cereals in the index of total animal feed. and
below that are the estimates for cereals use in animal feed under the different scenarios:
base 1 base 2 MacSharry
199213 0.55 0.55 0.55
1993/4 0.54 0.55 0.50
1994/5 0.53 0.54 0.48
199516 0.52 0.53 0.46
199617 0.51 0.53 0.45
1997/8 0.50 0.52 0.45
1998/9 0.49 U.51 0.44
1999/20 0.48 0.51 0.43
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base 1 base 2 MacSharry
199213 83581. 73 83581.73 83581.73
1993/4 84619.94 83868.96 90677.42
1994/5 84043.31 82765.86 88372.00
1995/6 83412.22 81594.60 87931.87
199617 82726.74 80354.28 86259.06
1997/8 81987.06 79044.14 85231.11
1998/9 81193.53 77663.58 84148.37
1999/20 80346.60 76212.17 83010.42
From this. the following estimates of total internal use can be derived:
TIU basel TIU base2 TIUMacS
1992/3 140603.56 140603.56 140603.56
1993/4 141851.68 141100.70 147909.16
1994/5 141482.37 140204.93 145811.06
199516 141056.42 139238.79 145576.06
199617 140574.20 13820l.73 144106.52
1997/8 140036.20 137093.28 143280.25
1998/9 139443.02 135913.08 142397.86
1999/20 138795.36 134660.92 141459.17
It can be seen from the MacSharry estimates that the decline in cereals prices is
insufficient to reverse the decline in the use of cereals in animal feed (dominant in the
movement of TIU), although it does slow down that decline. The one year where
cereals consumption does rise is from 1992/3 to 1993/4. when there is a very large
price cut. The main factor that would most likely turn around the general decline would
be a rebalancing in animal production away from those animals for whom concentrate
feed plays the most important part. This thesis has not focussed on the reforms of the
livestock regimes, and the full impact of the cereals reforms on those regimes, but it is
possible that the cereals reforms, plus the reforms aimed at extensifying animal
production, could help in the restoration of previous levels of cereals consumption.
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8.6: Cereals Trade
8.6. I: Cereals Imports
Rather than model cereals imports, a simplifying assumption will be made that these
imports will stabilise at about the current level. With a great deal of product
differentiation between grains, the EC has traditionally imported certain types that it has
had a deficit in. A priori. this can be expected to continue in the future for a number of
reasons. Firstly. with controls on production being tightened with the MacSharry
reforms. it seems unlikely that production will be allowed to expand markedly, even
into these deficit cereal types. Moreover. climatic and other 'natural' factors are likely to
ensure that the EC cannot expand production of these cereals significantly. Secondly,
trade agreements. such as between the EC and the US following Spain's accession to
the Community are geared to ensuring past trade patterns aren't altered dramatically. In
particular. they are set up to guarantee the US in particular continued market access for
certain cereal types to certain markets.
In the other direction. even if the reform package does dramatically cut EC cereals
production. with a large surplus already existing as well as historically unprecedented
levels of cereals intervention stocks. it seems unlikely that the EC will need to
INCREASE its imports significantly in the short term.
This work will follow Rayner et al (forthcoming) and assume imports continuing at
a level of 5 million tonnes per year.
8.6.2: Cereals Exports
Following the work of Chapter 5. the quantity of cereals exports. more accurately
defined at this stage as the quantity of cereals available for export. shall be estimated as
the residual of total available supplies (defined as production plus imports), minus total
internal use. or quantity of cereals consumed. Initially this analysis will ignore sales of
'surplus' cereals into intervention stores. If the simplifying assumption is made
however that there are only two outlets for surplus cereals - sale into intervention or
sale to third countries; and that all. or nearly all. the quantity sold into intervention
eventually is sold onto third country markets. then this isn't a problem. The analysis
can then readily be amended later to account for this. once a figure for disposable
cereals surplus is established. If the figure for exports plus intervention purchases
(effectively what is being estimated by Q+M-C), is considered. then the figures shown
below for the estimates of exportable surplus under the different scenarios aren't as
high relatively as they at first appear.
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MacSharry hasel: T base 1:T ML base 2: T base2:TML
1992 46426.62 42894.18 44326.11 42894.18 44326.11
1993 37036.31 44299.24 46305.99 42090.10 44080.63
1994 14791.57 46624.97 48600.87 46807.77 48799.53
1995 17658.43 48858.27 51251.82 51537.35 53989.68
1996 13141.36 51094.10 53586.01 56372.79 58968.16
1997 22758.37 53361.12 56193.31 61344.15 64343.20
1998 26008.63 55667.57 58672.70 66461.51 69697.34
1999 34429.95 58015.31 61324.51 71728.65 75352.55
8.1;EXPQrlB~[undEstimaliQn
As was discussed in Chapter 4. the calculation of refunds for exports from the open
market is, in essence. hased on the EC's internal market price and the third country
price at which exporters feel their exports will be competitive with grain from other
exporting countries. From earlier work. the unit export refund can therefore be
estimated as the difference between the EC's price15 and the third country selling price
of EC exports. In tum, this last price can be related to the 'world price' of cereals
exports from other exporters. The main quantities considered are generally 'hard'
wheats not produced in great quantities in the EC. and which fetch a price premium
over EC standard wheat on the world market. Thus the third-country selling price of
EC exports can either be conceived directly. or as a percentage of the third country
selling price of cereals from other exporters. The other factor to consider is the
ECU:US Dollar exchange rate. Thus changes in this can affect the third country selling
price of EC exports (world prices generally denominated in US dollars) with all other
factors being held equal. The following regression incorporates such factors:
rl = 0.998zt + 4O.879kt
(8.394) (6.394) 0.500 0.468 1.160
where T, is the unit export refund. Zt is the gap between the EC internal price and the
ECU 'world' price, and k, is the exchange rate (given as number of ECU per dollar). Tt
and ZI can be found in Appendix 18. and k, in Appendix 6. The coefficient of 0.998
shows that movements in the EC market price are just about fully reflected in
movements in the unit export refund. Moreover, there is a gap of nearly $41 per tonne
15 the 'Selling Price of Crop Products'. that is. the market price measured in market ECU (see
Appendix 4).
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between the 'world' price and the third country selling price of EC exports. The DW is
however rather poor.l?
For forecasting purposes. the estimation of unit refund will therefore be based on
the relationship
What this regression says is that the unit ECU refund on exports of cereals from the
EC is related to the gap (in ECU) between the EC market price and the 'world' cereals
price. plus a gap that relates to the fact that EC cereals exports trade at a price below
those cereals whose prices go into the 'world' cereals price (see Appendix 10). This is
measured in dollars like the world price. and must therefore be converted to ECU. Note
that with a world dollar price that appears unrelated to the exchange rate. it matters little
if the unit refund is measured in ECU or dollars. With the expenditure implications for
the EC budget being in ECU, it was therefore decided to look at the unit refund directly
in ECU. This regression is also based on the nominal cereals market price for the EC.
As with all cases before. the assumption will be made that changes in the institutional
prices will be fully reflected in this price series. The changes in EC cereals price will
also be as before. assuming a 3% cut each year under stabilisers. a price freeze on the
1992 price level for the second base scenario. and cuts of 3%. 28.44%. 7.69% and
7.41% under Mac Sharry . Initially. just one exchange rate scenario will be considered,
along with one world price scenario.
Looking first at the exchange rate. it can be seen that other than for the period 1982
to 1986. when the dollar was particularly strong for reasons connected with US
domestic economic policy. the rate has t1uctuated about 0.8 to 0.9 ECU per US dollar.
The average value for the full period. including the early 1980's. is 0.9177 ECU to the
dollar. but with those five years excluded, the average has been 0.8285 ECU to the
dollar. Given the tendency for the exchange rate to fluctuate around this value. it seems
reasonable as a first run to take kt as 0.8285. This implies a future gap of 34 ECU per
tonne between the 'world' price of North American grains and the third country selling
price of EC grains.
16 It is inconclusive at 5%, and only marginally so at 1%.
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Nominal World Cereals Price
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This graph clearly shows how the price fluctuates notably, but around a steady
figure of about $140 per tonne (the actual average is $141 per tonne). Rather than take
this figure however, the 'base' price will be taken as a five year ROLLING average.
This will tend to smooth out the series by 1999, but will pick up something of the
cyclical movement in the short term.
Making these assumptions then gives the following unit refunds for the three
scenarios for the period 1992 to 1999, in ECU per tonne:
year base 1 base 2 MacSharry
1992 72.56 72.56 72.56
1993 63.87 68.38 25.63
1994 60.34 69.22 18.20
1995 60.72 73.85 15.47
1996 56.69 73.93 15.55
1997 50.35 71.59 13.21
1998 46.29 71.39 13.02
1999 43.13 72.00 13.62
Thus it can be seen that, given the assumptions made, by 1995 the internal EC price
will be around 13 to 15 ECU per tonne above the world price.
From this and the data presented above in Section 8.6.2, estimates can be made of
total export refund expenditure assuming that all of the exportable surplus can be and is
exported at the unit refunds estimated:
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Total Refund Expenditures in million ECU.
MacSharry base 1: T base 1:TML base 2: T base2:TML
1992 3368.84088 3112.51747 3216.422 3112.51747 3216.422
1993 949.335683 2688.38534 2815.52458 3029.24995 3166.47441
1994 269.180667 2824.1644 2944.33818 3227.32783 3364.09704
1995 273.219757 3129.56909 3278.48507 3608.21564 3784.9806
1996 204.391871 3195.74814 3342.87808 3777.46398 3961.69462
1997 300.658045 3088.9828 3239.99947 3820.07234 4022.82581
1998 338.532197 3076.36211 3226.14172 3974.34879 4188.89756
1999 468.89138 3093.96095 3250.27512 4176.92177 4415.17378
Thus it can be seen that the moves to reduce the market support price under
Macsharry lead to significant reductions in total refund expenditures, although with the
internal price, under the given assumptions, not reaching the level of the world price,
these expenditures do not fall to zero. Moreover, as has been hinted throughout this
chapter, under the assumptions that prices are frozen after 1995, rather than cut further,
refund expenditures start to rise again under MacSharry. It is clear however that these
figures are still well below the sums indicated by the base scenarios.
These figures can further be amended to examine the impact of different world
prices on the MacSharry estimation. Taking the world price figures in the above
calculations as 'average', the figures can be re-estimated using 'high' and 'Iow' world
prices. The high price is taken as the average world dollar price plus $20 per tonne, and
the low price is taken as the average price minus $20 per tonne. This gives the
following unit refund levels:
rt average Pw rt high Pwl? rt low Pw
1992 72.5626944 55.9926944 89.1326944
1993 25.6325661 9.06256605 42.2025661
1994 18.1982432 1.6282432 34.7682432
1995 15.4724855 0 32.0424855
1996 15.5533324 0 32.1233324
1997 13.2108764 0 29.7808764
1998 13.tH61481 0 29.5861481
1999 13.6187068 0 30.1887068
17 It is very important to note that here. and in many of the following tables. the zero reflects the fact
that in estimating that particular number. the estimated value came out as a negative. Negative unit
refunds. export quantities etc have no economic meaning however. and are therefore recorded as zero.
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The significance of the high world price scenario is that by 1995, internal and world
prices arc at the same level, and therefore no export refunds are needed.
MacS av Pw MacS high Pw MacS low Pw
1992 3368.84088 2599.55173 4138.13003
1993 949.335683 335.644013 1563.02735
1994 269.180667 24.0842802 514.277053
1995 273.219757 0 565.819894
1996 204.391871 0 422.144132
1997 300.658045 0 677.764276
1998 338.532197 0 769.495218
1999 468.89138 0 1039.39563
For 1999, the high and low world price scenarios represent price levels of plus and
minus 14.75% of the average world price. This however eliminates the need for export
refunds under the high price scenario, but leads to an increase in refund expenditure
under the low price scenario of over 120%.
8.8: INTERVENTION OPERATIONS
The calculations presented above assume that all of the exportable surplus is
exported in the year of production, and without passing through intervention first.
Consideration of USDA data for imports and exports to and from the main exporters
and importers suggests that import opportunities are going to get tighter. Export
opportunities too look like they will get harder. The total export market is generally
fairly static, with the US holding its market share. With the recently announced
expansion of its EEP programme, and Canadian and Australian exports generally stable
and well-established, the EC will probably find it very difficult to increase exports.
Given the recent expansion of the EEP programme, then it seems reasonable to take
a maximum export figure of about 30 million tonnes each year from the EC. This is a
somewhat artificial assumption, as there are many factors determining export
opportunities, hut it is illustrative of something that might happen. This means that if
this is a correct assumption, then the EC are going to have to resort even more to
intervention under the base scenarios, although under MacSharry the exportable surplus
falls very rapidly. If the assumption is made that the unit export refund from the open
market is equal to the unit 'export refund' from intervention, then the only factors to
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consider are the storage costs. If it is further assumed that carryover stocks from 1991
to 1992 are 18 million tonnes. and that sales from intervention back onto the domestic
EC market require no budget expenditure. then it is possible to very roughly estimate
stock figures each year on which storage costs are payable. Net domestic intervention
and exports from intervention are estimated from the regressions in Sections 5.5.2 and
5.5.3 respectively. where both are regressed against time and production residuals. The
latter figures are estimated as the difference between the trend of production from 1973
to 1991. extrapolated to 1999. and the production estimates under the five different
scenarios presented in Section 8.4 above.
year MacSharry base 1: T base 1: TML base 2: T base2:TML
1992 205~ 1.063 19379.4874 19846.2958 19379.4874 19846.2958
1993 21328.6525 20325.235 21446.2431 19849.875 20965.5952
1994 13136.622 20683.2926 22448.4425 20683.9705 22449.0055
1995 4748.71861 20400.5885 22946.0344 21867.1904 24431.6848
1996 0 19454.8261 22812.6346 23415.7044 26826.2871
1997 0 17832.8996 22114J)()()4 25355.6382 29743.9086
1998 0 15524.2724 20785.0436 27716.5957 33159.7461
1999 0 12518.948 18858.5181 30529.6447 37154.1864
This suggests that under MacSharry. from 1996. with export opportunities not
constrained as production falls under the price cuts imposed. then intervention will play
no major role in holding stocks over one year.
As a simple comparison of policies however. the following figures relate to costs of
holding those stocks retained for over one year. The main problem is getting accurate
estimates of the storage costs themselves. Direct contact with the EC Commission lead
to the answer that for commercial and trade reasons. the member states. who operate
the intervention policies. are most unwilling to reveal these figures. An estimate was
therefore derived by looking at closing stock levels and technical and financing cost
expenditures for a period in the 1980·s. From this. a unit storage cost of about 25 ECU
per tonne seems an acceptable figure. Note that with compulsory stock depreciation.
this figure only considers the technical costs of storage. It is assumed that financing
costs are small enough to ignore with the depreciation policy (figures in '000 ECU):
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year MacSharry base I: T base I: TML base 2: T base2: TML
1992 513276.575 484487.184 496157.395 484487.184 496157.395
1993 533216.3 I3 508130.875 536156.078 496246.874 524139.881
1994 328415.551 517082.315 561211.061 517099.263 561225.138
1995 118717.965 510014.713 573650.86 546679.76 610792.12
1996 0 486370.653 570315.864 585392.611 670657.177
1997 0 445822.489 552850.011 633890.956 743597.716
1998 0 388106.811 519626.09 692914.892 828993.652
1999 0 312973.701 471462.952 763241.119 928854.661
It can be assumed that the negative figures for MacSharry simply indicate that after
that period. costs will be negligible. Thus the export costs of the policy as estimated
above without reference to intervention can have these above figures added to them.
This therefore makes allowance for the additional costs of storing some surplus first.
prior to export. given the assumptions set out above.
8.9: COMPENSATORY PAYMENTS
Under the MacSharry reforms. two different and distinct compensatory payments
are payable. The first is the payment designed to offset the cut in institutional prices,
and is added to the target price each year (now redefined as the reference price for aid)
to give a constant figure of 155 ECU per tonne for each year to 1995/6. This set at 25
ECU per tonne for 1993/4. rising to 35 ECU per tonne in 1994/5 and 45 ECU per
tonne in 199516. For all farmers other than those designated 'small'18. this payment is
made only if the farmer sets aside 15% of his arable land. It is. moreover. an area-
based payment rather than a quantity based payment. The yield is set as a 'regional'
yield. This is set by the national governments. and can be the average yield for the
whole country. or just one region within it. The calculations here will. for simplicity,
work on EC average cereals yields. The payment per hectare can then be calculated
from the compensatory payment per tonne and the average yield figure. The calculation
for the average yield is set out in the relevant legislation.I? The yield figures for the
years 1986187 to 1990/91 are taken. the highest and lowest figures are dropped. and the
average of the other three is taken for the area payment calculation.
A second. separate payment is one due to farmers to compensate for the setting
18That is. those fanning an area giving no more than 92 tonnes at average yields.
19 Article 3. paragraph 2 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1765/92. of 30 June 1992. in OJLl81,
page 12.
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aside of land. This is specified in ECU per hectare, and is set for all years at a level
equal to the area compensatory aid payment due in 1995/6.20
The average yield for 1986 to 1990 from the yield data used earlier is 4.5 tonnes per
hectare. This gives total compensatory payments equal to the figures set out in the table
below. CP is the compensatory payment, and SAP is the set aside compensatory
payment:
year CP (ECUIt)
1993/4 25
1994/5 35
199516 45
Area Aid (ECUlHa) SAP (ECUlHa)
112.5 202.5
157.5
202.5
202.5
202.5
Note that the set aside requirement is for ~ land in total. with the compensation
paid on the basis of cereals compensatory payments.
In determining the area to be set aside, it must be noted that areas set aside under the
old five year set aside scheme are not eligible for compensation under the new system
as well. Farmers can choose to keep their set aside land in the old five year scheme or
transfer it to the new scheme.
A decision must also be made as to the likely allocation of set aside land between
cereals and other eligible crops (principally rape. sunflower and soya. but also peas,
field beans and sweet lupins). Important here is a recent article in Agra Europe.21 It
argues that the cereals to oilseeds price ratio set out in the legislation will result in
farmers concentrating as much of the set aside requirement as possible on non-cereal
crops. For the period 1987 to 1991, the area planted to oilseeds came to an average of
12% of NAA. Ignoring the protein crops included in the regulation, this figure indicates
that farmers overall will be unable to concentrate all the set-aside requirement into
oilseeds. It is under any assumption very unlikely that oilseeds area will fall to zero
overnight. It has also been made known that the US, through the GATT negotiations.
would like the EC oilseeds area to halve. Without trying to justify or defend such a
demand. let it be assumed that. under MacSharry and the relative prices established. the
US's wishes are granted. First however. the total set aside area needs to he established.
This is given by the forecasts of NAA to 1999 (all in '000 Ha):22
20 Aniele 7. paragraph 5.
21 Agra Europe No. 1495. June 12th 1992. page P/lff.
22 Note that land set aside under the five-year set aside scheme is incorporated in the base area, 15% of
which bas 10 be set aside. The only requirement is thai all of this land previously set aside must be
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year NAA MacSharry 15% SA area
1992 41129.55 6169.43
1993 40489.25 6073.39
1994 40153.13 6022.97
1995 41734.77 6260.21
1996 40945.92 6141.89
1997 42155.93 6323.39
1998 41633.71 6245.06
1999 42374.85 6356.23
The area planted to oilseeds in the EC rose significantly for a number of years, but
has recently flattened out (subject to fluctuations under the stabiliser mechanism
discussed in Section 4.2.2). The average for the years 1987 to 1991 is just under 4.8
million hectares, with the last two figures around 5 million hectares. 1992 plantings
were already starting to fall, given the uncertainty surrounding the 1991 reforms of the
oilseeds regime, so let it be assumed that the points noted lead to a fall in oilseeds area
of 2.5 million hectares.
This means that each year, 2.5 million hectares of the area to be set aside, as shown
above, is to be taken out of the area planted to oilseeds (assuming a total oilseeds area
figure of 5 million hectares). The following figures therefore show the amount of set
aside land taken from the cereals area, and the resulting cereals area net of this:
year cereals SA area - no SA area with SA
1992 3669.43 34967.57 31298.14
1993 3573.39 34129.22 30555.83
1994 3522.97 33508.25 29985.28
1995 3760.21 34453.12 30692.91
1996 3641.89 33481.01 29839.12
1997 3823.39 34140.75 30317.36
1998 3745.06 33394.63 29649.57
1999 3856.23 33663.09 29806.87
Thus with the set aside requirement allocated between cereals and oilseeds under the
given assumptions, cereals area will tend settle fairly rapidly at about 30 million
hectares.
cultivated in the first year of the operation of the new policy. as pari of the rotation requirements set
down to minimise the problem of slippage.
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The following table then shows the cost of compensatory payments and set aside
compensatory payments (Cl' and SAP) under Mac.Sharry, and assuming that the levels
of aid in 1995 continue to the end of the forecast period:
year ep area aid area for ep area payments SAP SA area SA payments
1992 na 34960.12 mEeU 6169.43 mEeU
1993 25 112.5 34415.86 3871.78 202.5 6073.39 1229.86
1994 35 157.5 34130.16 5375.50 202.5 6022.97 1219.65
1995 45 202.5 35474.55 7183.60 202.5 6260.21 1267.69
1996 45 202.5 34804.03 7047.82 202.5 6141.89 1243.73
1997 45 202.5 35832.54 7256.09 202.5 6323.39 1280.49
1998 45 202.5 35388.65 7166.20 202.5 6245.06 1264.62
1999 45 202.5 36018.62 7293.77 202.5 6356.23 1287.14
One key point arising from this table is that with area stabilising under MacSharry,
expenditures on the two compensatory payments stabilise at around 8.5 billion ECU.
The impact of this reduction in cereals area however must now be traced back
through production to exports and export refund costs. The following table compares
the MacSharry reforms on export refund expenditures with and without the 15% set
aside requirement:
With set aside Without set aside
year Production Exports unit ref ref exp Production Exports ref exp
1992 162928.27 27324.71 72.56 1982.75 182030.18 46426.62 3368.84
1993 161104.87 18195.71 25.63 466.40 179945.47 37036.31 949.34
1994 139242.98 0 18.20 0 155602.64 14791.57 269.18
1995 140964.77 388.71 15.47 6.01 158234.49 17658.43 273.22
1996 135687.15 0 15.55 0 152247.87 13141.36 204.39
1997 143004.06 4723.81 13.21 62.41 161038.62 22758.37 300.66
1998 145081.19 7683.34 13.02 100.01 163406.49 26008.63 338.53
1999 151313.16 14854.00 13.62 202.29 170889.12 34429.95 468.89
As was done earlier in the chapter. the calculations for export refund expenditure
with set aside too can be re-estimated with different world price assumptions:
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year refexp high Pw refexp low Pw
1992 1529.984 2435.525
1993 164.8998 767.90569
1994 0 0
1995 0 12.455214
1996 3.476359 0
1997 0 140.67933
1998 0 227.32032
1999 0 448.4228
The earlier sections of this chapter showed the importance of the price cuts under
MacSharry on the cereals market and expenditure on supporting cereals. This table
shows that the impact of the compulsory set aside requirement on production and
export refund expenditures is also very important within that.23 What has also been
shown however is that the cost of the compensatory payments will, as many expected,
push up the cost of the cereals regime to the EC hudget. The main way in which this
has been illustrated in this chapter is by assuming that there is no reduction in the
compensatory payments to farmers after the initial period to 1995.
Cenain assumptions can therefore be made in order to allow for estimates of the
impact of degressive compensatory payments. In the Agra Europe from immediately
after the reform agreement-s. there is a quote from Ray MacSharry on this matter.
When asked if the payments would be degressive or not, he is reported to have said that
they would he "fixed in stone until 1997 .... What the following calculations assume is
that from 1997. the CP level falls. The first set of figures assume it falls by 5 ECU per
tonne per year, and the second by lO ECU per tonne. In both cases it is assumed that
the level of the set-aside compensatory payment falls each year in line with the falling
~ aid payment
year CP area aid area for CP area payments SAP SA area SA payments
1992 na 34960.12 mECU 6169.43 mECU
1993 25 112.5 34415.86 3871.78 202.5 6073.39 1229.86
1994 35 157.5 34130.16 5375.50 202.5 6022.97 1219.65
1995 45 202.5 35474.55 7183.60 202.5 6260.21 1267.69
23 The incorporation of set aside, the impact of MacSharry etc does not assume that fewer EC exports
has no impact on the world price. Specifically, it assumes that fewer EC exports has no impact on the
inlemational trading price of certain North American hard wheats and Canadian barley.
24 Agra Europe No 1492, 22nd May 1992, page P/12.
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1996 45 202.5 34804.03 7047.82 202.5 6141.89 1243.73
1997 40 180 35832.54 6449.86 180 6323.39 1138.21
1998 35 157.5 35388.65 5573.71 157.5 6245.06 983.60
1999 30 135 36018.62 4862.51 135 6356.23 858.09
year CP area aid area for CP area payments SAP SA area SA payments
1992 na 34960.12 mECU 6169.43 mEeU
1993 25 112.5 34415.86 3871.78 202.5 6073.39 1229.86
1994 35 157.5 34130.16 5375.50 202.5 6022.97 1219.65
1995 45 202.5 35474.55 7183.60 202.5 6260.21 1267.69
1996 45 202.5 34804.03 7047.82 202.5 6141.89 1243.73
1997 35 157.5 35832.54 5643.63 157.5 6323.39 995.93
1998 25 112.5 35388.65 3981.22 112.5 6245.06 702.57
1999 15 67.5 36018.62 2431.26 67.5 6356.23 429.05
Thus the three alternatives give the following figures for the total of compensatory
payments plus set aside compensatory payments:
year no cut in CP 5% cut in CP 10% cut in CP
1992
1993 5101.65 5101.65 5101.65
1994 6595.15 6595.15 6595.15
1995 8451.29 8451.29 8451.29
1996 8291.55 8291.55 8291.55
1997 8536.58 7588.07 6639.56
1998 8430.83 6557.31 4683.79
1999 8580.91 5720.60 2860.30
This clearly shows the significance of cutting the compensatory payments. a cut of
5 ECU per year from 1997 cuts 1999 expenditure by 33% (this results from a cut in the
1999 CP of 22% compared with the base scenario). A 10 ECU cut lowers expenditure
by 55% (a 67% cut in the base 1999 CP).
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8. 10; CONCLUSION
This chapter has developed the work of Chapters 6 and 7 to produce estimates of
future expenditures incurred in supporting the cereals regime to 1999 under different
policy assumptions. The three basic scenarios developed are firstly where there is a
strict continuation of the stabiliser system, one where the policy is unreformed and real
prices are held at their 1992 levels, and one where the MacSharry reforms are imposed.
The first two 'base' scenarios are further developed by considering two different
estimates for cereals area. The consequences of the MacSharry reform package are
examined by considering the likely future budgetary expenditures with and without the
compulsory set aside requirement. The impact of 'high' and 'low' world prices is also
considered.
Examining first the impact of different policy scenarios on export refund
expenditure, the following results have been obtained:
basel:T base I: T ML base 2: T base 2: TML
1992 3112.51747 3216.422 3112.51747 3216.422
1993 2688.38534 2815.52458 3029.24995 3166.47441
1994 2824.1644 2944.33818 3227.32783 3364.09704
1995 3129.56909 3278.48507 3608.21564 3784.9806
1996 3195.74814 3342.87808 3777.46398 3961.69462
1997 3088.9828 3239.99947 3820.07234 4022.82581
1998 3076.36211 3226.14172 3974.34879 4188.89756
1999 3093.96095 3250.27512 4176.92177 4415.17378
This compares with the following estimates under the MacSharry reforms. The first
table presents refunds under average high and low world prices with exports based on
no set aside, with the second table examining the impact of set aside on this
expenditure.
average Pw high Pw low Pw
1992 3368.84088 2599.55173 4138.13003
1993 949.335683 335.644013 1563.02735
1994 269.180667 24.0842802 514.277053
1995 273.219757 0 565.819894
1996 204.391871 0 422.144132
1997 300.658045 0 677.764276
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1998 :nXSUI97 0 769.495218
1999 468.891 ~8 0 1039.39563
year average Pw refexp high Pw refexp low Pw
1992 1982.75 1529.984 2435.525
1993 466.40 164.8998 767.90569
1994 0 0 0
1995 6'<>1 0 12.455214
1996 0 0 0
1997 62.41 0 140.67933
1998 100.01 0 227.32032
1999 202.29 0 448.4228
If however not all of the exportable surplus can be exported in anyone year, some
will have to he sold into intervention. Allowing for this, and also the stock overhang of
large carryover stocks from earlier years. the following table summarises the additional
costs of having to store a certain amount of the exportable surplus2S, given an
assumed ceiling on the total amount of exports possible in anyone year:
year MacSharry base 1: T base I:TML base 2: T base2:TML
1992 513276.575 484487.184 496157.395 484487.184 496157.395
1993 533216.313 508130.875 536156.078 496246.874 524139.881
1994 328415.551 517082.315 561211.061 517099.263 561225.138
1995 118717.965 510014.713 573650.86 546679.76 610792.12
1996 0 486370.653 570315.864 585392.611 670657.177
1997 0 445822.489 552850.011 633890.956 743597.716
1998 0 388106.811 519626.09 692914.892 828993.652
1999 0 312973.701 471462.952 763241.119 928854.661
The main way in which the MacSharry policy differs from the base policies in terms
of expenditures incurred by the EC budget is with regard to the direct payments made to
farmers.
25 It is assumed. for simplicity. that the unit export refund on exports from the open market. and the
equivalent figure for eXJlOl1.I1 from the open market, are identical. Thus total refund expenditure remains
unchanged. rcgardles.1Iof where the exports originate. The only difference is that cereals that have been
stored farst incur these additional costs for the budget.
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The table below indicates estimates of expenditures incurred on hoth the
compensatory payment made for lower support prices (CP). as well as the payments
made to compensate for the setting aside of land (SAP). The first column assumes no
cut in compensatory payments after 1996. with the second and third columns assuming
different rates of cut in those payments:
year no cut in ep 5% cut in CP 10% cut in CP
1992
1993 5101.65 5101.65 5101.65
1994 6595.15 6595.15 6595.15
1995 8451.29 8451.29 8451.29
1996 8291.55 8291.55 8291.55
1997 8536.58 7588.07 6639.56
1998 8430.83 6557.31 4683.79
1999 8580.91 5720.60 2860.30
Thus an examination of the 1999 expenditure estimates reveals the following.
Export refunds under no policy change (base 2) could range from 4176 to 4415 million
ECU. If prices were to be cut under a strict continuation of the stabiliser mechanism
(base I). this figure falls to between 3100 and 3250 million ECU. Under MacSharry,
the fall is very significant. Without the set aside requirement. expenditures fall to zero
under a high world price scenario, 469 million ECU under an average price scenario,
and 1040 million ECU under a low price scenario. With the set aside requirement. these
figures fall to zero. 202 million ECU and 448 million ECU respectively.
To these must be added intervention storage costs. under base 2. these could be as
high as 763 to 929 million ECU under base scenario 2, or 313 to 471 million ECU
under a continuation of stabilisers. Under MacSharry however. by 1999 they could,
under the given assumptions. fall to zero.
Thus the sum of refund and intervention costs in 1999 under the three scenarios
(base 1. base 2 and MacSharry) are therefore 3413 to 3721 million ECU for a
continuation of stabilisers, 4939 to 5344 million ECU for hase 2 ( a real price freeze
from 1992). and a maximum of 450 million ECU under MacSharry.
To this last figure however must be added the combined cost of the two types of
compensatory payment availahle under MacSharry. These come to 8580 million ECU if
there is no cut in the hasic payment per tonne from 1997 to 1999. 5720 million ECU if
there is a 22% cut hy 1999 and 2860 with a 67% cut.
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If the MacSharry reforms are therefore to achieve budgetary savings in the long
term (here given as 1999). then the implication of these calculations is clear: the level of
the compensatory payments must be cut. and they must be cut significantly. Even if
they are not cut until 1997. it is possible to realise savings for the budget (relative to
alternative policy scenarios) very quickly. Without this however. the EC will have
adopted an even more expensive policy than it had with stabilisers.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION. POLICY IMPLICA TIONS.
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The budget of the European Communities has historically been dominated by
expenditure on agricultural price support, under the mechanisms of the Common
Agricultural Policy. The share of the total EC budget taken up by agriculture has ranged
from nearly 80% in 1973 to just- under 60% in 1990. Initially it was accepted that the
CAP would take a high percentage of the budget, as it was the only common policy that
had been developed - as time went on, more common policies would be formed, and
the share of the budget taken by the CAP would naturally decline. As things turned out
however, this was not the case. Rising production generated progressively higher
budgetary expenditures at a time when the European Communities were looking to
develop new policies. By the time the decision came to move the EC forward to become
a single market, the level of agricultural expenditure was so high that the Community
was technically bankrupt.
During the 1980's, rising agricultural production had generated surpluses that were
causing the EC in general, and the Commission in particular, a great deal of political
embarrassment. Not only did the media pick up on stories like cheap butter being sold
to Russia, but the well publicised build-up of intervention stocks came at a time when
there were a number of major famines in the third world. It has however never been
these pressures that have encouraged the EC to attempt major reforms of the CAP. The
main pressure for reform has consistently been budgetary, and reform agreements have
always been preceded by financial difficulties.
The historical basis of the CAP was discussed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the
support policies operated by certain countries that would later become members of the
EC were examined. This was done in the context of the financial transfers between
producers, consumers and taxpayers. in order to understand both the political and
economic influences that acted to shape the CAP. It demonstrated that France and
Germany, who were most closely involved in the formation of the CAP, had a history
of policies that transferred income from consumers to taxpayers via high market prices.
In contrast, the UK and Denmark, who joined subsequently, more commonly operated
policies that let consumers buy food at low prices, with support for farmers coming
more from direct government payments.
This chapter went on to confirm that it was the rise in agricultural production,
stimulated by such a high price policy, that led to the rise in productivity and the
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consequent higher expenditures. It also explored the issue of funding the EC budget It
thus demonstrated why a country such as the UK. relatively poor in GNP per capita
terms. should find itself paying a relatively large share towards the EC budget.
Chapter 3 then took up the ideas developed in Chapter 2 to give the background to
the first of the major reform packages of the CAP. These 1988 reforms linked the two
issues of agricultural reform and budgetary reform and control. producing the two
linked policies of stabilisers and budgetary discipline. It was seen from this that whilst
at the time they were heralded as a major breakthrough in policy reform, they were
fundamentally t1awed. It had been argued by many that the main problem with the main
tools of support under the CAP was that they were open-ended. Thus support was
offered on all production, regardless of the volume. Many felt that the system of
maximum guaranteed quantities had ended this. In fact, even under stabilisers, support
has been open ended. Farmers have still b~en able to get support for all their
production; the only consequence of the MGQ has been that the production has been
eligible for support at a slightly lower price the following year. Thus production and
expenditure levels have continued to rise. The growth in support expenditure did slow
down at this time. but this has been shown to be due to a drought in the US rather than
these reforms.
The three appendices to Chapter 3 then examined budgetary issues that have a direct
consequence for agricultural expenditure. The first demonstrated how uncontrolled
growth in agricultural expenditure. against a budgetary ceiling as exists with the EC
budget, can lead eventually to a financial crisis. This shows clearly what happened to
the EC budget through the early 1980's. The second appendix focused on the way in
which intervention stocks are dealt with financially. With lax budgetary rules, a budget
nearing exhaustion. and rising surplus production. it was shown how the BC attempted
to limit current support expenditures by selling into intervention rather than to third
countries, only to raise the total cost in the long term. It also showed how the 1988
reforms attempted to resolve this problem. and how. if the same surplus was to build
up again. the financial consequences would be felt immediately by the EC budget. The
third appendix then considered the significance of the US$:ECU exchange rate to the
budget. It showed that. ceteris paribus. changes in this exchange rate would increase
or decrease the total amount of support expenditure on the CAP. because of the
importance of this rate in determining the level of export refunds, coupled to the
significance of these refunds in total CAP support expenditure.
Chapter 4 look the general policies discussed in the preceding two chapters, and
examined them in detail for two particular sectors. cereals and oilseeds. The cereals
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sector is currently the second biggest spending sector under the CAP. with oil seeds
being one half of the biggest spender (oils and fats). These sectors were chosen for this
reason. and also the significant economic links that exist between the two sectors.
The nature of the different ways in which financial transfers have been effected
under the two regimes were highlighted. and how oilseeds took a higher share of the
EC budget relative to total production than did cereals. This chapter examined in detail
how expenditures under the two regimes are determined. It also considered how
financial mismanagement and fraud can adversely affect attempts at controlling
budgetary expenditures on these two sectors. In preparation for subsequent chapters.
the details of the 1992 MacSharry reforms (the second major reform package of the
CAP) were also discussed. although they were given less weight here as the focus was
more historical, detailing the causes of the build up of surpluses and expenditures.
Chapter 5 then went on from Chapter 4 to analyse the operation of the cereals
market in much greater detail. Utilising the fact that most key variables in the market
trend over time. it showed how. with cereals consumption fairly stable, the rise in
production has been reflected in a fall in imports and a rise in exports. It went on to
examine the importance of intervention operations in the short tenn management of the
cereals market. It showed that. on average. sales of grain to intervention account for
less than 4% of total production. If the rise in production is considered however
intervention lakes. at the margin, 15% of production. This analysis suggested moreover
that intervention does not play any long term role in the operation of the cereals market.
It is used much more as a short term stabilising instrument. with the rise in volumes
sold into intervention matched overall by a rise in volumes sold out of intervention in
the medium to long term. The significance of this was drawn out by the residuals
analysis. thai showed thai changes in intervention account for (or absorb) 30% of
production variation around trend. The main variable absorbing production variation
however was shown to he net trade. absorbing 50% of production variation. The
remaining 20% was accounted for by changes in consumption.
From Chapters 4 and 5. it was made clear that the two most important variables in
determining the level of expenditure on cereals were production and consumption.
Chapters 6 and 7 therefore took this up. modelling each in turn in order to allow
forecasting in Chapter 8.
Chapler 6 examined production as the product of area and yield. Yield was
represented a..s being a function of time. generally thought of as being a proxy variable
for technological change. and the ratio of cereals to fertiliser prices. Thus yields were
linked to farmers costs and returns. as well as a key input influencing yield levels.
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Area on the other hand was modelled indirectly. Net arable area was modelled first,
with the percentage of this planted to cereals modelled separately. and the area planted
to cereals derived from these figures. This approach was important in the work of
Chapter 8. as the MacSharry reforms also relate to arable crops as a whole. rather than
cereals in isolation.
In analysing cereals consumption. Chapter 7 broke the data down into its five
constituent parts. Losses and seed. the two smallest elements. were shown to be
relatively stable. Human consumption is rising. but at a progressively slower rate over
time. as microeconomic theory suggests it should. Industrial uses of cereals appear to
be growing at a fairly steady rate.
The single largest element in cereals use. and the part on which this chapter
focussed on most. was animal feed. The analysis took the approach of examining the
share of cereals in total feed use. A weighted index of total feed use was constructed for
this purpose. The analysis also constructed a series relating different animals to a
common base - their dependence on cereals as a provider of energy. It further related
cereals' share of total feed to the relative prices of cereals and non-cereals inputs in
feed.
Chapters 6 and 7 then formed the basis for the analysis. presented in Chapter 8, of
the impact of agricultural policy reforms on cereals budget expenditure. The impact of
the MacSharry reforms was compared to two bases - the first was a strict continuation
of the stabiliser price cuts through to 1999. The second was a price freeze. in real
terms, from 1992 to 1999. to allow comparison with an unreformed policy.
One feature of the work on cereals yields that would impact significantly on the rest
of the chapter was the estimated impact on cereals yields of the very large price cut from
199212 LO 1993/4. Whilst debatable. it needs to be remembered that there has never, in
the lifetime of the CAP. been a year to year cereals price cut of that order of magnitude.
Even so. the yield figure forecast for 1994 under Mae'Sharry is still only the same as the
1989 level.
The initial cereals area estimate then assumes no set aside requirement. This allows
comparison later between MacSharry with and without this aspect. in order to assess
the impact on expenditures of taking this land out of production.
When considering total internal use, or consumption. it was shown that initially, the
large price cut to 1993/4 results in cereals use in animal feed rising. and hence total
consumption rising. After that time however. total use starts to fall again, albeit at a
slower rate.
When examining cereals trade. Chapter 8 argued that it was reasonable to assume a
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stable figure for imports over the next few years. From the figures of production,
consumption and imports thus estimated, figures for the exportable surplus were
derived. From this, an estimate of export refund expenditure was made assuming no
restriction on the total volume of cereals the EC could export each year. The financial
consequences of placing cereals in store, only for them to be exported later that same
year, were ignored. The following section however produced expenditure estimates
under the assumption that world market conditions limited the export opportunities for
the EC. Thus some of the exportable surplus had to be placed in store instead. Note that
the difference in expenditures between the MacS harry scenario and the four base
scenarios depends not only on the exportable surplus from 1992, but also the extent to
which the EC is able to dispose of the stock overhang. Stocks in 1991 were around 18
million tonnes. Just prior to the time of writing, they had risen to over 22 million
tonnes. With a rising exportable surplus and large carryover stocks, the EC could face a
rapid rise in budgetary expenditures in trying to dispose of this total surplus. Given the
limits on expenditure discussed in appendix 1 of Chapter 3, and the reform of the
financial treatment of stocks discussed in appendix 2 of Chapter 3, the consequences
could be disastrous for the EC budget. It is therefore vital for the EC that the cuts in
production and exponable surplus, predicted in Chapter 8, are realised.
Offsetting export refund and intervention storage expenditure savings realised from
the Macsharry reforms however is the added cost of the two types of compensatory
payment discussed in detail in Chapter 8. Under the initial assumption of no cuts in the
level of these payments through to the end of the forecast period in 1999, it was
demonstrated that the total cost of supporting the cereals regime will actually rise
relative to the base alternatives. Note that this also assumed that there would be no
slippage with the set aside land. This assumption is justified if it is also assumed that
the rotational requirement placed on the land under MacSharry is fully implemented and
fully effective. Thus farmers will not be able to set aside just their lower yielding land,
but must set aside all of their land in turn. The only qualification to the forecasts that
needs to be made therefore is that in anyone year, if lower than average or higher than
average yielding land is set aside, production may be higher of lower than forecast,
thus leading to higher or lower budgetary expenditures. On average however, over the
period to 1999, the impact of this should be neutral.
Chapter 8 also had to assess how much of the land needed to be set aside would be
taken from area previously planted to cereals. Given research referred to above from
Agra Europe, it was felt that farmers would try to concentrate set aside onto land on
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which crops other than cereals had been grown. Thus oilseeds would take a share of set
aside well in excess of their share in net arable area.
Finally calculations were made to assess the impact for the budget of reducing the
level of compensatory payments after 1996. Two alternative scenarios wee examined,
and it was concluded that total budgetary savings could be realised, but only if the cuts
were of a significant size. One point in favour of such action however was shown to be
that if these cuts ARE made, then budgetary savings can be realised very quickly.
This highlights another feature of the budgetary impact of the MacSharry reforms.
Given that a much higher proportion of total expenditure will now be dependent on
fixed direct payments rather than market vagaries, it should become much easier to get a
more accurate forecast of future budgetary expenditures. In the past, mechanisms such
as guarantee thresholds, as well as certain aspects of the budgetary discipline rules,
have proved ineffective in keeping budgetary expenditure within the required guideline.
Now however, a system is in place that gives the Commission a much more effective
tool with which to control expenditure, if they need and wish to.
Thus the main policy implications to be drawn from the findings of Chapter 8 are
therefore that the MacSharry reforms offer an ideal opportunity to reduce expenditure
on agriculture and free budgetary resources for other policies. For this to be realised
however, the level of compensatory payments must be reduced. If they are, significant
savings can be realised very quickly. If they are not however, the new policy could
well turn out to be more expensive than the stabiliser system it replaces next year.
One of the major limitations inherent in modelling EC policy reforms is the extent to
which one needs to make assumptions regarding the future actions and decisions of the
Council of Ministers and EC Commission, especially the cereals management
committee (in this case). Thus there is much scope for extending the work presented
here to examine different political scenarios, and the extent to which they impact on the
EC budget.
It also needs to be borne in mind that the EC is currently engaged internationally in
agricultural policy reform negotiations under the auspices of GATT. The model
discussed here presents a framework within which it is possible to consider whether or
not the reforms of the CAP, implemented under MacSharry, result in the changes that
the US are demanding for an agreement to be reached. If it is found that the changes
under MacSharry are insufficient to get agreement from the US in GATT, it would be
possible within the framework of the model to see what would have to be changed in
the MacSharry package in order for the EC to match US demands. The model also
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highlights one significant feature of the world cereals market that the negotiating parties
appear to have overlooked - that is the importance of product differentiation in
determining just what the world price is. Thus as the EC exports lower quality grains
than many types exported by the US, Canada and Australia, they will trade
internationally at different prices with, as has been demonstrated above, different unit
refunds (and therefore total refund expenditures) being required.
Intervention activity in the EC has generally been under-researched in the past, and
the models and forms of market analysis developed in Chapters 3 and 5 offer a strong
framework within which this element of the CAP can be examined further. Moreover,
the residuals analysis presented in Chapter 5 allows for the role of intervention in the
cereals market as a whole to be examined more closely, as well as permitting a different
approach to the study of the interaction of all the main variables in the cereals market as
a whole.
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DATA APPENDIX
''The govcm11unt are very {q,en on amassinq statistics. 'They collect
tfum, ada them, raise them. to tfu ntli potaer, ta{q, the cube root and prepare
wonderful tfingrams. 'But you must never forget tliat everyone of these figures
C011US in tfu first instance from tlie viffoge watcliman, Who just puts down
wliat fu damn. well pleases ..
.9I.non!f"U'us,quoted in Sir Josiah Stamp 'Some 'Economic Factors in
Motkm Life, and quoted itself on P39 of the Sliazam manual.
EC 12Cereals Area, Yield and Production
EC12 Cereals Consumption
Price Deflators
Nominal Cereals Price Data
Nominal Fertiliser Prices
Dollar:ECU and ECU .Dollar Exchange Rates
Cereals Substitute Prices
Nominal Oilseed Rape Prices
Nominal Price Indexes
World Cereals Prices
Nominal Intervention Prices
ECIO Intervention Balance Sheet
ECIO/121ntervention Balance Sheet
Arable Areas for NAA Calculation
Quantity of Non-Cereals Inputs in Compound Feed
EC Cereals Import and Export Data
EC 12 Animal Numbers and Milk Production
r, and z, used in export refund estimation
app.I
app.2
app.3
app.4
app.5
app.6
app.7
app.8
app.9
app.lO
app.l1
app.12
app.13
app.14
app.15
app.16
app.17
app 18
EC 12 CEREALS AREA, YIELD AND PRODUcrION
YEAR cereals area cereals yield cereals prod
1973 36678 33.1 121404.2
1974 37031 34 125905.4
1975 36316 31.9 115848.0
1976 36298 29.8 108168.0
1977 35493 34 120676.2
1978 36928 37.1 137002.9
1979 36540 36.2 132274.8
1980 36998 39.1 144662.2
1981 36482 36.8 134253.8
1982 36615 39.7 145361.6
1983 36039 38.3 138029.4
1984 36242 47.7 172874.3
1985 35712 44.9 160346.9
1986 35516 43.4 154139.4
1987 35053 44.1 154583.7
1988 34839 44.4 154685.2
1989 35178 46.4 163225.9
1990 33463 47.1 157610.7
1991 34177 49.6 169517.9
SOURCES:
Eurostat. Agricultural Situation in the Community
HGCA. Weekly Digest
FAO Production Yearbook
app.l
EC12 CEREALS CONSUMPTION
AnimalFeed Losses Seed Human C Ind Use TIU
1973/4 93040.7 1421.1 5711.5 0.0 0.0 143604.6
1974/5 90354.2 1614.9 5409.7 33275.0 0.0 140696.0
1975/6 87265.5 1557.5 5490.5 33525.8 9159.9 136999.2
1976n 86434.0 1462.4 5149.6 33230.2 9895.0 136171.3
1977/8 87096.6 1871.5 5512.1 33833.2 10069.0 138382.3
1978/9 91482.3 2320.5 5645.2 34819.9 10686.0 144953.9
1979/80 91041.4 2756.7 5461.4 35099.7 10681.0 145040.2
1980/1 86475.0 1840.0 5450.0 35502.0 11533.0 140800.0
1981/2 86082.3 2711.8 5495.6 35686.7 10107.0 140083.4
1982/3 86413.3 3058.2 5534.9 34519.5 8273.0 137798.9
1983/4 87610.0 2978.0 5725.0 35263.0 9746.0 141322.0
1984/5 90677.0 2061.0 5860.0 36382.0 9874.0 144854.0
1985/6 88220.0 2033.0 5762.0 36739.0 10040.0 142794.0
1986n 84862.0 2019.0 5643.0 36692.0 10355.0 139571.0
1987/8 81142.0 1890.0 5565.0 36801.0 10686.0 136084.0
1988/9 80970.0 1946.0 5725.0 37039.0 10925.0 136605.0
1989/90 79376.0 1469.0 5381.0 35666.0 11423.0 133315.0
1990/1 80815.0 1949.0 5954.0 37437.0 12717.0 138872.0
1991/2 81191.0 1942.0 6088.0 37330.0 12391.0 138942.0
SOURCES:
Eurostat AgriculturalSituation in the Community
Agra Europe. Agra Europe.
app.2
PRICE DEFLATORS
YEAR UK FR WG EC12
1972 96.21 96.55 97.48 96.69
1973 103.55 104.25 103.20 104.55
1974 115.08 115.17 110.12 116.41
1975 139.73 129.77 117.26 133.00
1976 168.22 145.26 122.85 150.74
1977 192.54 159.63 127.34 168.68
1978 216.63 174.84 132.44 187.51
1979 244.76 192.59 137.93 207.59
1980 286.79 213.65 144.01 232.51
1981 330.06 238.20 150.33 260.14
1982 361.08 266.11 156.65 288.09
1983 384.22 294.67 162.66 315.45
1984 403.20 319.41 166.96 339.64
1985 423.81 340.25 170.46 361.49
1986 442.97 358.94 174.99 382.25
1987 461.41 373.55 179.44 400.53
1988 487.80 385.33 182.57 417.77
1989 521.01 398.24 186.32 437.85
1990 559.36 411.98 192.21 461.52
1991 599.82 426.19 200.00 487.36
SOURCE:
Eurostat European Economy.
app.3
NOMINAL PRICE DATA CECUrrONNE)
Soft Wheat Barley
year Germany France UK Germany France UK
1972 103.3 88.1 69.5 92.8 81.4 63.3
1973 116.7 95.5 96 104.1 83.5 85
1974 128.6 103 120.6 119.6 99.5 115.3
1975 140.3 111.9 101.2 128.8 102.3 101.1
1976 166.2 129.2 116.5 153 118.3 119.7
1977 172.3 133 128.5 157.8 118.4 121
1978 180 138.7 131.5 159 118.8 120.2
1979 182.1 141.6 149.9 164.4 128.3 142
1980 185.4 150.2 167.6 164.6 132.4 156.7
1981 190.1 161.7 198.9 167.4 141.3 184.4
1982 208.5 170.3 204.1 187.2 152.2 198.4
1983 218.4 174.2 215.5 196.7 159.5 204.9
1984 209.8 166.4 192.8 200.4 159.9 190.5
1985 188.9 163.1 189.8 179 153.2 181
1986 192.5 170.9 164.8 175.3 153.9 161.3
1987 191.2 161.5 157.8 173.7 138.5 154.3
1988 175.2 148.2 160.9 161 131.1 160.9
1989 168.8 150.9 161.6 152.7 134.5 165.8
1990 162.9 145.7 158.4 148.3 129.9 156.8
1991 165.8 152.7 168.1 149.8 133 160.2
SOURCES;
Eurostat Agricultural Prices (Annual)
Eurostat. Agricultural Prices (Quarterly)
app.4
NOMINAL FERTILISER PRICES
Year UK France Germany
1973 99.7 103.3 99.5
1974 142.8 153.3 132.3
1975 160.7 180.1 151.4
1976 152.5 170.3 162.9
1977 136.6 169.4 166.5
1978 147.9 177.5 173.3
1979 160.9 185.5 178.7
1980 208 228.6 192.4
1981 253.3 234.8 216
1982 287.4 236.5 240.1
1983 273.8 240.9 233.9
1984 282.6 237.1 227.3
1985 305.8 270 243
1986 238 243.5 243
1987 188.3 202.4 209.6
1988 199.6 206.9 209.2
1989 208.1 215.5 210.1
1990 202.3 212 210.1
1991 202.9 213.5 218.4
SOURCES;
Eurostat. Agricultural Prices (Annual)
Eurostat. Agricultural Prices (Quarterly)
app.5
DOLLAR:ECU AND ECU:DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES
Year lECU:x$ l$:xECU
1973 1.2294 0.8134
1974 1.1916 0.8392
1975 1.2402 0.8063
1976 1.1175 0.8949
1977 1.1408 0.8766
1978 1.273 0.7855
1979 1.3702 0.7298
1980 1.3903 0.7193
1981 1.1148 0.8970
1982 0.9801 1.0203
1983 0.8902 1.1233
1984 0.7877 1.2695
1985 0.7595 1.3167
1986 0.9825 1.0178
1987 1.1535 0.8669
1988 1.1828 0.8455
1989 1.1017 0.9077
1990 1.2712 0.7867
1991 1.2266 0.8153
.soURCE:
Eurostat. European Economy
app.6
CEREALS SUBSTITUTE PRICES IN ECUrrONNE
year Manioc Soya Bean 80%M20%S
Meal
1972/3 0 168.217905 151.396115
1973/4 0 140.91135 126.820215
1974/5 110.180328 125 113.144262
1975/6 103.079555 142.001711 110.863986
1976n 99.1777188 210.212202 121.384615
1977/8 78.4823626 163.519278 95.4897457
1978/9 105.687453 175.304282 119.610819
1979/80 125.090383 170.281996 134.128706
1980/1 128.285946 226.783103 147.985378
1981/2 124.394966 223.939981 144.303969
1982/3 158.148547 226.942949 171.907427
1983/4 151.646635 286.262019 178.569712
1984/5 131.268966 218.731034 148.761379
1985/6 151.88764 199.280899 161.366292
1986n 140.610546 172.756707 147.039778
1987/8 142.201835 192.727273 152.306922
1988/9 138.644068 248.813559 160.677966
1989/90 131.647972 192.95082 143.908542
1990/1 133.281972 151.640986 136.953775
1991/2 141.233766 159.090909 144.805195
SOURCES:
FAO. Production Yearbook.
FAO. Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics.
FAO. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
app.7
NOMINAL OILSEED RAPE PRICES (ECUrrONNE)
year Pn OSR FR Pn OSR WG
1973 191.900 210.600
1974 256.300 246.200
1975 242.200 259.900
1976 262.800 312.500
1977 253.700 336.100
1978 262.600 358.400
1979 290.200 370.900
1980 307.800 378.100
1981 342.600 400.300
1982 374.300 443.400
1983 393.600 481.500
1984 404.800 497.500
1985 410.400 459.900
1986 402.400 461.000
1987 344.300 409.800
1988 330.200 371.300
1989 374.500 404.400
1990 347.700 403.100
1991 271.900 317.300
.soURCES:
Eurostat. Agricultural Prices (Annual)
Eurostat. Agricultural Prices (Quarterly)
app.8
NOMINAL PRICE INDEXES
year cereals an products milk
1973 51.33 64.56 53.14
1974 62.62 62.42 59.57
1975 64.70 73.40 69.30
1976 75.38 79.39 77.01
1977 81.32 84.84 84.45
1978 86.27 89.83 88.07
1979 90.65 93.68 93.24
1980 100.00 100.00 100.00
1981 112.43 113.29 108.14
1982 123.90 126.80 121.30
1983 134.90 128.90 130.20
1984 135.90 134.10 133.30
1985 132.70 137.00 140.10
1986 135.60 133.10 144.50
1987 133.90 129.60 146.30
1988 130.80 134.40 154.40
1989 132.13 149.18 166.17
1990 129.73 141.93 161.97
1991 135.36 138.35
SOURCES:
Eurostat. Agricultural Situation in the Community.
Eurostat Agricultural Prices (Quarterly).
app.9
woRLD CEREALS PRICES
year Wheat Wheat Barley Pw wh Pwcer
allP's US HWNo2 CanCWRS Nol Can NolCW $ $
$/mt ord.protein 13.5% in store instore
fob Gulf Thunder Bay Thunder Bay
1973 127 158 137
1974 165 193 124 174 166
1975 149 172 109 157 149
1976 117 124 92 119 115
1977 113 124 69 117 109
1978 138 151 71 142 130
1979 163 172 85 166 153
1980 164 193 112 174 163
1981 177 196 115 183 172
1982 161 166 91 163 151
1983 158 169 92 162 150
1984 153 165 102 157 148
1985 138 174 89 150 140
1986 115 168 71 133 122
1987 114 133 56 120 110
1988 146 180 83 157 145
1989 171 201 96 181 167
1990 137 156 86 143 134
1991 129 131 66 130 119
SOURCES;
FAO. ProductionYearbook.
FAD. QuarterlyBulletinof Statistics.
FAD. Monthly Bulletinof Statistics.
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NOMINAL INTERVENTION PRICES (ANNUAL AVERAGES)
Units - ua up to 1978179, ECU from 1979/801
year Common Barley
Wheat
1973 109.20 99.29
1974 112.43 100.69
1975 123.32 108.86
1976 133.31 118.33
1977 138.27 123.05
1978 141.64 126.16
1979 155.67 138.82
1980 177.81 158.75
1981 186.54 167.10
1982 199.18 179.65
1983 210.03 190.74
1984 209.91 193.45
1985 198.46 191.00
1986 190.00 186.26
1987 186.07 175.87
1988 183.98 174.98
1989 180.20 171.34
1990 174.41 165.85
1991 172.01 163.63
SOURCES;
EC Commission. Green Europe Newstlashes.
Agra Europe. CAP Monitor.
1 1978179 prices in Eel! and ua ace comparable by multiplying the ua price by 1.208953.
app.ll
ECI0 INTERVENTION BALANCE SHEET
year opst int purch's dom sales netdom int intexports closingst
1975/6 3287 1401 400 1001 1961 2328
I976n 2325 438 658 -220 613 1489
1977/8 1312 1134 693 441 700 1053
1978/9 989 1225 183 1042 393 1641
1979/80 1640 1778 202 1576 937 2280
1980/1 2710 4741 503 4238 3417 3531
1981/2 3484 2432 529 1903 2793 2590
1982/3 2744 7982 520 7462 2699 7502
1983/4 6925 4488 1992 2496 5007 4414
1984/5 4514 13159 156 13003 3281 14233
1985/6 13860 11355 1700 9655 6952 16526
1986n 16702 5664 2572 3092 6352 13413
1987/8 13431 4883 1587 3296 6641 10076
1988/9 11103 3895 1764 2131 5031 8173
1989/90 8179 6910 696 6214 3784 10611
1990/1 10534 7784 1554 6230 1210 15548
1991/2 17309 6962 415 6547 7793 17272
inc'sEG
SOURCES;
HGCA. CerealsStatistics.
HGCA. Weekly Digest.
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ECIOJ12 INTERVENTION BALANCE SHEET
year opst intpurch's dom sales netdom int intexports closingst
1975/6 3287 1401 400 1001 1961 2328
1976n 2325 438 658 -220 613 1489
1977/8 1312 1134 693 441 700 1053
1978/9 989 1225 183 1042 393 1641
1979/80 1640 1778 202 1576 937 2280
1980/1 2710 4741 503 4238 3417 3531
1981/2 3484 2432 529 1903 2793 2590
1982/3 2744 7982 520 7462 2699 7502
1983/4 6925 4488 1992 2496 5007 4414
1984/5 4514 13159 156 13003 3281 14233
1985/6 14620 11548 1704 9844 6973 17454
1986n 17657 6276 3225 3051 6368 14311
1987/8 14283 5197 1951 3246 6643 10876
1988/9 11748 4545 2065 2480 5052 9145
1989/90 9156 7270 761 6509 3802 11860
1990/1 11795 8361 1947 6414 1227 16974
1991/2 18750 7432 415 7017 7886 17877
inc'sEG
SOURCES;
HGCA. CerealsStatistics.
HGCA. Weekly Digest.
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ARABLE AREAS FOR NAA CALCULA nON
year Cereals Area Oilseeds Area Set Aside Area NAA cer%NAA
1973 36678 1001 37679 97.34
1974 37031 1055 38086 97.23
1975 36316 1413 37729 96.25
1976 36298 1110 37408 97.03
1977 35493 1147 36640 96.87
1978 36928 1195 38123 96.87
1979 36540 1319 37859 96.52
1980 36998 1553 38551 95.97
1981 36482 1886 38368 95.08
1982 36615 2261 38876 94.18
1983 36039 2614 38653 93.24
1984 36242 2890 39132 92.62
1985 35712 3223 38935 91.73
1986 35516 3608 39124 90.78
1987 35053 4718 39771 88.14
1988 34839 4525 361 39725 87.70
1989 35178 4425 433 40036 87.87
1990 33463 5263 511 39237 85.28
1991 34177 4929 1455 40561 84.26
SOURCES:
Eurostat. Agricultural Situation in the Community.
HGCA. Weekly Digest.
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OUANTITY OF NON CEREALS INPUTS IN COMPOUND FEED
year Qcersub
1973 37482.4122
1974 37611.4827
1975 38124.4739
1976 43157.9332
1977 45329.5492
1978 49552.9324
1979 55048.8408
1980 55145.5829
1981 57335.0204
1982 59756.8977
1983 59651.101
1984 57656.132
1985 58252.5326
1986 62354.0337
1987 64966.1538
1988 69136.4191
1989 70062.5581
1990 71003.3333
1991 74148.9
SOURCE:
Derived from Eurostat. Agricultural Situation in the Community.
app.15
EC CEREALS IMPORT AND EXPORT DATA
year ECx imports exports
1973/4 9 40319 28151
1974/5 9 21210 10807
1975/6 9 21574 12581
1976n 9 26493 6607
1977/8 10 20256 11281
1978/9 10 19549 15281
1979/80 10 17925 17422
1980/1 10 15426 22390
1981/2 10 14297 22682
1982/3 10 8767 21362
1983/4 10 8688 22336
1984/5 12 13582 29399
1985/6 12 11081 27500
1986{1 12 7050 27302
1987/8 12 7573 26886
1988/9 12 7349 25705
1989190 12 5776 33875
1990/1 12+EG 5899 30624
1991/2 12+EG 4733 33822
SOURCES;
Eurostat. Agricultural Situation in the Community.
Agra Europe. Agra Europe.
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-26.395203
29.288524
-5.8296011
42.081026 30.5889125
44.0814428 42.6765093
74.1188269 38.9315611
88.(1917965 38.9423792
57.696172 40.9827343
50.3881439 18.3687366
53.7833625 30.9041728
70.2474018 23.594465
38.8012564
-3.9272037
42.3357953
-9.950688
72.7899237 45.6961563
121.65414 67.9751963
113.444676 32.7315062
86.7862424 3.79736559
73.2631705 44.667604
95.5284028 57.9002322
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